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I. Introduction
In the United States, the debate over communications issues
like network neutrality, copyright law, and public broadcasting
often seems to be carried out in a constitutional vacuum. The First
Amendment, while understood as a "free speech" protection, is not
infrequently just the opposite - either missing in action, or applied
in a way to lessen the amount and variety of speech, information,
and opinion available to the public. One reason for this, as
developed below, is that the First Amendment is framed
linguistically as a negative - "government shall make no law. ..
abridging the freedom of speech" - and the Courts have generally
focused on the "no law" rather than the "freedom of speech" part of
this command.
This paper compares First Amendment jurisprudence on this
point to a system built on a constitution phrased in the affirmative,
guaranteeing freedom of the press and broadcasting as institutions,
and protecting speech and information flows as dynamic processes.
The German post-war constitution (the Grundgesetz or Basic Law)
was built on the ashes of a fascist dictatorship that had misused
mass communications, and was structured to make such a
catastrophe as unlikely as possible in the future. Article 5 of the
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Basic Law provides for freedoms of speech, information,
broadcasting, and the press; these freedoms are intertwined and
subsumed under the rubric of "communications freedom."' This
paper headlines information freedom as particularly salient in an
Information Age, and particularly evocative of the differences in
constitutional approach between the two countries, but this is not
meant to distort the unified fabric of the German communications
freedoms.
In a dozen or so seminal cases from 1961 to the present, the
German Constitutional Court2 has claimed the media, and
particularly the electronic broadcast media, for the project of self-
government, and has linked the media to dominance-free "opinion-
building" in both the personal and public spheres.3 While the First
1. See Christopher Witteman, Constitutionalizing Communications: The German
Constitutional Court's Jurisprudence of Communications Freedom, 33 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMp. L. REV. 95, 115 (2010) [hereinafter Constitutionalizing Communications]. That
article was itself an update of a student "Note" I had written twenty-seven years
earlier: Christopher Witteman, West German Television Law: An Argument for Media
as an Instrument of Self-Government, 7 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMp. L. REV. 145, 197 (1983)
[hereinafter West German Television Law].
2. Or Bundesverfassungsgericht, which is usually and strictly translated as
Federal Constitutional Court, abbreviated FCC. As this paper deals extensively
with another FCC, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission, the
Bundesverfassungsgericht will be referred to herein as the German Constitutional
Court, or Constitutional Court, or German Court. The U.S. Supreme Court will be
referred to as Supreme Court. Constitutionally, these two highest courts perform in
much the same way, adjudicating constitutional questions presented by clashes
between government divisions and between government and the governed. The
Supreme Court, however, also handles nonconstitutional questions of statutory
interpretation and civil law which in Germany are handled by a separate court, the
Bundesgerichtshof or Federal Court of Justice. See http://www.bverfg.de/en/
index.html FEDERAL COURT OF JUSTICE, Position of the Federal Court of Justice in the
Federal Court System, at 4, available at http://www.bundesgerichtshof.de/
SharedDocs/ Downloads/ EN/ BGH/brochure.pdf?_blob=publicationFile.
3 "Free individual- and public opinion building" (freie individuelle- und
oeffentliche Meinungsbildung) is a recurrent trope in the Court's decisions. See, e.g.,
Constitutionalizing Communications, supra note 1 at 131, n.109, citing 83 BVerfGE 238,
315 (1991); see also 73 BVerfGE 118, 152 (1986). The Article 5 jurisprudence is also
treated in CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 77-81 (1993)
(discussing the specifics of German media jurisprudence); OWEN FIss, THE IRONY OF
FREE SPEECH 6 (1996); John David Donaldson, "Television Without Frontiers": The
Continuing Tension Between Liberal Free Trade and European Cultural Identity, 20
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 90, 143 n.308-09 (1996) ("Europe to a large degree still requires
broadcasters to fulfill a public task obligation"); Stephen A. Gardbaum,
Broadcasting, Democracy and the Market, 82 GEO. L.J. 373, 395-96 n.50 (1993); Vicki C.
Jackson, Holistic Interpretation, Comparative Constitutionalism, and Fiss-ian Freedoms,
58 U. MIAMI L. REv. 265, 297 n.124-25 (2003). For a wide-ranging discussion and
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Amendment is cast in the negative, Article 5 is phrased in the
affirmative, and contains an express guarantee of free media:
Everyone has the right to freely express and disseminate his
opinion by speech, writing and pictures, and to inform himself
from generally accessible sources without hindrance. Freedom of
the press and freedom of reporting by broadcast and film are
guaranteed. There shall be no censorship.4
Despite these differences, both constitutions are animated by similar
democratic concepts; indeed, the Americans and their World War II
Allies were at least partially responsible for Germany's post-war
constitutional scheme, and insisted in particular that broadcasting
be free from both government influence and commercial capture.5
comparison of the British, French, Italian, and United States' approaches to
broadcasting, see ERIC BARENDT, BROADCASTING LAw, A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1993).
4. Grundgesetz for die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [hereinafter Basic Law]
Article 5, paragraph 1, May 23, 1949, REICHSGESETZBLATr, available in English at
https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf and http://www.iuscomp.
org/gla/statutes/GG.htm, in German at http://www.gesetze-im-intemet.de/
bundesrecht/gg/gesamt.pdf ("Jeder hat das Recht, seine Meinung in Wort, Schrift und Bild
frei zu auJern und zu verbreiten und sich aus allgemein zuganglichen Quellen ungehindert zu
unterrichten. Die Pressefreiheit und die Freiheit der Berichterstattung durch Rundfunk und Film
werden gewihrleistet. Eine Zensur findet nicht statt"); see also DONALD KOMMERS, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLic OF GERMANY 404-15 (2d ed.,
1997). Paragraph 2 of Article 5 provides that these "rights shall find their limits in the
provisions of general laws," e.g., in the provisions for the protection of young persons.
Paragraph 3 provides for the related freedoms of art, scholarship, research and teaching.
5. After the war, Americans joined their allies in insisting that the new
broadcasting bodies be decentralized and free of state influence: "It is a basic policy
of the U.S. Military Government that the control of the means of public opinion
such as press and broadcasting be widely distributed, and free of government
control." November 21, 1947 Order of the American Military Governor Lucius
Clay, reprinted in H. BAUSCH, RUNDFUNKPOLITIK NACH 1945 (1980) at 34 (translated
from the German). The British were of a similar mind. BBC journalist Hugh
Carlton Greene, who was assigned to lead the Northwest German Broadcasting Co.
in Hamburg, told his German colleagues, when first he met with them in 1946:
This broadcasting company must never become a party broadcaster, or a
government broadcaster, or the mouthpiece of commercial interests. If I
could sum up the policy of this broadcaster in two words, they would be
dispassionate substantiveness and objectivity (Sachlichkeit und Objektivitat)
in all areas.
Arnulf Kutsch, Unter britischer Kontrolle, Der Zonensender 1945-1948, in DER NDR
ZWISCHEN PROGRAMM UND POLITIK; BEITRAGE ZU SEINER GESCHICHTE 120 (Kohler, ed.
1991); see also Libertus, Essential Aspects Concerning the Regulation of the German
Broadcasting System 4 (Rundfunk Insitut Kdln, Working Paper No. 193, 2004), available
at http://www.rundfunk-institut.uni-koeln.de/institut/pdfs/19304.pdf, at 4 ("[I]t
was the British BBC that served as a role model, exemplifying impartial
broadcasting .... In light of the fresh memories of the abuse of broadcasting by the
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The German Constitutional Court has taken this "free and
democratic" framework much further than its U.S. counterpart.6
As in the United States, the German Court has been vigilant in
detecting and forbidding government actions that might chill the
speech of its citizens. Unlike the United States, however, the
German Court does not limit its gaze to the vertical relationship
between the state and the citizenry, but extends its free speech
thinking to the horizontal dimension of "private" or contractual
relationships among people or groups in society. This enables the
German Court to see potential dangers to speech emanating from
the private sector (what has been called - and is discussed below as
"private censorship"), as well as from the government. In Germany,
the Constitutional Court has required legislators to take affirmative
steps to protect speech - understood as the free flow of information
and opinion in society - from both private censorship and state
control.
Also unlike the United States, the Germans have escaped from
what might be called a speaker fixation, one that renders the First
Amendment into a "freedom of the speaker" rather than a "freedom
of speech." As we will see, at the heart of the net neutrality debate
is the question of whether a network owner is ipso facto a speaker,
and the question within the question of whether the mere
transmission of bits can be considered speech. The post-war
German understanding of "speech" as a process at the core of a
democratic state helps clarify these definitional questions.
Although the German jurisprudence of communications
freedom grew largely in the press and broadcast contexts, the
German Court's constitutionalism provides a theoretical framework
National Socialists, however, an effort was made to ensure even greater
independence from the state with institutional and legal approaches than was the
case with the BBC."); cf 12 BVerfGE 205, 210 (1961) ("[T]he western occupation
forces pursued a policy of excluding all government influence on broadcasting.");
see also Constitutionalizing Communications, supra note 1, at 111-13.
6. See, e.g., 74 BVerfGE 297, 337 (Fifth Decision, 1987) ("laws of general
applicability to be interpreted in recognition of the importance of the basic rights
found in Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Basic Law for a free and democratic state")
("die allgemeinen Gesetze sind aus der Erkienntnis der Bedeutung der Grundrechte des
Art. 5 Abs. 1 GG im freiheitlichen demokratischen Staat auszulegen"); see also
Constitutionalizing Communications, supra note 1, at 113-16. English translations of
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rich in implications for any number of issues and institutions in a
world where - increasingly, and in different ways - information is
power. "Information wants to be free" may be a hoary clich6 from
the 1960s, a battle cry of uncertain provenance and import,7 but
information freedom as a constitutional mandate suggests new
approaches in a number of different areas: copyrightA antitrust;9
telecommunications; consumer protection; education; and a host of
other public and private issues and undertakings. My specific
undertaking here is to consider how a right or value of information
freedom might apply to the case presented by net neutrality
regulations requiring nondiscrimination, no blocking, and
transparency in network practices.
At a basic and colloquial level, I use the term information
freedom to mean access to information. The importance of
information access is reflected in its value in the marketplace (see
Bloomberg and Google), as well as its essential role of information
in forming our world view and framing our decision-making.
While the German usage comes from specific Court decisions
regarding Informationsfreiheit, the concept is also informed by
international treaties, policy statements of the United States, the
7. A 2012 Lexis search for law review articles containing this phrase yielded
317 results. The phrase is generally attributed to Stewart Brand. See JOHN
MARKOFF, WHAT THE DORMOUSE SAID 286 (2005) (quoting Brand," Information wants
to be free. Information also wants to be very expensive"); see also STEWART BRAND,
THE MEDIA LAB: INVENTING THE FUTURE AT MIT 201 (1988).
8. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 136, 220-21 (2003) (rejecting First
Amendment challenge to 20-year copyright extension, without considering the First
Amendment information rights of consumers whose access to that information
might now be truncated); compare Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
390 (1969) (" [i]t is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political,
aesthetic, moral and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here"); see further
discussion of the rise and fall of Red Lion in Part V infra.
9. See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust and the Marketplace of
Ideas, 69 ANTITRUST L. REV. 249, 252 n.14-16 (2001), arguing that "The antitrust laws
. . promote the marketplace of ideas by reaching anticompetitive private restraints
on this marketplace," (citing FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting,
436 U.S. 775, 800 n.18 (1978) ("application of the antitrust laws to newspapers is not
only consistent with, but is actually supportive of the values underlying, the First
Amendment"), and Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); but see
Verizon Communications v Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 416 (2004) (violation of network-
sharing and competition elements Telecommunications Act not antitrust law
violation, no mention of First Amendment); Pac. Bell Tel. Co. dba AT&T v.
Linkline, 555 U.S. 438, 457 (2009) (antitrust claim by Internet Service Providers
alleging AT&T's anticompetitive conduct in the wholesale DSL market, dismissed
for failure to state a claim, no mention of First Amendment).
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writings of Jtirgen Habermas and others, and by an alternative (and
at times seemingly underground) strain of domestic First
Amendment interpretation.
This article follows on Constitutionalizing Communications, a
detailed examination of the particulars of German broadcasting,
information and communications jurisprudence as of 2010.10 This
paper takes the next step, exploring what lessons the German
communications constitutionalism might hold for domestic
consumption. It is increasingly apparent that a key issue today,
both at home and abroad, is the struggle around issues of
information access and control. And this is occurring on an
increasingly globalized communications system.
This writing is in some respects deeply contrarian. Today's
communications landscape - and when we talk about information,
we are talking primarily about the communication of information - is
increasingly driven by economic models. Constitutional values (self-
government, for example) are everywhere in retreat - in the United
States, in the European Union, and further abroad - before the
imperatives of the market and/or geopolitics, despite rhetoric by
policymakers to the contrary." The Supreme Court's most
important communications case in the last forty years - the Brand X
decision, which moved the Internet from its historical common
carrier substrate to something far more nebulous - failed to even
mention the First Amendment. 12
When constitutional values do enter the communications
debate, they are most often asserted in favor of the rights of
communications network owners. Thus, Verizon recently argued in
the D.C. Circuit that the FCC's Open Network Order (announcing
limited network neutrality rules) "infringes broadband network
owners' constitutional rights [and] violates the First Amendment by
stripping them of control over the transmission of speech on their
10. Constitutionalizing Communications, supra note 1.
11. See, e.g., discussion in Part III.C; see also Part III.B, regarding the fight for
information freedom language in the European Charter of Human Rights.
12. Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n. v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967,
980 (2005) (deferring to the FCC's decision that cable modems [and later DSL
modems] were not "common carrier" telecommunications facilities, but rather
much less regulated information services; this effectively moved the Internet from a
common carrier foundation to the quicksand of the free market); see also underlying
FCC decision, High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 17
FCC Rcd 4798 (2002) [hereinafter Cable Modem Ruling].
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networks. And it takes network owners' property without
compensation." 1 3
One can ask whether the language of ownership and market
economics is sufficient to describe how information is used in the
public sphere today, how that is changing, or how it is changing us.
Might we do better to ask what democracy demands, or at least to
make social and political questions coequal with those of
economics? This is precisely the question the German
Constitutional Court asks in its broadcasting and information
decisions. The German Court has advanced the following concepts
that might be useful in our domestic debate:
* free speech (or communications freedom) protects not
only individual speakers, but also the process of speech; 14
* constitutional free speech must provide some guarantee
that electronic media (in particular) will take up and pass
along "the diversity of themes and opinions that play a
role in society"; 15
* government has a constitutional duty to act positively to
create structures that protect this communication; 16
* constitutional values can and sometimes should have a
'radiating effect," i.e., should be considered when
implicated by more quotidian legal endeavors such as
statutory interpretation and/or market regulation;17 and
* censorship can emanate from private markets as well as
governments. 18
While some of these ideas might sound radical to American
ears, they are in fact the constitutional framework for a democratic
state with a strong market economy. Nor are they entirely unheard
of on our shores.19 The United States is on record internationally as
supporting the free flow of information as a necessary concomitant
13. Opening Brief for Petitioners Verizon and MetroPCS at 3-4 ,Verizon v. FCC,
No. 11-1355 (D.C. Cir. 2012), available at http://gigaom2.files.wordpress.com
/2012/07/verizon-metropcs-net-neutrality-brief-as-filed.pdf. [hereinafter Verizon
Brief].
14. Constitutionalizing Communications, supra note 1, at 125, 129.
15. Id. at 125-26.
16. Id. at 126, 129.
17. Id. at 127-28.
18. Id. at 138-43.
19. See supra note 3 and U.S. policy statements in Part III.C infra.
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to democracy. The rhetoric, however, does not always match
domestic legal and economic reality. By considering the distance
between the two, by examining how the "no law" of the First
Amendment plays out in practice, particularly when thrown into
relief by the more affirmative German approach to freedom of
speech, we may be able to reprogram our understanding of the First
Amendment and of what is at stake in this Information Age. The
notion of a "fresh," new, or reconstructed understanding of the First
Amendment will undoubtedly send shudders down the spines of
constitutional scholars who worry about "slippery slope" problems,
but the fact that Germany's different approach to speech has not in
fact led to a collectivist nightmare may give them some comfort. 20
I am hardly the first to attempt this analysis. 21 My hope is to
bring some new material into the discussion, specifically the
German and international approaches to freedom of information
and communication, and to connect constitutional theory with a
view of current legal and administrative practice. 22 I begin the
analysis in Part II below with a discussion of communications and
constitutions generally, and preface that with a sketch of the layered
nature of today's electronic network; I then turn to speculation
about why architectural decisions about that network have not yet
been constitutionalized, and why they should be. Part III provides a
syncretistic construction of information freedom, borrowing from
the German Constitutional Court, international treaties, U.S. policy
20. John McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First
Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 49, 122 n.304 (1996) ("growing realization that most
of the truths emerging from contemporary social inquiry are not hospitable to
collectivist and egalitarian ideals. Greater regulation of speech may thus retard
competition from these rising ideas"); Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual
Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 1109, 1119-20 (1993)
("The collectivist theory, therefore, stands for the subordination of public discourse
to a framework of managerial authority.").
21. For two quite recent, competent, and diametrically opposed views on "no
law" vs. "free speech" interpretations of the First Amendment, see Christopher Yoo,
[Individual Rights:] Technologies of Control and the Future of the First Amendment, 53
WM. & MARY L. REV. 747 (2011); see also Marvin Ammori, First Amendment
Architecture, 2012 Wis. L. REV. 1 (2012). See also Stuart Minor Benjamin, Transmitting,
Editing and Communicating: Determining What "the Freedom of Speech" Encompasses, 60
DUKE L.J. 1673 (2011); and Christopher Yoo, Free Speech and the Myth of the Internet as
an Unintermediated Experience, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV 697 (2010).
22. The author has participated as a staff attorney for the California Public
Utilities Commission in various interconnection disputes, merger proceedings, and
telecommunications consumer protection proceedings. The views advanced in this
article are, again, his own.
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statements, philosophical treatises, and U.S. law. Part IV situates
information freedom in the larger field of German communications
jurisprudence, summarizing what is set forth in greater detail in
Constitutionalizing Communications. Part V traces the rise and fall of
information freedom in U.S. law (a "right of the public to receive
suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas
and experiences"), as well as the eventual dominance of the
"negative freedom" model of the First Amendment. 23 Part VI offers
criticism of the affirmative speech model, specific suggestions as to
how a useful and adequate domestic free speech regime might
incorporate the principles of information freedom, and what the
road forward might entail.
II. Constitutions and Communications
A. The Constitutional Vacuum Around Communications and
Communications Law
The FCC and the Courts have issued a number of significant
decisions in recent years that define the communications substrate
of the Internet, and that are either entirely devoid of discussion of
the First Amendment, or present a truncated and one-sided view of
it.24 To grasp the enormity of this failing, one must understand
what we talk about when we talk about the Internet and its
communications substrate, which is the specific case on which this
paper focuses.
The Internet may be a "forum for a true diversity of political
discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and
myriad avenues for intellectual activity," 25 but all that good stuff
23. The quotation is from the paradigmatic U.S. information freedom case, Red
Lion, discussed supra note 8. The clash between negative and affirmative freedom
models is described in Part II.C infra.
24. See supra note 12. The Brand X case failed to even mention the First
Amendment, and the underlying Cable Modem Ruling refers only to the First
Amendment rights of network owners. Any number of other seminal
communications decisions, which structured the communications substrate for the
Internet, could be mentioned here. See, in place of many, National Broadband Plan,
24 FCC Rcd 4342 (2009), which initiated the Obama Administration's broadband
buildout, with no mention of the First Amendment.
25. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 566 (2002) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3),
sometimes referred to as Communications Decency Act). Interestingly, section 230
also states that the services available over the Internet "represent an extraordinary
advance in the availability of educational and informational resources to our
154 [Vol. 36:1
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does not just happen. Calling the Internet a "cloud" does not help,
and may be misleading. In a physical sense, the Internet runs on
wires. As one of its pioneers put it, "One of the things about the
Internet that escapes a lot of people ... is that it really is composed
of things like routers and lines and computers and the like." 26
Initially, and to a large extent still today, these wires and hardware
were constituent parts of a common carrier telephone system,
sometimes still quaintly referred to as the public switched telephone
network (PSTN). 27 Wireless broadband may deliver an increasing
share of Internet content, but it is significantly slower than wired
citizens," and "offer users a greater degree of control over the information that they
receive, as well as the potential for even greater control in the future as technology
develops." 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(a)(1)-(2). Here again, however, there is no reference to
the First Amendment, and the paean to the wonders of the Internet shortly gives
way to the statutory assertion of a "competitive free market that presently exists for
the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State
regulations," and finally to provision of immunity for any ISP that takes "action
voluntarily in good faith to restrict access to . . . material that the provider or
user considers to be obscene . . ." 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2), 230(c)(2)(A). Years later,
the D.C. Circuit would reject section 230 as the basis for Commission action to
prevent a network provider's blocking or discrimination among Internet traffic.
Comcast v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (the FCC, having rejected
common carrier treatment of cable modems, could not then invoke section 230 to
establish "ancillary jurisdiction" over the modem service).
26. Robert Kahn, at 2007 Silicon Flatirons Conference, as quoted in Susan P.
Crawford, The Digital Broadband Migration: Digital Think, 5 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 467, 468 (2007).
27. The Internet has, from its infancy in the late 1960s as a Department of
Defense project though its mass commercialization in the 1990s, run largely on the
common carrier facilities of the telecommunications networks. See, eg., Christopher
Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847, 1882 (2006)
("the Internet began as an overlay on top of a voice network"); Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv
C. Shah, Fool Us Once, Shame on You - Fool Us Twice, Shame on Us: What We Can
Learn from the Privatizations of the Internet Backbone and Domain Name System, 79
WASH. U. L. REV. 89, 101. (2001) (history of the evolution of ARPANET to CSNET to
NSFNET in the late 1980s, and increasing privatization of network as Sprint, Pacific
Bell, and other carriers took control of critical network access points or NAPs); see
also Kevin Werbach, The Centripetal Network: How the Internet Holds Itself Together,
and the Forces Tearing It Apart, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 343, 398 (2008) ("The Internet
and the public switched telephone network ('PSTN') use the same physical
infrastructure"); Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake: Connecting Internet
Backbones, 1 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUs 45, 45, 51 n.59 (2003) (Internet as "network of
networks, owned and operated by different companies, including Internet
backbone providers" AT&T and others); Merger of SBC Communications Inc. and
AT&T Corp. , 20 FCC Rcd 18290 (2005), at 123 (referring to "Tier 1 backbone
providers - AT&T, MCI, Sprint, Qwest, Level 3, [and] Global Crossing"), and 108
("the merger may result ... in significant vertical integration").
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broadband, and is in fact wireless only over the last mile.28
Upstream, wireless traffic runs largely on the same wires that
deliver home and business telephony and broadband. 29 Telephone
and broadband are services on these wires. 30 The wires and their
appurtenances (routers, utility poles, conduits and the like) are often
referred to as the "physical layer" of the Internet.31  The
Telecommunications Act of 1996 was supposed to usher in
competition at the physical layer; many observers believe this
promise has not been realized, and that significant market power
bottlenecks have ensued at the hardware or facilities level. 32
Variously described service and application layers ride on this
physical layer; content rides on the top.3 3 Whoever controls the
28. As used here, wireless broadband refers primarily to broadband as
delivered to handheld devices. Susan Crawford, The Communications Crisis in
America, 5 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 245, 247 (2011) (neither slower wireless broadband
nor satellite Internet access, nor "pipedream" of broadband over power lines, likely
to compete directly with cable broadband; telecommunications companies have
fallen behind).
29. See, e.g., California Public Utilities Commission Order Instituting
Investigation 1.11-06-009, In re AT&T/TMobile Merger, at 2 (re "backhaul"); available
at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/SearchRes.aspx?DocFormat=ALL&DoclD=453777. The
author was an advisor to the Commission for this proceeding.
30. See, e.g., Richard Whitt, Evolving Broadband Policy: Taking Adaptive Stances to
Foster Optimal Internet Platforms, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 417, 427 (2009).
31. See, e.g., Rob Frieden, Adjusting the Horizontal and Vertical in
Telecommunications Regulation: A Comparison of the Traditional and a New Layered
Approach, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 207, 213 (2003). Frieden describes a "hierarchy of
identifiable layers involved in the provision of information and
telecommunications, including a network/physical layer (the wired, wireless, or
optical medium), services carried over such networks (one-way, two-way,
narrowband, or broadband), and applications/content (voice, data, video, or
Internet) riding at the top of the layered stack." Id.
32. See, e.g., Lee Selwyn & Helen Golding, Revisiting the Regulatory Status of
Broadband Internet Access: A Policy Framework for Net Neutrality and an Open
Competitive Internet, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 91, 120, passim (2010) ("if we have learned
nothing else over the fifteen years since adoption of the 1996 Act, it is that such
entry [into 'facilities-based mass market broadband competition'] is not
economically viable").
33. See Direct Testimony of Jeffrey Richter, in Petition of AT&T Wisconsin for
Declaratory Ruling that Its "U-Verse Voice" Service is Subject to Exclusive Federal
Jurisdiction, Wisconsin Public Service Commission Docket 6720-DR-101 (filed Nov.
14, 2008), at 8-9 ("The OSI 7 Layer Model defines the relationship between the
application (at the top) and the physical hardware (at the bottom); The TCP/IP
model [in contrast] uses four layers"), available at http://psc.wi.gov/apps35/
ERF view/viewdoc.aspx?docid=104378. See also id. at Exhibit 1 (illustrating the
seven layers of the OSI Model, with physical layer at bottom and applications layer
at top, with "each layer functionally independent of the others, but provid[ing]
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physical layer can exert control over the higher layers.34  A
separation of the physical transport layer on the one hand, and the
service and content layers on the other, has seemed to many
observers the obvious and optimal organization for next generation
networks (NGNs):
Electronic communications networks [are] becom[ing] packet
switched, mostly or completely based in the IP. They will be
multi-service networks, rather than service specific networks for
audio (including voice), video (including TV-services) and data
networks, allowing a decoupling of service and transport
provision... A core feature of IP networks is the separation of . .
transport and service. This distinction potentially allows
competition along the value chain more easily than in the PSTN
world. A crucial point is the adoption of open and standardized
interfaces between each functional level in order to allow third
parties to develop and create services independent of the
network.35
In other words, IP is the lingua franca which allows many
different services, and a world of content, to ride on what is
currently, and will hopefully remain, one unitary, interconnected
public electronic network. 36 It is becoming increasingly meaningless
to talk of a telephone network or a cable system or radio or
television network - these are all applications or services on a
converged network. It is this interconnection and convergence that
allows the prospect of ubiquitous, universal, and affordable
service to the layer above it, and receive[ing] service from the layer below it"),
available at http://psc.wi.gov/apps/erf-share/view/viewdoc.aspx?docid=104379.
34. Richard Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward: Formulating a New Communications
Public Policy Framework Based on the Network Layers Model, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 587,
647 (2004) (re "lower level control": "an entity's control over unique elements of the
Physical Layer and its resulting control over higher layers in the protocol stack"
leads to a situation where "he who controls the lower layers also can control the
dependent upper layers").
35. ERG Consultation Document on Regulatory Principles of IP-IC/NGN Core
(ERG 08) 26revl, at 96-97. The Consultation Document is available at
http://berec.europa.eu/doc/publications/erg-08_26_final-ngn-ip-ic-cs_081016.p
df.
36. See generally Werbach, supra note 27, (discussing threats to the
interconnected network). The FCC has acknowledged the move to IP-based
networks in many recent rulings, including its NBP Public Notice No. 25 seeking
comment on the Transition from Circuit-Switched Network to All-IP Network. Public
Notice DA 09-2517 (rel. December 1, 2009), at 1-2, available at http://
hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DA-09-2517A1.pdf.
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communications and access to information.37  It is also this
interconnection and convergence that underline the significance of
market concentration, as discussed below. Despite the central role
of this network in our lives, few of the seminal network-structuring
decisions mention the First Amendment rights of network users.
In 2002, for example, in the arcane recesses of an administrative
proceeding, the FCC determined that cable modem service, and
with it the broadband connection to the home (or office), was not a
common carrier telecommunications service, but rather a lightly
regulated information service. 38 But the FCC did not consider the
impact of this decision on the information rights of consumers; the
only First Amendment rights mentioned were those of the network
owners.39 There is a direct line from that 2002 decision deregulating
the facilities substrate to the network neutrality debate of today.
When that case reached the Supreme Court as National Cable &
Telecommuncations Association (NCTA) v. Brand X Services, the Court
"deferred" to the FCC's decision (under the Chevron deference
doctrine), without looking too closely at the FCC's decision or its
impact, and without considering the First Amendment at all. 4 0 After
Brand X issued, the FCC extended its "information service" category
to DSL broadband, again without mention of the First
Amendment.4'
Even where the First Amendment is mentioned in FCC and
court proceedings, it is often the First Amendment as applied to the
37. Built into the concept of "ubiquitous, universal, and affordable" is the
question of the "digital divide" between the information access available to middle-
and upper-income people, and that available to lower income individuals, a
problem state and federal legislators and regulators have sought so solve through
universal service mechanisms. Cf. Werbach, Connections: Beyond Universal Service in
the Digital Age, 7 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 67, 68 (2009) ("Subsidy mechanisms
to enhance ubiquity should be linked to obligations to preserve the unitary nature
of the Internet").
38. High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 FCC
Rcd 4798 (2002) [hereinafter Cable Modem Ruling].
39. Id. T 80 ("Many commenters have debated whether a federally-mandated
system of multiple ISP access would violate the First Amendment rights of cable
operators").
40. Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Services, 545 U.S. 967, 980
(2005).
41. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, 20 FCC Rcd 14853 (2005) [hereinafter DSL Modem Order] (DSL modem
not common carrier telecommunications service).
[Vol. 36:1158
Information Freedom
rights of the network owner, not the network users.42 Sometimes
one detects a confusion in network cases as to who the speaker or
protected party is - the network owner, the content provider using
the network to reach an audience, or the audience which
"consumes" the content. 43 In antitrust cases addressing the facilities
bottleneck, the First Amendment is again largely missing in action.44
This absence of First Amendment analysis, and more
particularly of an analysis of the speech and information rights of
network users, extends to scholarly works as well, even those
written by proponents of the information consumer. 45 All of this
42. See, e.g., Matter of Framework for Broadband Internet Service, 25 FCC Rcd.
7866, 1 54 (June 2010) ("Are there First Amendment constraints on the
Commission's ability to compel the offering of such a [broadband common carrier]
service?") [hereinafter "Reclassification Notice"]; see also Cable Modem Ruling,
supra note 38.
43. See, e.g., discussion of Reno v. ACLU and United States v. American Library
Ass'n., infra Part V.D.
44. See Verizon Communications v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004); Pac. Bell Tel.
Co. dba AT&T v. Linkline, 555 U.S. 438 (2009). See also discussion in Part V.F infra.
Compare Springer/SAT1 merger discussed infra in Parts IV.C and VI.C.
45. Thus, in the seminal article on network neutrality by Professors Lemley and
Lessig, The End of End-to-End, the First Amendment is not mentioned in the text
proper, although it crops up in the footnotes. Mark A. Lessig & Lawrence Lemley,
The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era,
48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001). Christopher Yoo's equally seminal anti-network
neutrality essay mentions the First Amendment only once in its text, and then only
to assert the First Amendment rights of telephone companies. Christopher Yoo,
Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 49, n.180 and accompanying text
(2005). Much of the work of even insightful network neutrality proponents such as
Susan Crawford more often than not argues from economics or general public
policy grounds, rather than from the First Amendment per se, a fact noted by Prof.
Yoo. Yoo, supra note 27, at 1851 n.13 ("Since network neutrality proponents defend
their proposals almost exclusively in terms of the economic benefits of innovation,
this Article discusses the issues solely in economic terms. I therefore set aside for
another day any discussion of noneconomic issues, such as network neutrality's
implications for democratic deliberation or the First Amendment"); see also
Constitutionalizing Communications, supra note 1, at 102 n.16. Clearly there are
counter-examples (see works of Professor Lessig cited herein), but in some
instances they prove the point that the First Amendment is in retreat from this most
important issue. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE
167 (1999) ("egalitarian regimes - the Scandinavian countries - puzzled over how
we could think of ourselves as free when only the rich can speak and pornography
is repressed .. .. We have exported to the world, through the architecture of the
Internet, a First Amendment in code more extreme than our own First Amendment
in law") (emphasis in original); cf Hannibal Travis, Reclaiming the First Amendment:
Constitutional Theories of Media Reform: of Blogs, EBooks, and Broadband: Access to
Digital Media as a First Amendment Right, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1519, 1526 passim (2007)
(effort to reclaim the First Amendment under the "rubric of originalism [which]
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indicates the lack of a fully-theorized First Amendment, and the lack
of a constitutionally urgent case for information and its users.
There may be many reasons why communications cases are
often decided in a constitutional vacuum, but three come
immediately to mind: the common carrier heritage of the
communications substrate; the inherent difficulty of free speech
theory (and its "incompletely theorized" development in this
country as set forth in Part V.D below); and - most importantly - the
"no law" libertarian or negative freedom interpretation of the First
Amendment, with its concomitant "state action" requirement.
As to the first reason, communications facilities were
traditionally regulated as common carriers, and it appears not to
have occurred to the telephone companies (initially, at least) that
they might gainfully assert their own First Amendment rights in
their systems.46  It was generally accepted that telegraph and
telephone transport systems were natural monopolies, that they
should therefore be operated as common carriers, that they needed
public facilities (streets and publicly authorized easements) to
provide a public service, and that a guaranteed 10% to 12% return
on investment was not an unfair bargain. As the Internet matured,
the notion of a state-set return on investment paled against the
almost unimaginable amount of surplus value that could be created
by those transport systems, and all bets were off.
The second reason for the constitutional vacuum is the
difficulty of First Amendment theory. To begin with, it is difficult to
square the "no law" part of the speech clause with the notion that it
is a "free speech guarantee." 4 7 This is a recurring theme in much of
provides the most persuasive, consistent, and principled basis on which to establish
First Amendment limits to efforts by private entities to censor digital media using
government-issued monopolies").
46. See Angela J. Campbell, Publish or Carriage: Approaches to Analyzing the First
Amendment Rights of Telephone Companies, 70 N. C. L. REV. 1071 (1992); Susan J. Ross,
First Amendment Trump? The Uncertain Constitutionalization of Structural Regulation
Separating Telephone and Video, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 281, 288-89 (1998) ("Although the
telephone industry had been regulated as a carrier of others' goods for most of a
century, by the mid-1990s, telephone companies had assaulted regulations, which
confined them to serve as pure vehicles, with a barrage of lawsuits claiming a First
Amendment right to provide content as well") (citations and footnotes omitted).
See also DSL Modem Order, 20 FCC Rcd 14853 (2005) (DSL modem [previously
understood as telecommunications facility] reclassified as information service).
47. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Media Access: A Question of Design, 76 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 933, 935 and n.24 (2008) ("no law" means that "freedom of speech is 'not
applied to the very interests which have real power to effect such abridgment"'
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what follows. Then there is a sort of constitutional uncertainty
principle at work - the more one attempts to parse it, the more
elusive the First Amendment's meaning becomes. As discussed
below, different interests may collide on the media platform, some
of those interests have been described as individual rights, some as
"public" interests or rights. The interplay of different personal and
public rights and interests in communications cases has created
what has been called a First Amendment "Mobius Strip," 48 what
Professor BeVier calls a "doctrinal and scholarly cacophony." 49 One
can only speculate that all the sound and fury occur because
observers sense that what is at stake is more than whose wire runs
through what conduit, but has something to do with the future
shape of our culture.50 Add to that the increasingly technical details
(quoting Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press A New First Amendment Right, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1656 (1967)).
48. William W. Van Alstyne, The Mabius Strip of the First Amendment: Perspectives
on Red Lion, 29 S.C. L. REV. 539, 574-75 (1978).
49. Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment on the Tracks: Should Justice Breyer Be
at the Switch?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1280 (2005). An oft-cited example of these doctrinal
difficulties are the seven different concurring and dissenting opinions in Denver
Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 768-838 (1996),
grappling with the interplay of rights regarding access to the cable television
platform.
50. Different cognitive architectures can act as filters or membranes
circumscribing the available pool of information and ideas. See, e.g., Susan P.
Crawford, Shortness of Vision: Regulatory Ambition in the Digital Age, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 695, 696 (2005) ("choice in the current Internet governance debate between
open platforms, open devices, and diversity, on the one hand, and constrained
platforms, constrained devices, and monocultures, on the other"). My experience,
living in West Berlin in the late 1970s, and watching three channels of West
television along with two channels of its counterpart from the East (the so-called
German Democratic Republic), brought home to me how communications media
shape culture. Both the East and West television were self-contained worlds, with
vastly different value systems, frames of reference, and information membranes.
East German television broadcast Cabaret on Easter Sunday, for example, while
West German television tended more to devotional services on that day. It was not
surprising that when the Berlin Wall came down, there were two cultures where
before there had been one, an effect most pronounced where the Easterners were
outside the reception zone of West television. See generally INGO SCHULZ, SIMPLE
STORIES (1998). The ambivalence ot technology in the abstract is reflected in the
writings of James Boyle who revels in the joys of a cyber-libertarian in an
information utopia, but also sees that the very "technologies of liberation" that
provide this information abundance may lead to more efficient and powerful
mechanisms of surveillance, and state and private forms of "discipline." James
Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwired Censors, 66 U.
CIN. L. REV. 177, 204 (1997).
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of new electronic communication networks,51 and the carriers'
aggressive actions to keep that information confidential, 52 and it is
no wonder that there is confusion among policy-makers, legislators
and jurists about the semantics and operational realities of these
networks. 53
51. The so-called "expert" agencies suffer from what has been referred to as
"information asymmetry" - industry knows how these systems work, while the
administrative agencies do not. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese et al., Seeking Truth for
Power: Informational Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 281
passim (2004) ("asymmetries between regulators and those they regulate"); see also
FCC docket 05-25, In re Special Access for Price Cap Local Exchange Carriers,
regarding special access (business last-mile and "middle mile" lines), where the
FCC has been attempting to gather basic information for almost ten years; see also
Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Comptel et al. v. FCC, No 11-1262 (D.C. Cir. July
15, 2011) (competitive carriers alleging that the FCC had "dragged its feet" for over
a decade on special access, "a critical part of our national telecommunications
infrastructure," and done nothing about the problem that "[i]n most locations,
special access services are owned and controlled exclusively by a single entity - one
of the three dominant incumbent local exchange carriers ('ILECs'), AT&T, Verizon
or CenturyLink/Qwest"). No one knows precisely how concentrated the market is,
because in many instances the expert agencies have retired their engineers and
accountants and replaced them with freshly minted MBAs, and because of
"regulatory capture" which makes the agencies too timid to insist that the regulated
entities provide the information that is needed for reasonable decision-making; cf.
Herbet Hovenkamp, The Takings Clause and Improvident Regulatory Bargains, 108
YALE L.J. 801, 825 (1999) ("In addition to the expansive literature on regulatory
capture ... regulated firms faced grossly ineffective oversight by their regulators,
who often did little more than rubber-stamp their requests"); see also infra note 52.
52. As one example among thousands, see FCC's February 13, 2012, letter to
Verizon In re Special Access for Price Cap Local Exchange Carriers, Report & Order, FCC
WC Docket No. 05-25, discussing confidential, "highly confidential," and "enhanced
confidentiality" categories, rejecting inter alia Verizon's claims for confidential treatment
of public documents, but allowing Verizon to treat "the total number of intrastate and
interstate circuits purchased," "descriptions of CLEC or out-of-region ILEC sales,
pricing structures and discounts," and collocation data as "highly confidential," available
at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DA-12-199A1.pdf. Roughly
half the documents filed in the AT&T-T-Mobile merger investigation at California
Public Utilities Commission were filed under seal. See http://delapsl.cpuc.ca.gov/
CPUCProceedingLookup/f?p=401:57:1304589101695901::NO.
53. The classic statement of this confusion is Justice Scalia's "pizza analogy" in
Brand X. In his dissent, he deconstructs the majority's (and the FCC's) conflation of
the content and transport layers of broadband modem service:
If, for example, I call up a pizzeria and ask whether they offer delivery,
both common sense and common "usage," . . would prevent them from
answering: "No, we do not offer delivery - but if you order a pizza from
us, we'll bake it for you and then bring it to your house." The logical
response to this would be something on the order of, "so, you do offer
delivery." But our pizza-man may continue to deny the obvious and
explain, paraphrasing the FCC and the Court: "No, even though we bring
the pizza to your house, we are not actually 'offering' you delivery,
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The third, and by far the most daunting, barrier to a fully
constitutionalized understanding of communications is the "no law"
command of the First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech." It is on the "no law" issue that
agreement about the meaning of the First Amendment breaks down,
and a substantial gulf opens between those who put the emphasis
on "no law" and those who put the emphasis on "freedom of
speech." 54 There is an inherent tension between the two ends of this
clause: Those who focus on "no law" believe that the First
Amendment goes no further than protecting the individual from
laws, i.e., from direct government censorship of the individual's speech
(the "negative freedom" interpretation of the First Amendment);
those who focus on the "freedom of speech" end of the clause tend
to think the First Amendment extends to the public's right (and the
right of each individual comprising the public) to hear or receive that
speech, to determine and reach the information they think is
relevant, often within or with reference to a process of public
discourse and decision-making. This is sometimes referred to as an
"affirmative" view of the First Amendment, and generally comes
with a belief that government may (or should) act to protect the
availability and reception of that speech and information.55
If constitutional speech protection is limited to the negative
freedom model, i.e., to the vertical relationship between an
individual and his or her (or its)56 government, there is a natural
because the delivery that we provide to our end users is 'part and parcel'
of our pizzeria-pizza-at-home service and is 'integral to its other
capabilities."'
545 U.S. at 1007 (internal citations omitted). Similar confusion between the service
and transport layers of the now-converging network surfaces in legislation that
bans state regulatory jurisdiction over VolP and "IP-enabled services," while
purportedly allowing continued state oversight over traditional phone services
delivered over those same telephone lines, and remaining vague and ambiguous as
to the level of remaining state oversight of facilities. See, e.g., S.B. 1161, 2012 Leg.
(Cal. 2012), available at http://eginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/postquery?bill-number=
sb_1161&sess=CUR &house=B; see also Susan Crawford, Torching California's
Broadband Future: Why Your State Is Next, WIRED.COM (Aug. 27, 2012) (discussing
S.B. 1161), http://www.wired.com/business/2012/08/torching-californias-broad
band -future-why-your-state-is-next/.
54. The "no law" theories are sometimes referred to as focusing on "negative
freedom," libertarian, liberal, or subjective; the "freedom of speech" theories are
sometimes referred to as "affirmative freedom," democratic, republican, or
objective. See discussion infra in Part II.B.
55. See more extended view in Part II.C infra.
56. See generally, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
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contraction of the work that the constitutional protection can do,
adding to the vacuum effect.5 7
In regulatory and judicial decisions which have adopted the
negative freedom model, the focus tends to be on the network
owner as the speaker for constitutional purposes;5 8 in the affirmative
view, the owner shares the spotlight with the users of his/her/its
network.59 When the First Amendment focus is primarily on the
network owner, millions of network users - speakers and
information recipients - are either not in the picture, or lurking out-
of-focus at the periphery.
B. Constitutionalizing Communications
The U.S. Constitution embodies "self-government" and the
"fundamental principle of representative democracy."60 Democracy
57. The affirmative camp argues that, if speech protections are extended to the
horizontal dimension, to relationships between people and entities "in society,"
then more speech and information is protected; an individual's speech and
information rights would be protected not just from government, but also vis a vis
powerful private entities, particularly networks designed to carry speech. See, e.g.,
Harold Feld, Whose Line Is This Anyway?, 8 COMMLAW CONSPECTUs 23, 24 (2000)
(suggesting "virtual easement" for information in return for cable's use of streets).
Those who believe the most immediate threats to speech today emanate not from
government but from the private sector often cite SBC/AT&T chairman Ed
Whitacre's infamous comments about not allowing unaffiliated content providers
to "use my lines for free." See Rewired and Ready for Combat, BUSINESSWEEK.COM
(Nov. 6, 2005), http://businessweek.com/stories/2005-11-06/rewired-and-ready-
for-combat. This is essentially the posture of Verizon in the network neutrality
appeal in the D.C. Circuit.
58. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Comm'ns, 476 U.S. 488, 494-95
(1986) (cable operator's activities "implicate First Amendment interests" because of
asserted "original programming or by exercising editorial discretion over which
stations or programs to include in its repertoire");Turner Broadcasting. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994) (Turner 1) (same). Susan Crawford discusses how the
"romantic author" trope has been borrowed from copyright exegesis and fitted to
the cable owner as speaker, now become the "romantic builder" of networks in
negative liberty apologetics. Susan Crawford, Network Rules, 70 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 51, 54 (2007) ("In the current network neutrality debate, network providers
claim that they (the romantic builders) must be allowed by law to price-
discriminate vis-a-vis content sources in order to be encouraged to build the
network (or to continue supporting it")).
59. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
60. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 783 (1994) (it is a
"'fundamental principle of our representative democracy,' embodied in the
Constitution, that 'the people should choose whom they please to govern them."')
(quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S.
267, 356 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("the workable democracy that the
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demands communication. Or, as the German Court would have it,
democracy demands public opinion-building (consensus-building),
and public opinion-building demands communication. 61
At the nexus of communications and democracy, i.e., at the core
of the self-government project, is an Enlightenment belief in
reason.62 The hope is that, given sufficient information, the public
can reason to better solutions, and can effectively govern itself. 63
The First Amendment "rests on the assumption that the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources is essential to the welfare of the public."64 "The right of
citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach
consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-government and a
necessary means to protect it."65
The connection between communication and community, and
communications' central role in the body politic, cannot be denied.
In fact, "there's a reason why the first scene in every military putsch
is the tanks rolling up to the radio and television stations." 66 The
speech theories advanced in this article have been called
"democratic," based on the notion that communication of
information and opinion is essential to democracy, to the building of
public opinion which expresses itself (inter alia) in elections.67 Once
Constitution foresees")).
61. 74 BVerfGE 297, 335 (1987) ("politische Willensbildung"). Broadcasting has
been the primary focus of the Constitutional Court's jurisprudence. See
Constitutionalizing Communications, supra note 1, at 113-21 But in the real world this
one-to-many medium has been largely supplanted by the many-to-many medium
of the Internet. The Constitutional Court has not yet grappled with the collision of
speech interests on the Internet, and it will be interesting to see whether the Court
retains the continuity of its fifty-year development of communications, information
and broadcasting freedom in this new context. Compare note 198, infra, and
accompanying text.
62. See, e.g., Post, supra note 20, at 1137 ("the Enlightenment framework that
has so far governed our appreciation of democratic legitimacy").
63. See generally JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (2005)
64. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
65. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 890 (2010).
66. August 2008 interview with Prof. Wolfgang Schulz, Director of Hans
Bredow Institute, Hamburg, Germany.
67. SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 77, 241, passim (German broadcasting jurisprudence
as comparative example) (deliberative democracy). The German Court posits a basic
principle of free opinion-building (Grundprinzip der freien Meinungsbildung). 74
BVerfGE 297, 335 (1987). This is a necessary condition of public consensus or "will-
building." Id.; see also 73 BVerfGE 118, 157-58 (1986) ("broadcasting's role for opinion
and political will-building"); see also Constitutionalizing Communications, supra note 1,
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situated in the process of democratic opinion building,
communications becomes unavoidably constitutional, and part of
the legitimization of a democratic state.68
When the question is asked, people tend to agree that First
Amendment interests are at least "implicated" in cases concerning
communications facilities. 69  But specifically identifying those
interests is a more difficult task. Difficulty is not an acceptable
excuse for inaction, however, given that the specifics of our
cognitive or information infrastructure are up for grabs, and being
negotiated on a daily basis inside the Beltway. Ad hoc regulatory
solutions will inevitably be a day late and a dollar short in an
accelerating technological world governed by Moore's law, 70 and
celebrated at a conference that proudly calls itself "DISRUPT."71
Dispute resolution by private contract or property law will by
definition tend to discount the constitutional interests in speech,
discourse, and opinion-building when the First Amendment is
absent or given a one-sided reading. A strong constitutional
principle would provide a framework for the more granular
decisions that are made every day regarding the technologically
intensive electronic networks of today. This article argues that
judicial development of a more completely theorized First
Amendment is a better and more realistic approach to this problem
than a legislative fix or a constitutional amendment. 72
at 125-30.
68. JUrgen Habermas, Habermas Responds to His Critics (Reply to Symposium
Participants, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law), 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1477, 1481
(1996).
69. See discussion of City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Comm'ns and related
cases, supra note 58.
70. MARKOFF, supra note 7, at xi ("The 'law' said the number of transistors
would double every couple of years. It dictated that nothing stays the same for
more than a moment; no technology is safe from its successor; costs fall and
computing power increases not at a constant rate but exponentially").
71. Temple, Evangelista, Mayor Declares Innovation Month in S.F., S.F. CHRON.,
September 11, 2012 (report on TechCrunch Disrupt conference), available at
http://www.sfgate.com/default/article/Mayor-declares-Innovation-Month-in-S-F
-3857562.php.
72. See generally, Thomas Gais & Gerald Benjamin, Public Discontent and the
Decline of Deliberation: A Dilemna in State Constitutional Reform, 68 TEMPLE L. REV.
1291, 1304 (1995) ("Citizens may fear that constitutional conventions would open
up a 'Pandora's box"' and noting, on a federal level, "William Brennan, then
Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, declared it 'the most awful
thing in the world"') (citing RUSSEL L. CAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKSMANSHIP viii
(1982). Because of this widespread fear of opening the Pandora's Box of a
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C. Setting the Stage: the Speech Interests at Issue (a Battle Between
Two - or More - Concepts of Liberty)73
To contend, as Ronald Dworkin does, that people have an
intrinsic moral right to say what they wish because it is an "essential
and 'constitutive' feature of a just political society that government
treat all its adult members .. . as responsible moral agents,"74 or - as
Professor Edwin Baker does - that "communicative action is [a
constitutive] part ... of our present, historical nature as persons," is
only part of the story.75
The act of speaking is social; a purely individualized speech
protection does not capture the whole picture, as Baker himself
realized. Even the phrase "communicative action" suggests "a
process by which people seek agreement," a "public discourse" in
other words.76 Contemporary First Amendment interpretation (or
hermeneutics, as the theorists like to say) oscillates between these
two poles, of private autonomy and public purpose, expression of
individual liberty (self-fulfillment) and instrument of self-
government.77
constitutional convention, and a wariness about legislative solutions, the only
practical avenue forward may be for the Supreme Court to take a more proactive
and constitutional stance on information and communications issues. Cf
Crawford, supra note 28, at 261 (fearing a "mosh pit of stakeholders" if the long
overdue rewrite of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 comes to pass).
73. The reference is to Isaiah Berlin's essay, Two Concepts of Liberty, in ISAIAH
BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, passim (1969).
74. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW 7, 199-200 (1996), cited in Christopher
Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 91
GEO. L.J. 245, 344-45 (2003). The moral argumentation here begs the question of
whether corporations can in any sense be called "responsible moral agents." See
Citizens United v FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 935 (2010) (corporation as First Amendment
speaker).
75. C. Edwin Baker, Republican Liberalism: Liberal Rights and Republican Politics,
41 FLA. L. REV. 491, 514 (1989), as quoted in Frank Michelman, In Memoriam: "The Full
Person as Reason-Giver": the Liberal Constitutional Conception of C. Edwin Baker, 12 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 949, 950 (2010) (alterations in original).
76. Cf Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 267 (2011)
("premise of discourse, that is, of communicative action, a process by which people
seek agreement").
77. Earlier analyses had spoken of additional First Amendment purposes of
"truth finding" and societal "steam valve." My research for a 1983 student law
review note led me to conclude that there were historically "four separate but
interrelated theories of free speech" that animated First Amendment interpretation:
(1) individual self-fulfillment; (2) discovery of truth (citing Justice Holmes'
dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) that the "test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
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This dichotomy is sometimes described as the clash "between a
libertarian and a democratic theory of speech."78 Or between a
"procedural" and a "substantive" view of the First Amendment.79
The German Constitutional Court posits an antinomy between
subjective individual rights and "objective" constitutional norms
that frame the democratic project (and may regulate institutional
rather than individual behavior).80 The German philosopher JUrgen
Habermas distinguishes between private and public autonomy
(although the two have an interior relationship to one another)81
Then Professor and now Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan
contrasts a "speaker-based" model, where the emphasis is on the
"expressive opportunities [of] would-be communicators," with an
"audience-based" model focused on the "quality of the expressive
arena." 82
market"); (3) free speech as predicate of self-government (citing Alexander
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); and
(4) "free speech as a steam valve" capable of exuding "excess societal pressure" and
thereby "preserv[ing] the balance between stability and change" (citing Thomas
Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CAL. L. REv. 422, 428
(1980); see West German Television Law, supra note 1, at 197.
78. OWEN Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 3 (1996).
79. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Discrimination, Distribution, and Free Speech, 37
ARIz. L. REV. 439, 448-49 (1995):
Some thoughtful critics of free speech law, in contrast, take a substantive
rather than a procedural view. The First Amendment should be read, they
say, not only to free speakers from government discrimination, or protect
them from the sin of thought control.
These "thoughtful critics" argue that the goal should be "maximizing speech
maximizing the diversity of what is said":
Professor Sunstein, for example, has argued that the First Amendment
should be read to promote deliberative democracy. Thus, in his view, the
free speech end-state "must reflect broad and deep attention to public
issues" and "there must be public exposure to an appropriate diversity of
view." In other words, not just discrimination but distribution matters: in
his words, "It is important to ensure that government does not suppress
dissident views. It is also important to ensure not merely that diversity is
available, but also that a significant part of the citizenry is actually exposed
to diverse views about public issues."
Id., citing SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 20-23.
80. Constitutionalizing Communications, supra note 1, at 130.
81. Habermas, supra note 68, at 940 ("Thus private and public autonomy
mutually presuppose each other in such a way that neither human rights nor
popular sovereignty can claim primacy over its counterpart").
82. Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive
in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 424 (1996) (rejecting both of
these approaches in favor of a third approach most concerned with governmental
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Marvin Ammori, in a recent law review article, and Dawn
Nunziato in her 2009 book Virtual Freedom, provide useful surveys
of these opposing viewpoints in First Amendment scholarship, and
do so under the rubric of "negative" and "affirmative" models or
conceptions of First Amendment protection. 83 Ammori, drawing on
the British philosopher Isaiah Berlin, distinguishes between
"negative liberty - a freedom from government involvement in
speech," and "an exceptional affirmative model or equality
model."84
As his parade example of a negative liberty conception,
Ammori quotes the venerable Professor Laurence Tribe's brief
against net neutrality regulations, where Tribe argues that "a central
purpose of the First Amendment" is "to prevent the government
from making just such choices about private speech."85 Ammori
identifies four corollaries of the negative liberty conception: a
principle of "government distrust" (what has been called the
"slippery slope" problem); a belief that judges should impose a
broad value-neutrality on government (should "not pick winners
and losers"); which leads to the third corollary, government should
not "redistribute" speech opportunities; and, finally, the assumption
that private speech is tied to property rights.86
Ammori finds two "fallacies" underlying this complex of
corollaries: An "is-ought" fallacy, namely that law ought to be what
motive).
83. Dawn Nunziato, VIRTUAL FREEDOM NET NEUTRALITY AND FREE SPEECH IN
THE INTERNET AGE (2009).
84. Ammori, supra note 21, at 1, 4 n.4 (citing at n.4 Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of
Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969).
85. Amori, supra note 21, at 7-8 n.21-22 and accompanying text (quoting
Laurence H. Tribe & Thomas C. Goldstein, Proposed "Net Neutrality" Mandates Could
Be Counterproductive and Violate the First Amendment, at 2-4, written and submitted as
Exhibit A to Comments of Time Warner Cable, Inc., FCC GN Docket No. 09-191,
Oct. 19, 2009, available at http://freestatefoundation.org/images/TWCNet
Neutrality Violates_ theFirstAmendment-TribeGoldstein.pdf.
86. Amori, supra note 21, at 14 n.47 (citing Geoffrey Stone, Autonomy and
Distrust, 64 U. COLo. L REV. 1171 (1993); see also description of "slippery slope" in
Sunstein, Speech in the Welfare State; Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 255, 259-60
(1992) ("idea is that any restrictions on speech, once permitted, have a sinister and
inevitable tendency to expand. Principled limits on government are hard to
articulate; to allow one kind of restriction is in practice to allow many other kinds
as well. 'Slippery slope' arguments therefore deserve a prominent place in any
theory of free expression, as do the equally problematic and thorny issues around
'balancing' of competing speech rights (which, as noted elsewhere herein inevitably
arises when talking about speech on a network").
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it has traditionally been; and an inductive fallacy stemming from the
aggregate of constitutional law being distilled from a "small,
selective sample ... [of] offensive-speech cases," which then become
"core principles" as in the corollaries set out above. For example,
arguments against rules providing access to cable systems and
shopping malls are said to violate the "core" principle of
government distrust: "Equanimity in the face of the government
insertion of its regulatory power into the marketplace of private
expression is grossly inconsistent with the venerable tradition of
healthy skepticism of the governmental regulation of expression."87
So Ammori goes looking for precedent beyond the too-small set
of paradigmatic offensive speech cases. He finds a number of
instances where government has acted affirmatively to create speech
opportunities: traditional public fora like public streets and parks;
limited public fora; public fora on private property (company
towns, shopping centers); public fora created by telegraph and
telephone common carriage and the universal service funds to
extend telephony to those otherwise unable to afford it; the effective
public forum created by the Post Office; and leased and public-
educational-governmental (PEG) access rules for cable television. In
each instance, Ammori sees a "space" where public speech can
occur. In each instance, government has acted in a content-neutral
way to create a prerequisite of public speech or (as Habermas would
have it) of public autonomy. In the case of traditional public fora on
public land, government must allow free speech; government
authority in the other areas is permissive.
Against arguments that such a legislative approach would be
permissible (if not mandated) under the First Amendment in other
communications contexts, two further objections are made: (1)
warnings about possible unintended consequence should the
Supreme Court depart from the alleged normative consensus
around negative freedom as leitmotif of the First Amendment; and
(2) concern that the costs and burdens of a positive speech
environment would fall most heavily on the shoulders of private
property, namely that of the network owners.88 No matter that the
87. Amori, supra note 21, at 19 n.74 (citing Martin Redish & Kirk Kaludis, The
Right of Expressive Access in First Amendment Theory: Redistributive Values and the
Democratic Dilemma, 93 Nw. U.L. REV. 1083, 1086-87 (1999)).
88. See, e.g., comments of Lillian BeVier at Feb. 16, 2012, Stanford Technology Law
Review Symposium: First Amendment Challenges in the Digital Age, panel on Prof.
Ammori's paper First Amendment Architecture, supra note 21. The Entirety of the
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communication networks that carry broadband services today were
largely built by the telephone companies with ratepayer money, in a
tightly regulated environment that protected the network owners
and users alike. No matter that both telephone and cable operators
are reliant on the continued use of public streets easements, utility
poles owned by other utilities, and - in the case of wireless
broadband - allocations of radio-frequency spectrum from the
airwaves that were earlier said to "belong to the people." 89
Enter the Germans with an attempt to get beyond the
dichotomy of private and public speech rights, with the notion of
speech as a process. The German Court's decisions and German
speech theory suggest a model which incorporates much of what
Ammori says, but cuts - in my view - closer to the bone of the First
Amendment. This is the model of rational speech, speech
embedded in informed discourse between a speaker and a listener,
deliberative, problem-solving. This is speech in the political sense,
speech that is designed to convince, and build consensus. It is
"communicative action." Although this has been called the
"discourse model" of free speech, it does not always occur on a
podium or dais; it can come in the form of a cartoon, a musical, a
blog or interactive website, or any other "meme" or platform that
transfers information and is part of a public conversation.90
symposium is available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E6sQSSc-B8M.
89. President Johnson, in comparing the Public Broadcasting Act to the 1862
Morrill Act, 12 Stat. 503 (1862) codified at 7 U.S.C. §301-08 (1988), which set aside
lands in every state to build land grant colleges, stated: "So today we rededicate a
part of the airwaves - which belong to all the people - and we dedicate them for the
enlightenment of all the people," as quoted in Steven Zansberg, Objectivity and
Balance in Public Broadcasting: Unwise, Unworkable, and Unconstitutional, 12 YALE L. &
POLIcY REv. 184 194 n.60 (1994) (quoting Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1531 (Nov. 13,
1967)); compare Adam Thierer, Why Regulate Broadcasting? Toward a Consistent First
Amendment Standard for the Information Age, 15 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUs 431, 440-42
(2007); see also Amori, supra note 21, at 51-53 (describing communications carriers'
use of public and third-party resources); and 37-44 (describing the public fora
discussed in previous paragraph).
90. See discussion in Part IV.A infra. See also Boyle, supra note 50, at 183
(celebrating the cyber-libertarian ethos):
It is the mixture of Enlightenment values and upbeat, public-goods theory
that typifies Internet analysis of information flows. Information is costless
to copy, should be spread widely, and cannot be confined. Beyond the
Jeffersonian credo lies a kind of Darwinian anthropomorphism.
Information really does want to be free. John Perry Barlow credited
Brand's phrase ["information wants to be free"] with "recognizing both the
natural desire of secrets to be told and the fact that they might be capable
of possessing something like a 'desire' in the first place." Barlow
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In what is commonly referred to as the Magna Carta of German
broadcasting speech jurisprudence, the 1961 case in which the
Constitutional Court rejected Konrad Adenauer's attempt to form a
national, government-owned broadcast network, the Court
embarked on the road to its "neither state nor private" formula for
broadcasting.9' This was one year before a young German professor
named Jtirgen Habermas published his groundbreaking empirical
analysis of the democratic process in action, The Structural
Transformation of the Public Sphere.92 Since then, the Constitutional
Court's development of a constitutional norm of communications
freedom and Habermas' philosophical project to develop a "theory
of communicative action" have run roughly parallel (but by no
means always consistent) courses. The end point for both has been
the public sphere, the Offentlichkeit. The Constitutional Court
repeatedly situates the individual or subjective right of free speech
in the public square, and describes the reciprocal relationship
between private and public opinion-building, as more fully
described below.
D. The Problem of Constitutional Comparisons
It is the contention of this article that foreign constitutional and
media law can amplify, extend, deepen, and throw into new light
the United States debate about First Amendment values. This
contention raises the threshold question of whether it is permissible
or advisable for U.S. courts in ruling on domestic communications
issues to consider foreign law, constitutions, or legal theories, or to
consider the experience of other countries with different
continued: English biologist and philosopher Richard Dawkins proposed
the idea of "memes," self-replicating, patterns of information which
propagate themselves across the ecologies of mind, saying they were like
life forms.
I believe they are life forms in every respect but a basis in the carbon atom.
They self-reproduce, they interact with their surroundings and adapt to
them, they mutate, they persist. Like any other form they evolve to fill the
possibility spaces of their local environments, which are, in this case the
surrounding belief systems and cultures of their hosts, namely, us.
Id. (quoting John P. Barlow, Selling Wine Without Bottles: The Economy of Mind on the
Global Net, available at https://homes.eff.org/-barlow/EconomyOfldeas.html).
91. 12 BVerfGE 205, 263 (1961); 31 BverfGE 314, 325 (1972); see also
Constitutionalizing Communications at 115.
92. JORGEN HABERMAS, STRUKTURWANDEL DER OFFENTLICHKEIT (Hermann
Luchterhand Verlag, 1962), published in English as THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION
OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE (1989).
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communications architectures. Are the constitutional values of
Germany and other countries off-limits for any domestic legal or
policy debate?
The use of comparative and transnational law in Supreme
Court (and lower court) jurisprudence is not unknown, but some
U.S. jurists famously resist citation to foreign precedent. Justice
Rehnquist extolled the benefits of such a comparative legal
approach, 93 while Justice Scalia worried about the "brave new
meaning" the Constitution might be given through such a
comparative approach. 94 The consensus view in the scholarly
93. William Rehnquist, Verfassunggerichte - vergleichende Bemerkungen," in
DEUTSCHLAND UND SEIN GRUNDGESETZ 454 (KIRCHHOF, KOMMERS, EDS .) (Nomos
Verlag, 1993), ("[i]t is time that United States courts begin looking to the decisions
of other constitutional courts to aid them in their own deliberative process"), quoted
in Kommers, Can German Constitutionalism Serves as a Model for the United States, 58
ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHEs RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 787 (1998);
see also Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE
L.J. 1225, 1280 n.262, passim (1999).
94. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 627, n.9 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting,
rejecting majority's finding, partially in light of foreign precedent, that the juvenile
death penalty was no longer acceptable under the Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Constitution):
The Court responds that "[i]t does not lessen our fidelity to the
Constitution or our pride in its origins to acknowledge that the express
affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations and peoples
simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own
heritage of freedom." Ante, at 578. To begin with, I do not believe that
approval by "other nations and peoples" should buttress our commitment
to American principles any more than (what should logically follow)
disapproval by "other nations and peoples" should weaken that
commitment. More importantly, however, the Court's statement flatly
misdescribes what is going on here. Foreign sources are cited today, not to
underscore our "fidelity" to the Constitution, our "pride in its origins,"
and "our own [American] heritage." To the contrary, they are cited to set
aside the centuries-old American practice [of allowing juries to find death
penalty appropriate for minors]. What these foreign sources "affirm,"
rather than repudiate, is the Justices' own notion of how the world ought
to be, and their diktat that it shall be so henceforth in America.
Id. at 628. The majority's reliance on foreign law to repudiate the juvenile death
penalty unleashed a virulent reaction and calls for the impeachment of Justice
Kennedy, who had written the majority opinion. JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE 194-99
(2007) (the decision "tapped into a deep nativism"); Toobin, Swing Shift, How
Anthony Kennedy's Passion for Foreign Law Could Change the Supreme Court, Sept. 12,
2007 NEW YORKER ("debate over foreign law and the Constitution thrusts the
Supreme Court into the perennial struggle in American politics between
internationalists and isolationists"); compare German approach in, for example, 7
BVerfGE 198, 208 (1958) (Ltith decision) (quoting from Palko v. Connecticut 302 U.S.
319, 326-27 (1937) (Cardozo, J.)).
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literature seems to be that "the persuasive value of [such] a ....
source will depend on a combination of its reasoning, the
comparability of its contexts, and its institutional origin." 95
German constitutional experience, some argue, is relevant to
interpreting the U.S. Constitution under these criteria because both
countries share democratic values, a market economy, and because
of an intertwined history:
[T]he constitutional systems [in German and Italy] were our
"constitutional offspring," ... they "unmistakably drew their
origin and inspiration from American constitutional theory and
practice." Reciprocating was appropriate because "wise parents
do not hesitate to learn from their children." 96
As discussed above, the German Constitutional Court took what
was essentially an emergency, provisional and temporary
constitution, shaped under the Allies' watchful eyes, and made it its
own. The Court has repeatedly elaborated on the meaning of the
Article 5 communication guarantees in the Basic Law, and has
prodded the legislature (at least in the case of broadcasting) to adopt
an instrumentarium adequate to protecting a diverse and
information-rich public discourse.
Where the German Article 5 (in addition to securing the
freedom from government censorship) requires the legislature to
craft a system that insures sufficient information for public opinion-
building, the First Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court
is more often treated as a limit to what legislatures can do to
promote an adequately informed populace. 97
How did this difference arise, and how much does it matter
going forward, when it can be said that Germany's constitution is in
many respects more similar than dissimilar to the United States'
constitution? Most constitutional taxonomies look first at whether a
constitution is written or oral, located in one document or several,
95. Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law and Transnational Comparisons, the
Youngstown Decision and American Exceptionalism, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 191, 206
(2006) (quoting her earlier work, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance,
Engagement, 199 HARV. L. REV. 109, 125 (2005)).
96. Tushnet, supra note 93, at 1226 (quoting United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464,
468-69 (2d. Cir., 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring).
97. One need here only adduce the negative First Amendment arguments made
against the Fairness Doctrine, "must carry" rules, and campaign finance legislation.
The further use of the First Amendment as a sword against social and consumer
protection legislation is discussed in Part V.C infra.
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provides for easy amendment or not, and allows (or requires)
constitutional review of executive and legislative acts or not.98 In
each of these areas, the similarity between the U.S. and German
constitutions outweighs their differences.
The difference between the two different constitutional
approaches to speech may be due to the textual differences
described above, or to a culture with a longer history of examining
issues at the nexus of law, speech and culture. Or it may come from
the distinction between a "procedural" constitution like our own,
the principal purpose of which is to define and limit the power of
the state, and a constitution like Germany's which incorporates
substantive values and requires government action to implement
those values. 99 At the risk of over-simplifying the matter,100 we can
cite at least two distinctions between the German Basic Law and the
U.S. Constitution: (1) the Basic Law specifically incorporates
substantive values, some of which (like human dignity and the
"democratic and social" nature of the German state) may not be
changed by amendment;101 and (2) the Basic Law has been
interpreted in many instances to require government action to
incorporate those values. 102  With regard to communications
freedom, the requirement of affirmative governmental action is
supported by the text, as the Basic Law refers to a "guarantee" of
98. England is the primary example of a country without a unified written
constitution (although it does have documents such as the English Magna Carta that
spell out the values under which English society is constituted). Other examples
are Israel and New Zealand. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET & VICKI JACKSON,
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 199 (1999) (Britain, Israel, and New Zealand
provide plausible examples of democratic governments functioning without a
single document commonly designated as a constitution).
99. See Sullivan, supra note 79 (contrasting "procedural" and "substantive"
approaches to free speech); compare Habermas' "proceduralist understanding of
law" based on substantive values, the "procedural conditions of the democratic
process," infra note 157 and accompanying text.
100. Constitutional theory, including comparative constitutionalism, has been
called "a large and vast discipline, [including] many different but importantly
interrelated subjects." BEAU BRESLIN, THE COMMUNITARIAN CONSTITUTION xii (2004).
101. Basic Law, Section 79(3) forbids "[a]ny change to this Basic Law, through
which . . . the rights secured by Articles 1 and 20 . . . are affected" (Eine Anderung
dieses Grundgesetzes, durch welche . . . die in den Artikeln 1 und 20 niedergelegten
Grundsditze beriihrt werden, ist unzulassig"). Article 1 recognizes the inviolability of
human dignity and human rights; Article 20 defines Germany as, among other
thihgs, a "democratic and social federal state."
102. See discussion in Part IV.B infra; see also infra note 103.
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free speech in the press, broadcast, and film contexts.103
The Constitutional Court has also adopted heuristic
mechanisms that extend the reach of the explicitly stated
communications freedoms. Private relationships can be affected by
these fundamental constitutional values. This is the so-called
Drittwirkung or radiating effect of constitutional rights, and is
somewhat analogous to the way the Supreme Court has read First
Amendment concerns into private libel actions in New York Times v.
Sullivan, or the Equal Protection clause into private property
relationships in Shelly v. Kramer. The Germans are able to do this,
however, without the intervening judicial construct of "state action"
(as discussed in Part IV.C infra).
Although U.S. and German constitutionalism are undeniably
different, there are points of familial relationship even where the
Constitutional Court is considering questions not yet broached by
the Supreme Court, or building on the works of Kant, Hegel and
other 19th century Rechtsphilosophen (legal philosophers).104  In
finding an objective right or value inherent in free speech, for
instance, the Constitutional Court quotes Justice Cardozo:
The basic right of freedom of opinion is the most immediate
expression of the human personality in society and, as such, one
of the noblest of human rights ... . It is absolutely basic to a
liberal-democratic constitutional order because it alone makes
possible the constant intellectual exchange and contest among
opinions that form the lifeblood of such an order; [indeed] it is
"the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of
freedom." 105
103. The text of the Basic Law also supports the role of government in protecting
other constitutional rights. The equal rights article (Article 3(1)) specifies that "the
State shall promote the actual implementation of equal rights for women and men
and the elimination of existing disadvantages" (emphasis added). Similarly, the
article on protection of family and marriage (Article 6(1) states that "Marriage and
family shall enjoy the special protection of the state.")
104. See KOMMERS, supra note 4, at 41 ("if American constitutional jurisprudence
locates its indigenous spiritual roots in the commonsense realism of Madison,
Hamilton, and Wilson, German constitutional jurisprudence finds its guiding light
in the idealistic rationalism of Hegel, Kant, and Fichte [but] [t]he Basic Law
represents a major break from this tradition. It does not regard the state as the
source of fundamental rights. The core of individual freedom, like human dignity
itself, is anterior to the state").
105. 7 BVerfGE 198, 208 (1958) (Liith) (quoting (in English) Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937) (emphasis added) (German-English translation from
KOMMERS, supra note 4, at 364-65).
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Finally, German constitutional and communications scholars have
devoted considerable effort to understanding the U.S. media
landscape. Early in his career, and long before he became a Justice
on the Constitutional Court, Professor Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem
spent a year in California writing a detailed critique of U.S.
broadcasting. 106 Significant parts of Jurgen Habermas' Between Facts
and Norms address U.S. constitutional law, and at other points he
evokes a sort of dialogue between the two constitutional
traditions. 07
These common touchpoints could justify the consideration of
German communications jurisprudence in U.S. speech cases.
III. Defining Information Freedom
I have picked the term "information freedom" to act as a
standard-bearer for a complex of ideas that includes speech and
communications freedom, freedom of reception, free information
flow, "institutional" freedom of the press, and freedom of
broadcasting - in sum, for a democratic and discourse-theoretical
approach to speech. In so doing, my hope is that the phrase
"information freedom" will flip the First Amendment gaze from
speaker to listener, from the individual's expression to a process
which includes both expression and reception.
At the outset, let me bracket out of this discussion several uses
of the phrase that are not my focus here. First, is information in the
106. WOLFGANG HOFFMANN-RIEM, KOMMERZIELLES FERNSEHEN [COMMERCIAL
TELEVISION] (Nomos, 1981). Before his appointment to the Constitutional Court in
1999, Hoffmann-Riem returned to California to teach a media law course at
Hastings College of the Law. As Prof. Kommers has noted:
Many German justices have a close familiarity with American
constitutional law. Indeed, a full set of the United States Supreme Court
Reports is available in the library of the [then] West German Federal
Constitutional Court. Perhaps one day this manifest interest in our
constitutional jurisprudence will be reciprocated by U.S. Supreme Court
Justices ....
[I]n some areas . . German and American constitutional principles and
theories could be blended fruitfully and seasonably to produce more
equitable balances between rights and duties within the American political
order.
Donald Kommers, The Value of Comparative Constitutional Law, 9 J. MARSHALL J. OF
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 685 (1976) quoted in JACKSON & TUSHNET supra note 98, at 149.
107. JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 267-81 (William Rehg trans., 1996)
(containing an extended discussion of U.S. constitutional law).
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hands of government - the subject of Freedom of Information Acts
(FOIA) here, in the U.K., and throughout the world. Secondly, are
privacy issues, which often are framed in terms of informational
autonomy or control over personal information. While these
concepts are certainly related to the information freedom I mean,
indeed FOIA can be considered a subset of it, they do not precisely
track what I am getting at here - the rights of information
consumers, including the right to select information.
As used in this paper then, "information freedom" is an
amalgam of concepts, drawn mainly from the German
Constitutional Court, but also from international treaties, U.S. policy
statements, the writings of constitutional law scholars, and what I
call an "underground" current or rhizome strain of U.S. Supreme
Court thinking that surfaces, sometimes out of context, in the
Supreme Court's speech decisions.
A. Information Freedom in German Constitutional Law
Information freedom is described in the Basic Law as the right
"freely to inform [one's] self from generally accessible sources." Its
content has been most fully worked out in German constitutional
cases involving broadcasting freedom (Rundfunkfreiheit), and in
press cases where information freedom (Informationsfreiheit) stands
more on its own.
In the Third (or FRAG) Broadcasting Decision,1 08 the
Constitutional Court stated that "[f]reedom of broadcasting serves
the same purpose as do all of the guarantees of Article 5: free
individual and public opinion building." 0 9 This opinion building,
or Meinungsbildung, cannot occur in the absence of freedom of
information, "the freedom to hear the expressed opinion of others,
[and] to inform one's self."110
The Constitutional Court has made clear that, at least in
108. See generally Constitutionalizing Communications, supra note 1, at 168-88.
109 57 BVerfGE 295, 319, 321 (1982) (identifying broadcasting freedom as the
point where "different constitutional rights positions meet, and may even collide,"
and observing that "[t]o the legislator belongs the duty of mediating such
collisions").
110. Id. at 320-21; see also Fifth Decision, 74 BVerfGE 297, 323 (1987); Sixth
Decision, 83 BVerfGE 238, 295-96 (1991) (using almost identical language); Ninth
Decision, 114 BVerfGE 371, 387 (2005) (same); see also Constitutionalizing
Communications, supra note 1, at 117-21 for an overview of the ten or so (depending
on how they are counted) broadcasting Decisions of the Constitutional Court.
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broadcasting, the Legislature has a duty to protect the information
transfer process:
The securing of free informational activities and free information
access constitute an important concern of the Basic Law. . .There
is thus a public welfare aspect to the prevention of information
monopolies and the securing of a plurality of viewpoints and
offerings .... [Free individual and public opinion-building] can
only occur under the conditions of comprehensive and truthful
information. Information contributes to education and to the
testing of opinions. For that reason, Article 5, paragraph 1,
sentence 2 of the Basic Law demands that the informational
requirements of opinion-building be satisfied in this leading
medium of broadcasting. 1
As we will see, these words are not merely high theory; they have
been applied in concrete cases to tip the scales in favor of a diversity
of information, for example in the antitrust analysis applied to the
merger application of Germany's largest publisher (Springer) with
one of its largest broadcasters (Sat 1), as discussed below.112
In the infamous 1966 case of the Spiegel Search Warrants,
involving the "institutional freedom" of the press,113 the
Constitutional Court posited information freedom as an essential
part of a democratic constitution in a context other than
broadcasting: "If a citizen is to make a political decision, he must be
comprehensively informed, and also know and be able to weigh the
opinions that others have developed."114
In 1969, the Constitutional Court expanded on the concept of
information freedom in the context of deciding whether West
German officials could censor or restrict access to East German
newspapers. In the Leipzig Newspaper Decision, the Constitutional
Court found government attempts to interfere with the newspapers'
distribution to be an unconstitutional infringement on information
freedom:
111. 97 BVerfGE 228, 256-57 (1998) ("Short Reporting" Decision).
112. See Parts IV.C and VI.B infra. The U.S. Supreme Court likewise has cited
free speech values in Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1945), as
discussed in Part V.A infra.
113. See Constitutionalizing Communications, supra note 1, at 130; see also
comparison drawn in Part V.B infra between the German concept of "objective
rights" and the Supreme Court's construction of "interests broader than those of
the party seeking their vindication."
114. 20 BVerfGE 162, 174-75 (1966).
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Information freedom stands in the constitutional order as co-equal
with freedom of opinion and freedom of the press. It is not
merely a component part of the right freely to express and
disseminate opinion ... [but] also itself a prerequisite of the
opinion building which precedes the expression of that opinion.
Only comprehensive information, fed by sufficiently broad sources,
makes possible the free opinion building and expression of the individual
as well as the community.115
The Constitutional Court referred briefly, but powerfully, to
information freedom's troubled history in Germany:
This notion of information freedom first found expression after
the Second World War in the constitutions of the individual
German States [citations omitted], and then finally in the Basic
Law. The recognition of such an independent constitutional
guarantee was prompted by the National-Socialist practice of
government limitations on access to information, state control
over opinion, and prohibitions on the reception of foreign radio
broadcasts and selected literary and artistic works.116
The Court noted that the United Nations' Universal Declaration
of Human Rights of 1948 had also protected the ability to "obtain
and receive reporting and ideas through any form of transmission
and independent of borders," and that the European Convention on
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms had
adopted a similar protection two years later. 117
115. 27 BVerfGE 71, 81 (1969) (emphasis added).
116. Id. at 80. The validation of this subjective right in Leipzig Newspaper took the
form of an injunction against the government's interference with West German
citizen access to the East German press, but it created it created in this instance no
positive duty of the legislature to insure citizen access to that information. The
Court's emphasis on "comprehensive" information (n.111 and accompanying text)
as a prerequisite of democratic opinion-building has led to a discussion of the limits
of this principle, and conversely whether the government might in certain
circumstances have a positive duty to protect the public's basic information supply
("informationelle Grundversorgung"). MICHAEL KLOEPFER, INFORMATIONSRECHT §3
1-13, 64 (2002).
117. 27 BVerfGE at 82 (citing Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 19, (10
Dec. 1948) U.N.G.A. Res. 217 A (III) (1948); European Convention on the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 10(1)(Rome, 4 Nov. 1950), 312
E.T.S. 5, as amended by Protocol No. 3, E.T.S. 45; Protocol No. 5, E.T.S. 55; Protocol
No. 8, E.T.S. 118; and Protocol No. 11, E.T.S. 155; entered into force 3 Sept. 1953
(Protocol No. 3 on 21 Sept. 1970, Protocol No. 5 on 20 Dec. 1971, Protocol No. 8 on 1
Jan. 1990, Protocol No. 11 on 11 Jan. 1998) [hereinafter ECHR].
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B. Information Freedom in International Treaties and Law
International treaties also reflect the slow maturation of the idea
of information freedom, sometimes against formidable opposition.
The end of World War II was an anchor point not just for Germany
constitutional law, but also for the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, which the United Nations General Assembly adopted on
December 10, 1948, in Paris, France. The Universal Declaration
includes Article 19, specifically relating to the freedom of speech
and information:
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this
right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any
media and regardless of frontiers.118
Among its champions was Eleanor Roosevelt. It was not, however,
binding in any way on the U.N. member states. Nonetheless, Article
19 has been a standard reference point in public discussion, and
more recently has served as the inspiration for several web-based
information freedom campaigns.119
The continuing traction of information freedom on the
international stage was affirmed by the General Assembly's
adoption of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
in 1966 (effective 1976), which included an Article 19.2 that closely
echoed Article 19 of the Universal Declaration, this time in what is
considered by some (at least) to be a binding, international treaty.120
118. Full text available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Pages/Language.
aspx?LanglD=eng; for a history of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, see
also http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/history.shtml; see also LEE C.
BOLLINGER, UNINHIBITED, ROBUST, AND WIDE-OPEN, A FREE PRESS FOR A NEW CENTURY
119, 137-40 n.40 (2010) (quoting Report of the Special Rapporteur, Promotion and
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1998/40 Jan. 28, 1998, 1114 (arguing that "right to seek, receive and impart
information imposes a positive obligation on States to ensure access to information,
particularly with regard to information held by Government in all types of storage
and retrieval systems")).
119. See, e.g., www.articlel9.org, and www.freespeechdebate.com.
120. See Philip L. Verveer, State Dept. Coordinator for International
Communications and Information Policy, Two Cases for Internet Freedom, Remarks at
Winnik Telecom and Internet Forum (May 12, 2012), available at http://www.
state.gov/e/eb/rls/rm/2012/190144.htm. Article 19.2 states:
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally or in print, in the form of art, or
through any other media of his choice.
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At the European level, battles have been fought to enshrine
information freedom as a fully binding principle of European law.
The European Union in its various manifestations has been a
primarily mercantile enterprise; whether through the principle of
subsidiarity or otherwise, democratic values are seen as primarily
the concern of the member states and their constitutions. 121 The
protection of free speech, communication, information, and
broadcasting on a federal or European level have been left largely to
two human rights treaties - the 1950 European Convention on
Human Rights and the more recent European Charter of
Fundamental Rights - neither of these treaties had full status in
European Union lawmaking until the Treaty of Lisbon adopted the
Charter in December, 2009,122 although the Convention had been
considered among the "primary" sources of European law. 123
In Article 10 of the European Convention, the European
Council guaranteed freedom of expression and the freedom to
receive information in words almost identical to Article 19.124 The
121. See European Court of Justice Opinion 2/94, 1 27 (1996) (holding that the
European Community Treaty, adopted in Maastricht in 1992, did not authorize the
European Community to enact rules on human rights or otherwise adopt the ECHR
which had been promulgated 42 years earlier); see also id. 1 33 (The European Court
of Justice "draws inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the
Member States and from the guidelines supplied by international treaties for the
protection of human rights [and] has stated that the Convention has special
significance," even if not formally binding law) (citation omitted). This Opinion,
and other shortcomings of the ECHR, led to the drafting of a successor document,
the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Opinion is available online, with
summary of parties' arguments, at
http://www.pravo.unizg.hr/_download/repository/ Opinion 2_1994.pdf.
122. See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the
Treaty Establishing the European Community, declaration 17, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007
O.J. (C 306) 1, at art. 6(1) ("The Union recognizes the rights, freedoms and
principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7
December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have
the same legal value as the Treaties"), available at http://eur-lex. europa.
eu/LexUriServ /LexUriServ.do? uri=OJ:C:2007:306:FULL:EN:PDF.
123. The ECHR was viewed as a primary source of European law, although it
had never been formally adopted by the European Union. DIETER DORR & ROLF
SCHWARTMANN, MEDIENRECHT 135 (1st ed., C.F. Miller, 2006) (ECHR represents
"unwritten EC fundamental rights").
124. ECHR, art. 10, 1 states as follows:
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This
article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting,
television or cinema enterprises.
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codification of these values as "enforceable individual rights" was
seen as a natural reaction to the "catastrophe of the second world
war."125
Nor was it surprising, coming twelve years before the German
Constitutional Court's first pronouncement on broadcasting
freedom,126 that Article 10 focuses on individual speech rights, and
not on speech, the press, or broadcasting seen in an objective,
institutional, or systemic light.127 Supporters of the German
Constitutional Court's broadcasting freedom jurisprudence viewed
Article 10 as anchored primarily in a negative freedom model,
rather than in the role broadcasting might play in society; they
worried that Article 10 would lead to "a market oriented
entrepreneurial freedom in the tradition of the press" rather than
the "public service" idea developed by the German Constitutional
Court and in other countries as well.128
These concerns played out fifty years later, when a council of
125. Martin Stock, EU-Medienfreiheit - Kommunikationsgrundrecht oder
Unternehmerfreiheit, in 2001 K&R 289, 290.
126. 12 BVerfGE 205 (1961) discussed in West German Television Law, supra note 1,
at 151-60.
127. See, e.g., Constitutionalizing Communications supra note 1, at 130; see also Parts
IV.B. and V.B, infra. Broadcasting was conceived of as a "public service" in both
Germany and the U.K. Cf Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, Rundfunk als Public Service,
Anmerkungen zur Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft offentlich-rechtlichen
Rundfunks [Broadcasting as Public Service: Notes on the Past, Present, and Future of
Public-Law Broadcasting], 54 M&K 95, 96 (2006) (BBC's Hugh Carlton Greene as early
inspiration for North German Broadcasting).
128. Stock, supra note 125, at 293. Their worries were not unfounded, as the
European law has been used to challenge national public service broadcasting
institutions, as discussed in Constitutionalizing Communications, supra note 1, at 186-
88 and 195-96. See also Degenhart, Medienrecht und Medienpolitik im 21 Jahrhundert,
2000 K&R 49, 52-54 (arguing that Article 10 of the European Human Rights
Convention anchors primarily a subjective right of broadcasting producers to
engage in that activity, and that neither the European Convention nor the German
Basic Law support a continuing objective "special order" for broadcasting
institutions in an age of international networks, IP technologies, and convergence);
but see Wolfgang Schulz, Konzeptionelle Voriiberlegungen zu einer europiischen
"Content without Frontiers Directive," 2003 K&R 577, 579 n.23-24 and accompanying
text ("disputes continue as to [whether and] what extent this norm [Article 10 of the
Convention] contains something like the legislative duty to guarantee [broadcasting
freedom as derived from] the Basic Law. The decisionmaking of the European
Court of Human Rights, however, does legitimize state regulation in service of
guaranteeing broadcasting pluralism") (citations omitted, emphasis added); Dorr,
Miglichkeiten u Grenzen europyiischer Medienpolitik: Konvergenz u Kompetenz, 1999
K&R 102 ("Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights demands. . a
total [broadcasting] offering that corresponds to the pluralism principle").
1832012]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
the European Union adopted a Charter of Fundamental Rights,
which was to serve as a prototype for a European Constitution.
Article 11 of the Charter provides:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right
shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart
information and ideas without interference by public authority
and regardless of frontiers.
2. The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected. 129
Beneath these placid words, particularly those in the second
paragraph, lay a prolonged struggle to add a social and democratic
dimension to the Charter. The German contingent fought to add
language recognizing the imperative of free and neutral speech
carriers, not just individual free speech.130 As late as the
penultimate draft of the document, the second paragraph had read
"The freedom and pluralism of the media are guaranteed."131 The
spectre of an "objective law structural principle," capable of
mandating unified European action to preserve freedom and
pluralism of the media as the Constitutional Court had developed
these concepts, was apparently too much for "potentially affected
private enterprises" who immediately set to work convincing
important German politicians to push for a less binding EU role.
Private broadcasters joined with individual German States who
were afraid they would be preempted by a new supranational
European law; at the last moment, the verb "respected" was
substituted for the verb "guaranteed," and the above language was
approved.132
Although less democratic (in the sense of the German
communications jurisprudence) than it might have been, at least one
observer believes that the words "freedom and pluralism of the
media" helped overcome the "market oriented solipsism" of the
earlier Convention, 133 and gave recognition to something akin to
129. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 7, 2000, O.J. (C
364) 1, art. 11 available at http://www.eucharter.org/home.php?page-id=18.
130. Stock, supra note 125, at 289, passim.
131. Id. at 300 (emphasis added).
132. Id. As reflected throughout this discussion, there is a tri-level federalism at
play here, with the European Community, the German Federal Republic, and the
individual German States (which have jurisdiction over cultural matters) all vying
for primacy in broadcasting and communication issues. See Constitutionalizing
Communications, supra note 1, at 193-96.
133. Stock, supra note 125, at 293.
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communications freedom, the principle of independent
broadcasting and other media institutions as a necessary function in
a democratic society.13 4
Thus, while the European Community Treaty's free trade
provisions act as the equivalent of a "dormant commerce clause"
prohibiting member state legislation that might be construed to
interfere with a common European market, the Treaty still lacks
specific complementary authorization for a European-wide
replacement for the broadcasting-specific regulation that may be
preempted, i.e., "legislation for communications purposes, plurality
and equal communications opportunities."135
C. Information Freedom in U.S. Policy Statements
In 2010, at the Newseum, the press industry's glittering
monument to itself,136 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pronounced
"The spread of information networks is forming a new nervous
system for our planet."137 She recalled how President Obama had
"defended the right of people to freely access information" when he
visited China. She spoke of "threats to the free flow of information,"
but located those threats primarily (if not exclusively) in foreign
governments, reminding them that a "connection to global
information networks is like an on-ramp to modernity." She used
the phrase "information freedom," and concluded by stating the
134. In 2006, the EC adopted a UNESCO Convention on the Protection and
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions 2005, which some believe could
open the way to a more specifically communications-oriented bill of rights. The EC
decision is memorialized at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=IP/06/1830&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=fr;
and the UNESCO Convention is found at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL ID=31038&URLDO=DOTOPIC&URLSECTION=201.html (Article 6(2)(h)
provides that members may adopt "measures aimed at enhancing diversity of the
media, including through public service broadcasting").
135. Schulz, supra note 128, at 579.
136. Some have argued that, while the Newseum presents a fascinating "cabinet
of curiosities," it is really a "fetishizing of trivial relics" at the expense of serious
issues in the distribution of news, including ownership concentration, Internet
issues, cultural bias, and the like. See Jack Shafer, Down with the Newseum and its
6,214 journalism artifacts!, SLATE.COM (Feb. 7, 2008), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news-and-politics/press-box/2008/02/downwith the newseum.html.; Rachel
Gans, The Newseum and Collective Memory: Narrowed Choices, Limited Voices, and
Rhetoric of Freedom, 26:4 JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION INQUIRY 370-90 (October 2002).
137. January 21, 2010, Remarks of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at the
Newseum, available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm.
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U.S. position in apparently unequivocal terms:
We stand for a single internet where all of humanity has equal
access to knowledge and ideas. And we recognize that the world's
information infrastructure will become what we and others make
of it.138
In a 2012 speech and policy statement, State Department
Coordinator for International Communications and Information
Policy and former antitrust attorney, Philip Verveer, made the
parallel legal case for "Internet Freedom grounded in human
rights," quoting from Article 19. "The right 'to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of
frontiers' is the embodiment of the rights-based case for Internet
Freedom, articulated some two decades before the concepts that,
reduced to practice, became the Internet." 139 Left unclear is whether
information freedom is understood by the State Department only as
a "negative freedom"; the notion of private censorship or economic
concentration in the information and communication businesses is
almost entirely absent. Indeed, Verveer voices the hope that
economic interests will drive Internet openness abroad, while
leaving untouched the actions of those interests at home.
Finally, President Obama himself has repeatedly emphasized
the importance of free information flow. When he visited China and
met with Chinese students in 2009, he stated (in remarks censored
by Chinese media) that "access to information" was a "universal
right," and "that the more freely information flows, the stronger the
society becomes."140
Unfortunately, the reality was (and remains) that U.S. law is
itself not always hospitable to a freer information flow, as described
138. Id. Secretary Clinton has addressed this issue on several subsequent
occasions. See, e.g., February 15, 2011 speech at George Washington University,
available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/02/156619.htm ("Internet
Rights and Wrongs: Choices and Challenges in a Networked World").
139. See Philip L. Verveer, State Dept. Coordinator for International
Communications and Information Policy, Two Cases for Internet Freedom, remarks at
Winnik Telecom and Internet Forum (May 12, 2012), available at http://www.
state.gov/e/eb/rls/rm/2012/190144.htm; see also Philip L. Verveer, Remarks at the
Internet Governance, Internet Freedom, and Economics Conference on the Arab World after
the Arab Spring, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/rm/2012/189500.htm.
140. President Barack Obama, remarks at Museum of Science and Technology,





below. While it is true that the Internet represents still, and for the
most part, a single, global, interconnected and largely integrated
network, and that "the world's information infrastructure will
become what we make of it," there is no acknowledgement in any of
these official pronouncements of problems with information
freedom at home, or of threats to information freedom from the
commercial sector, just happy talk about "principles like
information freedom [that] aren't just good policy, not just
somehow connected to our national values, but [that] are universal
and ... also good for business." 141 And, while there are hints of the
constricting effects of private censorship, there is no readily
apparent discussion of this topic on the State Department's webpage
devoted to "Internet Freedom."142
141. Clinton remarks, supra note 137. The State Department's Verveer, while
hoping that economic interests will drive information freedom, at the same time
finds it necessary to "urg[e] U.S. media companies to take a proactive role in
challenging foreign governments' demands for censorship and surveillance." Nor
is there any discussion of the elephant in the living room - the screening and deep
packet inspection techniques sold by U.S. companies to repressive foreign
governments, and deployed for financial and (they argue) operational reasons
domestically, as described below. See generally REBECCA MACKINNON, THE CONSENT
OF THE NETWORKED 53 (2012).
142. See Internet Freedom, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/e/ eb/cip
/netfreedom/index.htm#work. The State Department has posted a 2009 report of
Freedom House, Freedom on the Net - A Global Assessment of Internet and Digital
Media, which does note the possibility of private censorship, albeit in a different
context than discussed in this article:
Privatization of censorship: There is a growing trend toward outsourcing
censorship and monitoring to private companies, as opposed to direct
intervention by government agencies. In a range of countries with
differing levels of democracy, private entities and their employees -
including service providers, blog-hosting companies, cybercafes, and
mobile-phone operators - are being required by governments or other
actors to censor and monitor information and communication technologies
(ICTs). This has been the case for local and multinational enterprises alike.
Id. at 2, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/135959.pdf.
This description of censorship at the instigation of the state differs by definition
from the self-interested and self-initiated censorship of broadband networks
operators and ISPs, described in Part V.F infra.
Freedom House does, at least, ask many of the right questions:
To what extent are sources of information that are robust and reflect a
diversity of viewpoints readily available to citizens ... ?
Does the public have ready access to media outlets or websites that express
independent, balanced views?
Does the public have ready access to sources of information that represent
a range of political and social viewpoints, including those of vulnerable or
marginalized groups in society?
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D. Information Freedom in U.S. Law, Legal Thinking, Philosophy,
and the Marketplace
While there are intimations, and occasionally bold statements,
of information freedom in U.S. constitutional law, U.S. speech
jurisprudence circa 2012 is still largely in thrall to an individual,
speaker-centric, and "negative freedom" view of free speech. The
concept of information freedom presented here is informed by the
minority view in U.S. law, discussed in Parts V.A and B below, by
legal thinkers like Cass Sunstein, pundits like James Surowiecki, by
philosopher John Rawls, and by "digital natives" and legal
advocates Larry Lessig, Tim Wu, Susan Crawford, Marvin Ammori,
and (contrariwise) Christopher Yoo.143
I do not mean to suggest that the digital revolution has
spawned only high-flown rhetoric and giddy optimism. To be sure,
there is a dystopian side to the de facto information freedom
wrought by Internet Protocol and exponentially expanding
processing speeds and memory capacity. There is the problem of
cyber-terrorism. 1 44  With regard to the Information Age's
To what extent are online communication or social-networking sites used
as a means to organize politically, including for "real-life" activities?
Are there economic constraints that negatively impact users' ability to
publish content online ... ?
Is there a high degree of ownership concentration within the online
services and advertising industry?
Are users required to pay varying fees for different degrees of access and
publication rights (i.e., are there limitations on "net neutrality")?
Do users have access to free or low-cost blogging services, web hosts, etc.
that allow them to make use of the internet to express their own views?
Id. at 16-17.
143. See, in place of many, Amit Schejter, Moran Yemini, Justice, and Only Justice,
You Shall Pursue: Network Neutrality, the First Amendment and John Rawls's Theory of
Justice, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV 137, 171 (2007). Although "digital native"
is sometimes used to refer to a person "born during or after the general
introduction of digital technologies and [who] through interacting with digital
technology from an early age, has a greater understanding of its concepts," and
thus would not strictly include some of the persons mentioned, it nevertheless
conveys the sense of those who have grown up with the technology and forms a
contrast to more abstract and academic European public policy experts. Definition
of digital native found at Digital native, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Digitalnative. See also Stefan Geens, Europe Arrives? Berlin's Humboldt
Institute for Internet and Society Launches (Nov. 7, 2011) available at
http://dliberation.org/2011/11/0 7 /europe-arrives-berlins-humboldt-institute-for-
internet-and-society-launches/
144. See, e.g., Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley, Remarks to the Second Tri-Border
Conference in Manilla, Philippines on Terrorist Use of the Internet (June 28, 2010),
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implications for civil society, there are also problems and dissenting
voices; sometimes the same writer can wax from optimistic to
pessimistic from book to book, or in the space of a single book. 4 5
The reality of commercial censorship, however, poses a limit -
and I argue, the most significant limit - to the potential for
information freedom created by the Internet. Everything, from
newspapers to television (broadcast and cable), from the iPhone to
mail, is converging onto one network, thanks to IP technology; the
problem which animates this article is that ownership of that
network is concentrated in increasingly fewer hands. There is the
potential for information bottlenecks in every medium, and the
current network is no exception; it just seems the stakes are
higher.146
IV. Situating Information Freedom in German Law
Information Freedom is found in Article 5 of Germany's Basic
Law, embedded among the other Article 5 freedoms of the press,
broadcasting, and speech. It is part of a larger system of free
expression, from which it draws jurisprudential muscle.
available at http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/2010/143876.htm. Ms.
Abercrombie-Winstanley understands that there is a delicate balancing act here
between free speech and safety:
The Internet presents us with a paradox. On the one hand, it facilitates free
discussion and the exchange of information. It also provides another venue
for individuals to exercise their right to freedom of expression. But by the
same mechanism, it allows people to seek each other out anonymously; to
reinforce their negative views or plan violent action. The challenge for
open societies, therefore, is to maintain the free flow of information and
respect for freedom of expression, while discouraging those who would
exploit it to harm others.
Id. How this balance is to be worked out, and whether or not the U.S. Government
has balanced these issues correctly, is a large topic substantially beyond the scope
of this article. See also Elisabeth Bumiller & Thorn Shanker, Panetta Warns of Dire
Threat of Cyberattack, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/ 2012/10
/12/ world/ panetta-warns-of-dire-threat-of-cyberattack.html?pagewanted=all.
145. Cf CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 65 (2001) (group polarization and other
pitfalls of an online public sphere); SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA/How MANY MINDS
PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE (2006) (a decidedly more optimistic tour of Wikipedia and
other cooperative knowledge building projects on the web); see also JARON LANIER,
You ARE NOT A GADGET (2010); see also www.jaronlanier.com.
146. See, e.g., TIM Wu, THE MASTER SWITCH (2010) (describing information
bottlenecks and market failures in the radio, telegraph, film, and telephone
industries); see also description of "lower layer control" in note 34, supra, and
accompanying text.
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A. Beyond the Individual Speaker - a System of Communication
Essential to Democracy
The essential quality of the Constitutional Court's speech
jurisprudence is that it simultaneously protects an individual right,
and the preconditions for public discourse. And indeed the two
exist in a reciprocal relationship, as is reflected in the Court's mantra
of "free individual and public opinion building."147 Even before the
Constitutional Court's first foray into electronic media (its first
broadcasting decision in 1961), it had decided that speech was at the
center of its value system, the "matrix" of every other freedom, and
that self-government was the animating principle at the heart of
speech.148 By tying speech into a public discourse or "opinion-
building," the Constitutional Court has explicitly and repeatedly
situated speech and information freedom in the process of
communication:
Free opinion building takes place in a process of communication.
On the one hand, it requires the freedom to express, distribute
and publish opinions; on the other hand, [it requires] the freedom
to hear the expressed opinion of others, to inform one's self.
Inasmuch as Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Basic Law protects
freedom of expression, freedom of publication, and freedom of
information as human rights, it seeks at the same time to protect this
process constitutionally.149
The concept of speech as process encompasses speaker and
listener, content provider and information recipient. The goal is
public dialog, a discourse that will drive both "individual and
public opinion building."o50 The Germans see individual/subjective
147. "Free individual- and public opinion building" (freie individuelle- und
offentliche Meinungsbildung) is a recurrent trope in the Court's decisions. See, e.g.,
Constitutionalizing Communications, supra note 1, at 131 n.109 (citing 83 BVerfGE 238,
315 (1991); see also 73 BVerfGE 118, 152 (1986)). This leads in turn leading to
political will-building, elections, and democratic legitimacy for the government. Id.
at 158 (politische Willenbildung).
148. Lath, 7 BVerfGE 198, 208 (1958); Constitutionalizing Communications, supra
note 1, at 101.
149. Fifth Decision, 74 BVerfGE 297, 323 (1987) (emphasis added), slightly
different translation than offered at Constitutionalizing Communications, supra note 1,
at 176; compare English translation on University of Texas website, note 6, supra.
This or very similar language occurs throughout the trajectory of Constitutional
Court broadcasting decisions. See Third "FRAG" Decision, 57 BVerfGE 295, 319
(1981); Sixth Decision, 83 BVerfGE 238, 295-96 (1991); Ninth Decision, 114 BVerfGE
371, 387 (2005).
150. 57 BVerfGE 295, 319 (1982).
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and public/objective rights as two sides of the same coin, "whereby
subjective - and objective - right elements condition and support
one another." 151
This speech conception, in the hands of Jiirgen Habermas,
became known as a "discourse theory" of speech.152 Habermas was
not a lawyer but a sociologist who taught himself constitutional law
to better understand how constitutions structure discourse in the
public sphere.153  He has been able to escape some of the
Constitutional Court's formalism, and re-express some of the
Court's thought in a more robust (if for American ears still
convoluted) manner. Echoing the Constitutional Court, he
understands a sphere of private autonomy largely structured by
negative liberties, and a sphere of public autonomy leading to self-
government, where both exist "not as a zero sum game ... based on
an undialectical opposition," but as part of one continuum, one
"intersubjective" loop:
[Fully enfranchised citizens] can in turn adequately exercise their
public autonomy, guaranteed by rights of communication and
participation, only insofar as their private autonomy is
guaranteed. A well-secured private autonomy helps 'secure the
conditions' of public autonomy just as much as, conversely, the
appropriate exercise of public autonomy helps 'secure the
conditions' of private autonomy... . 154
151. Id. at 320 ("wobei subjektiv- und objektivrechtliche Elemente einander bedingen
und statzen"). Several years later, the Fifth Decision reformulated this as
"penetrate and support one another." 74 BVerfGE at 323 ("einander durchdringen
und statzen").
152. See, e.g., Habermas, supra note 68, at 1478, passim.
153. Cf MATTHEW SPECTER & JORGEN HABERMAS, AN INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY 28-
34 (2012) ("the most decisive intellectual stimuli to his reformulation of Frankfurt
School cultural pessimism came from his encounter with ... West German
constitutional law").
154. Habermas, supra note 68, at 1544-45 ("not as a zero sum game" but
"intersubjective"); HABERMAS supra, note 107, at 408. Cf. Constitutional Court's
mantra of "free individual and public opinion building," a concatenation repeated
in almost every opinion touching on communications freedom as discussed
citations in note 147, supra. I do not mean to suggest, however, that Habermas and
the Constitutional Court were always in complete alignment. In fact, Habermas
had some severe hesitation about whether the Constitutional Court was prescribing
values for the public, rather than rules that would allow the public to arrive at its
values consensus. SPECTER, HABERMAS, AN INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY, supra note 153,
at 197 ("In 'the wording and tenor' of some important opinions of the Federal
Constitutional Court, Habermas detected a tendency to treat the Basic Law '... not
so much as a system of rules structured by principles, but as a 'concrete order of
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Participating in the democratic discourse allows the individual to
feel that s/he is not only subject to the laws, but is also a co-creator
of them.155 This specter inspires a "constitutional patriotism."156
Habermas' "proceduralist" understanding of law, centered on the
procedural conditions of a democratic process and an
"unsubverted" public discourse, overcomes (he believes) the
polarity between personal and public autonomy (the latter
concretized inter alia in the electoral decisions of the citizenry). 157
Similarly, the Constitutional Court has conceived of electronic
communications freedom as incorporating constitutional protections
for both broadcast speaker and information-recipient, and for
individual and public opinion-building; the network is the place
where
different constitutional positions meet, and possibly collide ... on
the one hand the claim, based on information freedom, of a right
to comprehensive and truthful information, on the other hand [the
claim based on] the freedom of expression of those who produce
the programming or speak in the broadcasts. 158
Communications freedom thus protects a system of communication,
and the individual in both speaking and receiving modes within
values"').
155. Habermas, Paradigms of Law, 17 CARDOZo L. REV 771, 776 (1996) ("legal
persons are autonomous only insofar as they can understand themselves at the
same time as authors of the law to which they are subject as addressees").
156. Habermas, supra note 68, at 1481.
157. See Habermas, supra note 155, at 776:
I would like to propose a proceduralist understanding of law that is
centered on the procedural conditions of the democratic process.
According to this view, the legal order is structured neither by the measure
of individual legal protection for private-autonomous market participants
nor by the measure of comprehensive social security for the clients of
welfare-state bureaucracies. Although it is supposed to provide or
guarantee both of these, they do not form the paradigmatic cases. In the
proceduralist paradigm of law, the vacant places of the economic man or
welfare-client are occupied by a public of citizens who participate in
political communication in order to articulate their wants and needs, to
give voice to their violated interests, and, above all, to clarify and settle the
contested standards and criteria according to which equals are treated
equally and unequals unequally.
158. 57 BVerfGE 295, 321 (1982) ("Namentlich treffen verschiedene
Grundrechtspositionen zusammen, die in Kollision miteinander geraten konnen, einerseits
der aus der Informationsfreiheit folgende Anspruch auf umfassende und wahrheitsgemj3e
Information, andererseits die Freiheit der Meinungsdufierung derjenigen, welche die
Programme herstellen oder in den Sendungen zu Wort kommen").
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that system. In this construct, speech happens on a network, but the
network owners are not ipso facto speakers.
B. Duty of Legislature to Protect this System of Communication
In German jurisprudence, communications freedom is seen as
an "objective value," i.e., not solely as an individual right, but as a
framing value directed to society as a whole. 159 Objective values
impose a "positive obligation on the state" to create the conditions
under which the constitutional freedoms can be meaningfully
exercised,"160 and a duty on the part of the lawmaker to protect those
constitutional values and rights through legislation and/or
enforcement.161 Thus, for example, in a 1972 case involving
vocational training, the Court extrapolated from Section 12 of the
Basic Law, which protects the "right to freely choose career,
workplace, and educational or training path," to find a duty on the
part of government to provide sufficient educational and training
possibilities to make this choice real. "Without the factual
prerequisites [for career preparation], the freedom to make such
choices would be an empty promise [wertlos]."162 Other German
constitutional rights said to create duties because of their broad
social implications are the freedom of research and teaching (Freiheit
von Forschung u. Lehre) found in paragraph 3 of Article 5, and the
rights of parents (Erziehungsrecht) found in Article 6 of the Basic Law
(which, like broadcasting, is characterized as a "serving" freedom,
and obligates the parent to act as trustee for the child).163
In information markets, the legislature has a positive duty to
prevent "dominant opinion-making power" (vorherrschende
159. Constitutionalizing Communications, supra note 1, at 130-33.
160. KOMMERS, supra, note 4, at 47 ("Every basic right in the Constitution - for
example, freedom of speech, press, religion, occupation - has a corresponding
value. A basic right is a negative right against the state, but this right also
represents a value, and as a value it imposes a positive obligation on the state to
ensure that it becomes an integral part of the legal order"). Thus, says Kommers,
"while basic rights apply directly to state action, they [also] apply indirectly to
substantive private law" such as interpretations of the Civil Code. Id.
161. See, e.g., 7 BVerfGE 198, 205-08 (1958); 74 BVerfGE 297, 323 (1987).
162. 33 BVerfGE 330-31 (1972).
163. Fink, Wem dient die Rundfunkfreiheit? [Whom does Broadcasting Freedom
Serve?] 19/1992 DIE OEFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG (DOV) 805, 805 n.4-5 and
accompanying text, (citing 59 BVerfGE 360, 377 (1982)); see also notes 102-03 supra,
and accompanying text.
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Meinungsmacht) in the nation's media.164 The Constitutional Court's
NDR or Fourth Broadcasting Decision, after setting out the
legislature's responsibility to create a framework of balanced
diversity in broadcasting, also charged legislators with continuing
obligation to monitor the media marketplace to prevent a coming
together of economic and journalistic power that could produce this
"dominant opinion power." 165
C. The Radiating Effect of Communications Freedom
Because communications freedom is an objective value, the
Germans can apply it - like other constitutional standards - to the
resolution of individual disputes, whether sounding in property,
tort or contract law. 166 This is appropriate when a rote application
of the civil law leaves constitutional rights unprotected. Once an
objective constitutional principle is established, it is said to have a
"radiating effect" on private-law relationships. 167
This, and the related notion of "objective law," were developed
by the Constitutional Court in its 1958 Lath Decision. Luth was in
many ways similar to New York Times v. Sullivan.168  The
164. See, in place of many, 95 BVerfGE 163 (1996) (the German Sports Television
Decision); see also Constitutionalizing Communications, supra note 1, at 120, 165-73.
165. 73 BVerfGE at 172, 175 (1986) (The "constitutional guarantee of free opinion
building also requires that legal precautions be taken against dominant opinion
power that might arise from a combination of influence in broadcasting and the
press."), 180 (citing Spiegel Search, 20 BVerfGE 162, 175 passim (1966), for the
proposition that "the development of opinion monopolies" poses dangers to a free
press).
166. BARENDT, supra note 2, at 62 ("[constitutional] rights, in this case freedom of
expression, create a system of values which must influence all spheres of law and
shape the development of private law. Further, private law itself forms part of the
'general laws' which must be interpreted and applied in conformity with basic
constitutional rights.").
167. A good discussion of these principles is found in KOMMERS, supra note 2, at
362-69. "[W]hile basic rights apply directly to state action, they [also] apply
indirectly to substantive private law" such as the Civil Code (alterations added); see
also Peter Quint's seminal article, Free Speech and Private Law in German
Constitutional Theory, 48 MD. L. REV. 247, 277-78 (1989); and West German Television
Law, supra note 1, at 155-56 (discussion of objective norms, as developed in the
Spiegel, Blinckfiier, and Lzith cases).
168. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964). Both cases grew out
of a perceived disparagement of an individual (alleged defamation of an Alabama
sheriff, a call to boycott an ex-Nazi, respectively), and an attempt to recover
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Constitutional Court overruled a lower court finding of liability
under a civil statute regarding intentionally damaging acts, holding
that a social and democratic "system of values" was incorporated
into the Basic Law, and "must apply as a constitutional axiom
throughout the whole system," i.e., in both public and private
law:169
... [T]he Basic Law is not a values neutral document [citations
omitted]. Its section on basic rights establishes an objective order
of values. . . This value system, which centers on the dignity of
the human personality developing freely within the social
community, must be looked upon as a fundamental constitutional
decision affecting all spheres of law [public and private].
Legislation, public administration, and adjudication all receive
direction and impulse from this objective value system. Thus it
clearly also influences the development of private law. Every
provision of private law must be compatible with this system of
values, and every such provision must be interpreted in its
spirit. 170
In this case, the constitutional claims effectively trumped the
German Civil Code, not because of some found state action (as in
U.S. case of New York Times v. Sullivan),171 but because of the
magnetic pull of the constitutional value itself.172 It was in the Liith
damages for same. The speaker in the New York Times case was the newspaper; in
Luth the speaker was a German legislator who called for a boycott of a director with
alleged Nazi sympathies; in both cases, the complainant was the person attacked by
the speech; in both cases the highest court acted to protect speech which otherwise
would have been civilly actionable. State action did not figure in Luth as it did in
New York Times, German objective law concepts having rendered a finding of state
action unnecessary. See discussion at note 170, infra.
169. 7 BVerfGE 198, 205 (1958) (translation partly from KOMMERS, supra note 2, at
363, and partly by the author).
170. Id. The Luth court went on to state that:
... The influence of the constitutional values system affects particularly
those provisions of private law that contain mandatory rules of law and
thus form part of the ordre public - in the broad sense of the term - that is,
rules which for reasons of the general welfare are also binding on private
legal relationships and are removed from the dominion of private intent.
Id. at 206.
171. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 265 ("state action" found because "[a]lthough this is a
civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts have applied a state rule
of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional
freedoms of speech and press").
172. Kommers says of Lath, "The court ruled that while basic rights apply
directly to state action, they [also] apply indirectly to substantive private law."
KOMMERS, supra note 4, at 49 (emphasis in original).
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case that the German Constitutional Court most emphatically put
the "constant intellectual exchange and contest among opinions" at
the center of the German legal system. 173
The radiating effect of German constitutional values obviates
the need to find state action in order to apply these democratic
values. In Lath we saw it applied to civil damages law; in the
merger issues in the Satl/Springer case discussed below, we will see
it applied to antitrust.174
D. An Empirical Focus - Market Censorship as Real as Government
Censorship.
The German Constitutional Court's criticism of the marketplace
is more fundamental than the European Union's economic focus on
"significant market power," 175 or the United States' theoretical bar to
monopolies, or even the Supreme Court's occasional concern about
market power and anti-competitive conduct in the information
industry. 176 It is the German Constitutional Court's consistently
expressed belief that the market by itself, and by definition, cannot
provide for a fully democratic media. This sets its communications
173. 7 BVerfGE at 208.
174. Constitutionalizing Communications, supra note 1, at 170-73.
175. The European model "establishes a harmonized, horizontal regulatory
model that subjects [information and communications] industries to government
oversight geared to remedy-specific instances of ineffective competition." Frieden,
supra note 31, at 247, see also Constitutionalizing Communications, supra, note 1, at 213.
Under the European Union's Framework Directive, "[a]n undertaking shall be
deemed to have significant market power if, either individually or jointly with
others, it enjoys a position equivalent to dominance, that is to say a position of
economic strength affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent
independently of competitors, customers and ultimately consumers." Directive
2002/21/EC of the European Parliament on a Common Regulatory Framework for
Electronic Communication and Devices art. 14(2), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
information society/ topics/ telecoms/ regulatory/new.rf/documents/ 1108200204
24enOO330050.pdf; see also J. Scott Marcus, The Potential Relevance to the United States
of the European Union's Newly Adopted Regulatory Framework for Telecommunications
28 (FCC, OPP Working Paper Series No. 36 2002); J Scott Marcus, Europe's New
Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communication in Action 6 (2004) (unpublished
manuscript), available at ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/div/KTO4/Paper-Marc
usInvited.pdf.
176. See generally Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7; see 15 U.S.C. § 2
("Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty
of a felony"); see also Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)
(anticompetitive conduct in information industry).
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jurisprudence apart from that of the United States. In its Fourth
Decision, the Constitutional Court put the case this way:
Private programming is not adequate to the task of providing
comprehensive information in full measure to the public . . . it
does not communicate information across the full breadth of
opinions and cultural currents in society. 177
The Constitutional Court has looked beyond spectrum scarcity
to a more generalized observation about the flattening affect of
advertising on program content:
Independent of [the scarcity rationale], one cannot expect from
private broadcasters a broad array of programming, because the
private broadcaster is dependent on income from business
advertising. Such advertising income increases only when the
private program reaches sufficiently high viewership.
Broadcasters thus stand before the economic necessity of
providing the most broadly attractive programs, designed to
maximize listener and viewer numbers, and to do so at the lowest
possible costs.178
The ConstitutionalCourt has consistently found that programs
intended for small audiences may not be commercially viable,
although they are important to the ecology of public opinion,
"necessary to the complete array of information without which
opinion building in a constitutional sense is impossible." 179
This value judgment, although one of the mainstays of German
media jurisprudence, has engendered sharp criticism both in
Germany and in the United States.180 Ironically, however, even the
conservative political parties in Germany agree that it is
commercially impossible to provide full and objective news coverage
in an advertising-driven broadcasting environment (and thus, they
argue, private broadcasters should be relieved of diversity and
fairness obligations, with public broadcasters to play a
177. 73 BverfGE 118, 155 (1986); see also West German Television Law, supra note 1,
at 174-75 (quoting 57 BVerfGE 295, 322-23 (1982)).
178 73 BVerfGE at 155. The German Court also noted the "extraordinary high
cost of television programming," and the resulting "small number of broadcasters"
active in Germany. Id. at 154-55.
179. Id. at 155-56.
180. See, e.g., Uli Widmaier, German Broadcast Regulation: A Model for a New First
Amendment? 21 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 77, 107, 151 (1998) (German "values
focus" constitutes an "elitist fallacy" and amounts to "governmentally created
ethics of human interaction"); see further discussion in Part VLA infra.
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compensating role).181
The Court's later Decisions return repeatedly to the theme of
market failure. The Court's September 2007 Decision, for example,
measured the market's shortcomings against the ideal of
"programming [that] captures the diversity of information,
experience, values and behaviors in society." 182 The Court cited
studies in media economics to support its view that "broadcasting
has ... in comparison to other goods, special economic
characteristics."183 The Decision described advertising-financed
broadcasting as inevitably leading to a search for the largest possible
audience, with a host of negative results: "standardization" of
product; "erosion of public television's identity"; "one-sided
reporting"; and the possibility that broadcasting would be "co-opted
for extra-journalistic purposes, be they of a political or economic
nature."184
The pressures of economic competition and the ever-more
difficult editorial effort to obtain the attention of the viewer often
lead for example to reality-distorting presentations, the preference
for the sensational, and the tendency to take from the reported
181. 83 BVerfGE 238, 279 (1991) (discussing complainants' argument):
Private broadcasters, because of their dependence on financing through
advertising are, in fact, not in a position to fulfill these requirements. To
the contrary, they must concentrate much more on entertainment
broadcasts attractive to the masses in order to survive.
182. 119 BverfGE 181, 215-16 (2007).
183. Id. citing JURGEN HEINRICH, 2 MEDIENOKONOMIE 24 (1999); WOLFGANG SCHULZ
ET AL., PERSPEKTIVEN DER GEWAHRLEISTUNG FREIER OFFENTLICHER KoMMUNIKATION 107
(2002). Heinrich references Ronald Coase's 1974 essay, The Market for Goods and the
Market for Ideas, 64 AM. EcoN. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 384 (1974), but suggests that the
two marketplaces are not co-extensive, or even substantially similar. Traditional
economic categories such as use-value and trade-value do not fully capture the
value of an idea or a media production in creating a public sphere, contributing to
diversity of opinion, and (hopefully) enabling a search for truth and shared social
values. HEINRICH, supra, at 46. Heinrich also suggests that viewer sovereignty is
undermined by the fact that advertisers are more important customers for the
broadcasting enterprise than are viewers, and it is the advertisers - rather than
viewers or journalists - who determine the breadth and targets of any given
progranmming. Id. at 44. Schulz, Held and Kops, on the other hand, start with the
"methodological individualism" of Hayek's ROAD TO SERFDOM, and the "invisible
hand" of Adam Smith, and focus more on market failure in the traditional sense,
due to the scale of modern broadcasting or communications services, and the
resulting ownership concentration in those markets. SCHULZ ET. AL., supra, at 107,
114-15 ("the model of atomized competition assumes many individual offerors and
offerees . . .").
184. 119 BVerfGE at 215-16, 219-20.
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subject only the peculiar, the scandalous.185
The 2007 Decision moves beyond the Court's fundamental
criticism of the market, suggesting that the problems with
advertising as a revenue base for the information industry are
exacerbated by the increasing concentration in the information,
communication, and entertainment industries:
Other entities, such as investment funds with significant
participation by international finance-investors, have become
increasingly active in the broadcast area. Telecommunications
companies are becoming active as the operators of the platforms
for broadcast programming. The process of horizontal and
vertical integration in the media markets marches on. The
production and transmission of broadcast programming is often
just a link in a multi-media production and marketing chain. 186
The lesson for U.S. readers is not the specific contours of the
problem identified or the specific solution chosen by the
Constitutional Court (publicly financed broadcasting), but the fact
that the Constitutional Court identifies the problem of private
censorship in the first place, and has for fifty years placed that
problem at the center of its communications freedom
jurisprudence. 187  This perception surfaces occasionally in U.S.
Supreme Court decisions, notably Justice Brennan's dissenting
observation in CBS v. Democratic National Committee (see below) that
"angry customers are not good customers and, in the commercial
world of mass communications, it is simply 'bad business' to
espouse - or even to allow others to espouse - the heterodox or the
controversial."188 But it is hardly a central strand of U.S. Supreme
Court decision-making. The Germans, however, have pitted their
view of information freedom - a concept of opinion-building that
185. Id. at 215-16.
186. Id. at 216-17 (citations omitted).
187. See also 25 BVerfGE 256, 268-69 (1969) (Blinckffier) ("The goal of freedom of
the press - to encourage and protect the formation of free public opinion - thus
requires protection of the press against attempts to suppress the competition of
ideas by means of economic pressure"); Quint, supra note 167, at 277-78 n.100 ("the
question of whether the [German] constitution limits a private person in any
specific case may sometimes depend upon the social or economic power wielded
by that person. The danger to objective constitutional rights presented by a person
or group with strong social or economic power is naturally greater than the danger
presented by other private individuals").
188. CBS v. Dem. Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 187 (1973); see further discussion of
the CBS cases in Parts V.B & V.C, and V.E infra.
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requires the largest possible pool of information, from the most
diverse sources 189 - against the information-constricting effect of the
marketplace.
E. Where Constitutional Norms and Communications Facilities
Meet.
There is recognition that broadcasting is moving onto the
Internet, and thus onto the telecommunications network: "In the
middle, namely as carrier. . stands telecommunication."1 90 The
tendency of owners of transmission capacity to prefer affiliated
traffic, and extract monopoly rents from non-affiliated content
providers and other customers, has been noted in Germany:
Network operators can, for example, erect financial hurdles, or
use technical standards or access conditions of a technological or
contractual variety as filters, or build in structural advantages or
disadvantages to the marketing of certain products.191
These are for the most part relatively new problems and new
realizations for the Germans, as their phone, broadcast and
communications networks were government owned until the
1980s.192 Like its American counterpart, the German Court's early
broadcasting jurisprudence focused on the infrastructure issue of
spectrum scarcity;193 in later decisions it recast the scarcity rationale
189. Constitutionalizing Communications, supra note 1, at 181 n.309, (citing HELGE
ROSSEN, FREIE MEINUNGSBILDUNG DURCH DEN RUNDFUNK 185 (1988) ("the
Constitutional Court . .. was intent on establishing an independent and stand-alone
content for information freedom. By using the term 'comprehensive information'
[27 BVerfGE 71, 81 (1969)] . [the Court] was signalling an extremely broad scope
for this constitutional right on an objective level").
190. Ingwer Ebsen, Offentlich-rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen einer
Informationsordnung, DEUTSCHES VERWALTUNGSBLATT 1039-40 (1997).
191. Wolfgang Hoffman-Riem, Medienregulierung unter Viel-Kanal-Bedingungen
[Media Regulation in Multi-Channel Context], in OFFENTLICHKEIT UNTER VIEL-KANAL
BEDINGUNGEN 186-87 (Otfried Jarren & Friedrich Krotz eds., 1998). See also, e.g.,
Martin Bullinger, Regulierung unter Viel-Kanal-Bedingungen, in OFFENTLICHKEIT
UNTER VIEL-KANAL BEDINGUNGEN, supra, at 178, 180 (The "owner of the transmission
capacity will endeavor to increase its share of Pay-TV value-creation by not
transmitting external or third-party [fremde] programming to the public, but rather
by acquiring programming rights, creating program packages, and offering them
based on profitability concerns.").
192. Constitutionalizing Communications, supra note 1, at 110 n.35 and
accompanying text.
193. Id. at 144 n.159 and accompanying text (citing 73 BVerfGE 118, 121 (1986)).
In the first Constitutional Court broadcasting Decision, the Court insisted that
ownership of transmission had to be separate from control of programming. Id. at
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in terms of market failure, and ruled that the now partially-
privatized transmission capacity had to be equitably apportioned
between public and private broadcasters.194 To date, the local media
commissions have insured that public broadcasting has access to the
facilities that it needs. 195
Other issues at the nexus of conduit and content, sometimes
expressed in the United States under the rubric of network
neutrality, have not occurred in Germany to the extent they have
here, perhaps because there is no German equivalent to the U.S.
division of transmission facilities into those providing "information
services" and those providing "telecommunications services." 196
When such problems do arise in Germany, the response tends to be
calls for increased antitrust enforcement, and for extension of
broadcasting and information freedoms into the online world.197
More recently, the German Bundestag's Investigatory Committee on
"Internet and Digital Society" affirmed the view that constitutional
norms of communications freedom also apply to the network
109-10.
194. Id. at 162 n.238 and accompanying text (citing 83 BVerfGE 238, 322-24
(1991)).
195. Constitutionalizing Communications, supra note 1, at 197-202, n.348-63 and
accompanying text ("Broadcast Media in a Telecommunications World - Conflict
between State and Federal Government").
196. Cf Cable Modem Ruling, supra note 38; see generally supra notes 38-42 and
accompanying text. Under German law, all forms of electronic transmission
capacity are treated similarly as part of "the totality of transmission systems
(Gesamtheit der Ubertragungsystemen)." The German Telecommunications Law
(Telekommunikationsgesetz or TKG) at § 3(27) defines "telecommunication network"
as the "totality of transmission systems and, where applicable, switching and
routing equipment as well as other resources, which make possible the
transmission of signals over cable, broadcast, optical [fiber] and other electro-
magnetic equipment, including satellite networks, wireline and mobile terrestrial
networks, power line distribution inasmuch as it is used for signal transmission,
networks for radio and television as well as cable networks, all independent of the
transmitted content"). A slightly but not materially different English version of the
TKG is available at http://www.bfdi.bund.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/411286
/publicationFile/25386/TelecommunicationsAct-TKG.pdf (website of German
Commissioner for Data Protection & Information Freedom). After a 2012
Amendment, the § 3(27) definition of the network was, if anything, broader,
specifically including dark fiber ("nicht aktiven Netzbestandteile") and IP-enabled or
"packet-mediated networks including the Internet" ("und paketvermittelten Netzen,
einschliefllich des Internets"). See http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF
/Gesetz/tkg-nicht-kosolidierte-fassung-2012,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi2Ol2,
sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf.
197. Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 191, at 186.
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neutrality issue:
The Federal Constitutional Court sees information and reception
freedoms as essential elements of a well-fortified [well-defended]
democracy. According to the Court's decision in the Leipziger
Newspaper case in 1969, the right to freely inform one's self
includes not only the simple reception of information, but also the
active and unhindered procurement of information.
"Unhindered" in this instance means to be free from legally
ordered or factually determined [state] censorship, restraint,
guidance, control, registration, and even "free from unreasonable
delay." Transposed to the theme of net neutrality, this means that
one data stream should not be preferred over another, and should
not be blocked, or slowed down, as any of these actions hinders or
delays the free and equal exchange of information. 198
The Constitutional Court has not yet, however, directly confronted
these questions.
V. In United States Jurisprudence, the Triumph of the No
Law Approach to the First Amendment.
In the modem era, the Supreme Court has properly interpreted
the First Amendment's "no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech" as a ban on government censorship. That fight was itself
long and arduous, but the anticensorship forces won out, and today
in the U.S. government can neither stop communists from leaving
their literature at the local bookstore,199 nor adolescents from
wearing jackets emblazoned with "F[*]ck the Draft." 200 This is an
198. Enquete-Kommission "Internet und Digitale Gesellschaft," report on
Netzneutralittit, at 40 (February 2, 2012), available at http://dip21.bundestag.de/
dip21/btd/17/085/1708536.pdf. (The sentence with the word [state-structured] in
brackets presents translation issues; here is the original: "Ungehindert bedeutet
dabei frei von rechtlich angeordneter oder faktisch verhingter staatlicher
Abschneidung, Be hinderung, Lenkung, Registrierung und sogar 'frei' von
unzumutbarer Verzogerung"). Further complicating the translation issues here is
the lack of a "state action" problem in German constitutional law, due to the
"radiating effect" of constitutional norms. See Part IV.C supra.
199. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) overruling Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (affirming the conviction of Ms. Whitney of
violations of California's Criminal Syndicalism Act, i.e., advocating the Communist
Party belief in overthrow of the United States).
200. Cohen v. California, 401 U.S. 15 (1971). In dissent, Justice Blackmun
suggested that Cohen's stunt was conduct, not speech (an "absurd and immature
antic"), and urged that the case be remanded to the California courts for further
consideration. Id. at 27-28.
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important story well told by others, but it is not our subject here.201
When speech began to interact with large, industrial forces in
the mid-20th century, two parallel but opposed developments took
place. 202 First, for several decades, the Court endorsed attempts to
protect speech on the airwaves, and in other commercially
controlled spaces, formulating what could be called an American
doctrine of information freedom. Secondly, commercial interests
began to push back, invoking the "free speech" clause for their own
purposes, as a protection against government regulation of all types,
often having little or nothing to do with their political speech, and at
times even diminishing the speech and information interests of third
parties.
A. Intimations of Information Freedom
As modem mass culture developed, the Court evinced a
growing awareness of a need to protect the free flow of ideas and
information. The Court developed a First Amendment right to
receive information, and increasingly put that right on the scales
when balancing competing speech interests. In Grosjean v. American
Press Co., the Court confronted a Louisiana license tax on
newspapers of over 20,000 circulation, animated by the interests (if
not sprung from the brain) of Sen. Huey Long, who called it a "tax
on lying." 203 The Grosjean Court looked back at the Amendment's
antecedents, and attempted to assay the intent of its drafters,
locating that intent most immediately in the founders' reaction to
the "persistent effort on the part of the British government to
prevent or abridge the free expression of any opinion which seemed
to criticize. . . the agencies and operations of the government";
reaching back further, the Court cited Milton's 1644 "Appeal for the
201. See, e.g., ANTHONY LEWIs, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT WE HATE: A BIOGRAPHY
OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2007).
202. An even broader point could be made here. The first detailed treatment of
the First Amendment did not occur until 1876 in United States v. Cruikshank, 92
U.S. 542 (1876), and even there the Court's analysis was cursory and arrived at the
conclusion that the First Amendment did not apply to the states. Id. at 552-53. The
relative late development of this part of the Constitution allows the surmise that the
First Amendment's latent meanings have only surfaced as modem forms of
communication have emerged.
203. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); see also Edwin Baker,
Advertising and a Democratic Press, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 2097, 2229-30 n.428-29 (1992)
(citing Minneapolis Star v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 579-80
(1983) (describing the historical background of the Grosjean case)).
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Liberty of Unlicensed Printing," and found that "mere exemption
from previous censorship was soon recognized as too narrow a view
of the liberty of the press." 204 The Court held that the license fees at
issue violated the First Amendment because they were "taxes on
knowledge" and they had "the effect of curtailing the circulation on
newspapers." 205 "In the ultimate, an informed public opinion was
the thing at stake," and vigilance was necessary regarding "any
action of the government by means of which it might prevent such
free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely
essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their
rights as citizens." 206
Nine years later, with World War II drawing to a close, the
Supreme Court addressed a much larger and electronically
connected association of newspapers than the hundred plus
newspapers whose taxes were at issue in Grosjean. Appellant
Associated Press (AP) was a cooperative of more than 1,200
newspapers, appealing an antitrust judgment obtained by the
Department of Justice. At issue in Associated Press v. United States
were the AP's Bylaws which prohibited AP members from selling
news to nonmembers. The Court rejected AP's First Amendment
challenge to the judgment that invalidated these bylaws, by turning
AP's argument around, one might say from shield to sword:
It would be strange indeed however if the grave concern for
freedom of the press which prompted adoption of the First
Amendment should be read as a command that the government
was without power to protect that freedom. The First
Amendment, far from providing an argument against application
of the Sherman Act, here provides powerful reasons to the
contrary. That Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources is essential to the welfare of the public, that a free press is a
condition of a free society. Surely a command that the government
itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas does not afford non-
governmental combinations a refuge if they impose restraints
upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom. 207
There are several aspects of this case which are thematic
204. Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 245-46.
205. Id. at 246, 251(emphasis added).
206. Id. at 247, 249-50.
207. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (emphasis added).
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cornerstones for a discussion of information freedom in the United
States: the fact that the U.S. government had intervened in an
information market and specifically addressed "non-governmental"
information bottlenecks; the Court's systemic approach that placed
the information needs of the public on equal (or higher) footing than
the speech rights of the press; and the discussion of whether
information markets are the same as markets for other goods. As to
the latter, Justice Black's majority opinion identified principles
common to both types of markets: "The fact that the publisher
handles news while others handle food does not ... afford the
publisher a peculiar constitutional sanctuary in which he can with
impunity violate [antitrust] laws regulating his business
practices." 208 Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion emphasized
the unique aspects of information markets:
But in addition to being a commercial enterprise, [the Associated
Press] has a relation to the public interest unlike that of any other
enterprise pursued for profit. A free press is indispensable to the
workings of our democratic society. The business of the press, and
therefore the business of the Associated Press, is the promotion of
truth regarding public matters by furnishing the basis for an
understanding of them. Truth and understanding are not wares
like peanuts or potatoes. And so, the incidence of restraints upon
the promotion of truth through denial of access to the basis for
understanding calls into play considerations very different from
comparable restraints in a cooperative enterprise having merely a
commercial aspect. I find myself entirely in agreement with Judge
Learned Hand that "neither exclusively, nor even primarily, are
the interests of the newspaper industry conclusive; for that
industry serves one of the most vital of all general interests: the
dissemination of news from as many different sources, and with
as many different facets and colors as is possible. That interest is
closely akin to, if indeed it is not the same as, the interest
protected by the First Amendment; it presupposes that right
conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues,
than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is,
and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all." 209
In the twenty-two years between Associated Press and Red Lion, the
Court cited AP's "widest possible dissemination of information"
208. Id. at 7.
209. Id. at 28 (quoting Judge Learned Hand's opinion in the Court below, United
States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (emphasis added).
2052012]1
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
rationale only once, in New York Times v. Sullivan.210 While not
taking the critical step of locating First Amendment rights in The
Times' readers or the public at large, as Red Lion would do, the
Court in New York Times nevertheless prepared the country for that
step by again stressing how critical access to the widest possible
diversity of opinion was for self-government. Justice Brennan,
writing for a unified Court, quoted the "multitude of tongues"
language from Associated Press, and underlined this with a quote
from Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California, emphasizing the
public aspect of speech:
Those who won our independence believed . . that public
discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a
fundamental principle of the American government. They
recognized the risks to which all human institutions are subject.
. . Believing in the power of reason as applied through public
discussion, they ... amended the Constitution so that free speech
and assembly should be guaranteed. 211
The stage was set for Red Lion.
B. Red Lion and Its Afterlife
In 1967, ruling on a case that grew out of name-calling, personal
attacks, and demands for rebuttal time during Barry Goldwater's
1964 presidential campaign, the Supreme Court in Red Lion
Broadcasting v. FCC endorsed "information freedom" as a right that
belonged to listeners, viewers, and the public. 212 The decision went
210. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (defamation judgment
in favor of public figure incompatible with "widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources," absent a showing of malice).
211. Id.
212. Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 371 (1969). In 1964, Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. broadcast a 15 minute program by the Reverend Billy James
Hargis as part of a "Christian Crusade" series, in which the Rev. Hargis attacked
one Mr. Cook:
Now, this paperback book by Fred J. Cook is entitled, 'GOLDWATER -
EXTREMIST ON THE RIGHT.' Who is Cook? Cook was fired from the
New York World Telegram after he made a false charge publicly on
television against an un-named official of the New York City government.
... After losing his job, Cook went to work for the left-wing publication,
THE NATION, one of the most scurrilous publications of the left which
has championed many communist causes over many years. Its editor,
Carry McWilliams, has been affiliated with many communist enterprises,
scores of which have been cited as subversive by the Attorney General of
the U.S. or by other government agencies ...
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significantly beyond its facts, beyond upholding the so-called
Fairness Doctrine (the immediate subject of contention), and
certainly beyond the "frequency scarcity" rationale to which the
case and the Doctrine are often linked. 213 The Court spoke of a
democratic understanding of speech, and did so in the broadest and
most far-reaching terms possible:
[T]he people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by
radio and their collective right to have the medium function
consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment.
It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters, which is paramount. It is the purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in
which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance
monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government
itself or a private licensee. "Speech concerning public affairs is
more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government." It
is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social,
political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is
crucial here. That right may not constitutionally be abridged
either by Congress or by the FCC. 214
395 U.S. at 373. Mr. Cook (alone among those referenced in the broadcast) wrote to
Red Lion and demanded equal time under the "personal attack" doctrine, one of
two prongs of the Fairness Doctrine. The station responded that it would supply
equal time if Mr. Cook would pay for it or declare under penalty that he could not
afford it. The FCC ruled that the station was obligated not only to provide equal
time on request, but also to send Mr. Cook a transcript, and offer him free time. 395
U.S. at 372.
The parties also argued about scarcity, with the FCC contending that a frequency
scarcity justified imposition on a broadcast speaker's qualified (by license) First
Amendment rights. Red Lion argued that there were more radio stations than
magazines in the U.S., and at least 9 radio stations were available to residents of the
small Pennsylvania town in which Red Lion was located.
213. Lillian BeVier, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC: a Different Perspective on the
First Amendment Cathedral in RICHARD GARNET & ANDREw KOPPELMAN, FIRST
AMENDMENT STORIES 319, 327, passim (2011).
214. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390 (emphasis added) (citing a wide array of references
supporting a democratic theory of speech: FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309
U.S. 470, 475 (1940); FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 361-362
(1955); 2 ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 546 (1947);
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964). See Justice
William Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First
Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965) (emphasis added).
The facts of this case are, however, much messier than the Court's broad rhetoric,
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What the Court in Red Lion did sub rosa was to balance the
rights of speaker and listener, or balance among the rights of
various speakers:
The right of free speech of a broadcaster, the user of a sound
truck, or any other individual does not embrace a right to snuff
out the free speech of others. 215
As problematic as it is, some form of balancing between different
speakers and listeners, readers, and network users is inevitable on
electronic networks, 216 and echoes down through subsequent
Supreme Court decisions. 217
One could write separately, and at length, on the many factual
involutions and layers of intrigue around Red Lion: Two days of
Supreme Court argument, followed by a ruling upholding the
Fairness Doctrine, only to have that Doctrine subsequently declared
unconstitutional (after a change of Administration) not by the Court,
but by the Agency that propounded it; as well as its continued
citation, often in strangely inappropriate settings, long after the
broadcast spectrum scarcity on which it was based had ceased to be
the primary bottleneck in the delivery of video programming to the
public. Much has already been written on the rise and fall of Red
Lion, and I will not attempt to duplicate it here.218 What matters
now, fifty years later, is the constitutional principle which the case
established for speech on electronic networks: "it is the rights of
viewers and listeners ... which are paramount."
Red Lion was the seminal statement of this principle, and must
and reveal - if anything - what a rickety mechanism the Fairness Doctrine was. As
suggested in the previous footnote, the Fairness Doctrine was often not self-
executing, and parties seeking network access were often put to the task of drafting,
if not filing and litigating, a complaint to obtain network access.
215. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 387 (citing Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20).
216. The very concept of "balancing" is an anathema to many constitutional
scholars and First Amendment absolutists, but seems unavoidable given the
plurality of interests involved, especially in cases of speech on electronic networks.
See discussion in note 368 infra and accompanying text.
217. See CBS v. Dem. Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 ("Balancing the various First
Amendment interests involved in the broadcast media and determining what best
serves the public's right to be informed is a task of a great delicacy and difficulty");
CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 397 (1981) ("We hold that the statutory right of access, as
defined by the Commission and applied in these cases, properly balances the First
Amendment rights of federal candidates, the public, and broadcasters"); see also
Turner I and Turner II, discussed infra.
218. See generally, BeVier, supra note 213; Fiss, supra note 3, at 58-74.
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be understood as recognition for a First Amendment right to receive
information. For several decades, it enjoyed a robust afterlife. The
"right of the viewers and listeners," and of the "public to receive
suitable access to . .. ideas," tipped the scales in favor of information
freedom in several important cases. Seven years after Red Lion, in
ruling on a case brought by the Virginia Citizens Consumer Council
seeking to overturn a ban on price advertising imposed by the
Virginia Board of Pharmacy, the Court upheld the standing of the
consumer group as an information recipient, and - more
importantly - identified the process of speech as the protected object
of the First Amendment:
Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker. But where a
speaker exists, as is the case here, the protection afforded is to the
communication, to its source and to its recipients both. This is clear
from the decided cases. In Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S.
301 (1965), the Court upheld the First Amendment rights of
citizens to receive political publications sent from abroad. More
recently, in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-763 (1972), we
acknowledged that this Court has referred to a First Amendment
right to "receive information and ideas," and that freedom of
speech "'necessarily protects the right to receive."' There are
numerous other expressions to the same effect in the Court's
decisions. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
390 (1969); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501, 505 (1946); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945); Martin v.
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943). If there is a right to advertise,
there is a reciprocal right to receive the advertising, and it may be
asserted by these appellees. 219
In a 1978 commercial speech case brought by the commercial
speaker itself, First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the Court
sidestepped the question of whether the Bank appellant was a First
Amendment speaker, but used the occasion to provide a strong
endorsement of an information freedom that echoes the German
notion of an objective right, a constitutionally protected "interest[]
broader than those of the party seeking their vindication," and again
held that it was more important to protect the speech than the
speaker:
The Constitution often protects interests broader than those of the
219. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748, 757 (1976) (emphasis added).
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party seeking their vindication. The First Amendment, in
particular, serves significant societal interests. The proper
question therefore is not whether corporations "have" First
Amendment rights and, if so, whether they are coextensive with
those of natural persons. Instead, the question must be whether
[the statute] abridges expression that the First Amendment was
meant to protect. We hold that it does. 220
Two years later, in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, the
Court overturned a trial judge's ruling excluding the public from a
murder trial, and issued a ringing endorsement of the public's right
to access information (but did so without mentioning Red Lion), once
more referring to (what the Germans would call "objective")
interests broader than the individual, and the "stock of information"
in general: "[The] First Amendment goes beyond protection of the
press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government
from limiting the stock of information from which members of the
public may draw ... In a variety of contexts this Court has referred
to a First Amendment right to 'receive information and ideas."'
221
In 1981, the Court cited Red Lion in upholding a statutory right
of candidates to purchase airtime, favoring the rights of viewers and
political speakers over broadcasters, in a head-to-head rematch of
220. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (rejecting a
Massachusetts law that forbade corporate electoral advertising during election
season). The focus here on the speech act or process may have been a convenient
way for the Court to sidestep the question posed by the Massachussetts Supreme
Court's ruling that the Bank as a corporation did not have full First Amendment
rights. Id. at 771-72. Whether from conviction or to avoid the still -unresolved
question of corporate rights under the First Amendment, the Court in First National
Bank was uncommonly effusive about the public's information rights: "[The] First
Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of
individuals to prohibit government from limiting the stock of information from
which members of the public may draw." Id. at 783. First National Bank's
recognition of "interests broader than those of the party seeking their vindication"
echoes the concept of objective rights under German law, rights that are broader
than any individual, and that frame the democratic state. Constitutionalizing
Communications, supra note 1, at 130-34, describing objective rights as "shaping
law."
221. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575-76 (1980).
Although the Court in Richmond Newspapers does not cite Red Lion, it cites
Kleindienst v. Mandel, which had an extensive discussion of Red Lion and
information freedom: "In a variety of contexts this Court has referred to a First
Amendment right to 'receive information and ideas."' 448 U.S. at 576, (quoting
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972) (finding the public's information




CBS v. Democratic National Committee, this time styled as CBS v.
FCC222 ("The First Amendment interests of candidates and voters, as
well as broadcasters, are implicated"). In 1984, in FCC v. League of
Women Voters, the Court relied on "the right of the public to receive
suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas" to
overturn a ban on editorials in public broadcasting. 223 The year 1990
marked the last successful turn for information freedom in the
highest Court, when the Court in Metro Broadcasting v. FCC upheld
the FCC's minority ownership rules based in large part on the rights
of viewers and listeners first identified by the Court in Red Lion.224
But from the late 70s forward, these voices retreated and were
more often heard in dissent, in cases such as Herbert v. Lando and
Houchins v. KQED.225 An exception to this trend, and to the rule
that important communications infrastructure cases are decided in a
constitutional vacuum, was Judge Greene's decision in the trial
court, approving the breakup of AT&T in 1982.226 This landmark
case came at a time when the future power of the Internet was
glimpsed as "electronic publishing." Here, Judge Greene was
prescient:
The threat to competition that is claimed to be posed by AT&T in
this industry is that, through the use of cross-subsidization and
customer discrimination, it will use its power in the interexchange
222. CBS, 453 U.S. at 395-96. Eight years earlier, as described below, the Court
had gone the other way in another CBS case, CBS v. Democratic National Committee.
In the earlier case, the DNC had relied not on a specific statute, but on general
arguments regarding a broadcaster's public trustee role and the First Amendment.
412 U.S. at 99-100.
223. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984). Justice Steven's
dissent also cited Red Lion and a public's right to know, but found them
outweighed by the dangerous spectre of government financed editorials. 468 U.S.
at 408-16 n.8.
224. Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 567 (1990) (ruling not in favor of
minority broadcasters but "the people as a whole"). The Court does not use the
"right of the public" verbiage from Red Lion, but does speak in general terms of the
"public interest" in information access and diversity. Id.
225. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 187-89 (1979) (Brennan, J.
dissenting) ("great mistake to understand . the First Amendment solely through
the filter of individual rights . . the 'press and broadcast media' have played a
dominant and essential role in serving the 'information function' protected by the
First Amendment") (citations omitted); Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 32 n.19, 34
(1978) (Stevens, J. dissenting) ("The question is whether petitioner's policies, which
cut off the flow of information at its source, abridged the public's right to be
informed about these conditions").
226. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 181 (D.D.C. 1982).
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market to disadvantage competing electronic publishers. 227
Judge Greene fully understood the constitutional dimensions of
network architecture, saw the ramifications of AT&T's potential
monopoly for public discourse, and recognized the First
Amendment implications of the Consent Decree:
[T]he Court must take into account the decree's effect on other
public policies, such as the First Amendment principle of
diversity in dissemination of information to the American public.
Consideration of this policy is especially appropriate because, as
the Supreme Court has recognized, in promoting diversity in
sources of information, the values underlying the First
Amendment coincide with the policy of the antitrust laws. 228
Judge Greene was concerned that "[d]uring the last thirty years,
there had been an unremitting trend toward concentration in the
ownership and control of the media," realized the potential reach
and impact of what was then still primarily a voice transmission
network, and placed his decision fully within the U.S. tradition of
information freedom, citing both Red Lion and Associated Press and
their concern for "the widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources." 229
During the twenty years following Red Lion, while the Supreme
Court made efforts to work out the law and theory of information
freedom, it also was engaged in an increasingly obvious retreat from
the strong statement it had made in the 1969 case. During this era,
the concern for diverse and antagonistic sources did not carry the
day in cases such as PG&E v. Public Utilities Commission (discussed
below), which failed to consider the rights of information recipients
as established in Red Lion. Red Lion does makes a cameo appearance
in the Supreme Court's Turner cases, in which the Court held that
considerations of both competition and information diversity
justified enactment of cable "must-carry" rules. In Turner I, the
majority held (without referencing Red Lion) that "assuring that the
public has access to a multiplicity of information sources is a
governmental purpose of the highest order, for it promotes values
central to the First Amendment," but did cite Red Lion for the kind
of scarcity that will always exist with top-down network control:
227. Id. at 181.
228. Id. at 184.
229. Id. at 183-85.
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[W]here there are substantially more individuals who want to
broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit
an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable
to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish. 230
Nonetheless the most salient part of Red Lion - that individuals and
the public have a right to access and receive information - has had
an increasingly dodgy career in subsequent years. By 1996, its stock
had declined to the point where Justice Thomas could claim it
almost entirely irrelevant:
In Red Lion, we had legitimized consideration of the public
interest and emphasized the rights of viewers, at least in the
abstract. Under that view, "it is the right of the viewers and
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."
After Turner, however, that view can no longer be given any
credence in the cable context. It is the operator's right that is
preeminent. 231
Since then, Red Lion has been the whipping boy for anyone who
thought the Fairness Doctrine might return, or that a public right to
information and ideas represents a foreign body in U.S.
constitutionalism, a juvenile mistake that needs to be eradicated and
atoned for. 232
C. Retrenchment and Ascendency of Subjective, "Negative Freedom"
Model.
Four years after Red Lion, the Court began a retrenchment on
information freedom. In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court
rejected rights of access to the media, and ignored or gave short
shrift to the rights of third party speakers as well as the public's
interest in "the widest possible dissemination of information and
opinion."
230. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994) (Turner 1),
affd after remand, Turner Broadcasting Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 186 (1997)
(Turner II) ("[wie have identified a corresponding 'governmental purpose of the
highest order' in ensuring public access to 'a multiplicity of information sources"').
231. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 816
(Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Rehnquist and Scalia) (internal citations
omitted).
232. See, e.g., Thomas Hazlett et al., The Overly Active Corpse of Red Lion, 9 Nw. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 51 (2010); see also BeVier, supra note 213 (both confining their
discussion of Red Lion to its factual setting, a perceived spectrum scarcity, rather
than exploring the decision's affirmation of a public right to information).
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First came CBS v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94
(1973), in which Chief Justice Warren Burger, like the pater familius
of a divided house, first paid homage to Red Lion, and then moved it
from its privileged place at the table. 233 Two groups - the Business
Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace, and the Democratic National
Committee - had sought to purchase airtime from CBS during the
1972 Democratic Convention for political advertising. CBS refused
to sell. The groups sued based on the First Amendment, the public
trustee duties of CBS under the Communications Act, and the
Fairness Doctrine. The Court ruled that the DNC could not compel
CBS' sale of advertising time, even at market rates, for a political
message. The Court acknowledged Red Lion and the concept of the
rights of viewers and listeners, but then engaged in a "[b]alancing
[of those] the First Amendment interests" with those of the
broadcaster, a "task of a great delicacy and difficulty." 234 At the end
of the day, the rights of the network owner were re-installed as the
favored right. 235
Next up was Miami Herald v. Tornillo, where the Court rejected a
right of reply statute as violative of the Miami Herald publisher's
First Amendment rights), with no mention of Red Lion or the
information rights of readers. 236
The increasing eclipse of information freedom can be seen in
three types of "ownership as speech" cases. First came the cable
television cases. Ten years after Red Lion, in FCC v. Midwest Video
Corp., the Court agreed that network owners' desire to be free of
community access requirements raised "grave First Amendment
problems," with no mention of the rights of viewers, listeners, or the
public. 237 In City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Comm'ns, the cable
owner's putative First Amendment rights trumped the
municipality's attempt to extract public interest undertakings in
exchange for use of city streets and easements, with no mention of
the rights of viewers, listeners, or the public. 238 These decisions
have allowed Prof. Yoo to argue for the "importance of giving the
conduit [owner] editorial control over the information being
233. CBS v. Dem. Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973).
234. Id. at 102.
235. Id. at 125.
236. Tornillo v. Miami Herald, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
237. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 699-70 (1979).
238. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Comm'ns, 476 U.S. 488, 494-95 (1986).
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conveyed," even in the face of the readily apparent market power
which the conduit's owner can exercise. 239
In the cable "network" cases, there was no specific speech of the
network owners at issue, just the possibility that they (and they
alone) might want in the future to rearrange the priorities of their
transmission, or select programming to sell their customers over the
remaining channels. Although these are two different things - the
transmission of content (now bits on a broadband conduit), and the
selection of programming on a cable television system - they are
often conflated in the current dialogue. 240  Neither represents
communicative action as described above. More troubling is the
apparent readiness of some jurists to accept bit-transmission as a
form of speech, a view that positions the cable owner/operator, qua
owner/operator of the entire network, as First Amendment
speaker.241
Stripped to their essence, the claims of the network operators in
Preferred and Midwest Video (and indeed in the subsequent Turner I
and Turner II cases) were based on lost business opportunities rather
239. Yoo, supra note 45, at 46-47 n.16 9-180.
240. I argue below that even the selection of content is not "speech" or editorial
activity, but merely the placement of product on a digital shelf. See Part V.D infra;
see also note 242, infra, and accompanying text.
241. But see Benjamin, supra note 21, at 1689-90 (distinguishing cable cases from
bit transmission). Part of the judiciary's confusion between bit-carriage and cable
television programuming stems from the fact that cable cases like Midwest Video and
Preferred, and even Turner I and Turner II, were decided in an era when cable
systems were primarily purveyors of entertainment and news programming on
their "57 channels," and long before cable became a serious competitor to the
telecommunications utilities as a provider of broadband Internet access. For
example, in Preferred, the full sentence using the "communication of ideas" phrase
quoted by Petitioner, reads "Cable television partakes of some of the aspects of speech
and the communication of ideas as do the traditional enterprises of newspaper and
book publishers Respondent's proposed activities would seem to implicate
First Amendment interests " 476 U.S. at 494 (emphasis added); cf Bruce
Springsteen, 57 Channels (and Nuthin's On) (1992). Even in the context of cable
television, the cable operator's speech claims are attenuated, as on most of these
channels the speech was not the cable operator's but that of independent producers
(the exception being the local origination channels where the cable operator
actually programmed its own content). For this reason, the Nixon White House
first suggested that even cable television's carriage of third-party television
programming should be structured as a common carrier service, a view rejected by
the [1984 Cable Television Act]. See Cable: Report to the President, 1974 (sometimes
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than frustrated speech. "Cable operators are not very much like
orators or authors in the Romantic sense. They are shopkeepers
who price and deliver a product." 242 The Germans, by contrast,
appear to view the feeding (Einspeisung) of programming into the
cable network more as a shopkeeper's resale activity than a
newspaper's editing.243
A second species of ownership-as-speech jurisprudence comes
in the "exclusion" cases. In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court
has rejected right of reply or other rights of third party speakers to
the owned media, again on the argument that the speech of third
parties interfered with the owner's speech. See CBS v. Democratic
National Committee, supra (DNC not allowed to compel CBS' sale of
advertising time, even at market rates, for a political message);
Tornillo v. Miami Herald, supra (right of reply statute violated
publisher's First Amendment rights); PG&E v. California Public
Utilities Commission, (First Amendment "concerns that caused us to
invalidate the compelled access rule in Tornillo apply to appellant as
well as to the institutional press"). 244  PG&E was especially
problematic because the contested space - the extra space in the
billing envelope sent by the energy utility - was deemed under
California law to belong to the ratepayers, not the company;
nevertheless, the ratepayers' speech was excluded. 245 In these cases,
the primary effect of a recognized negative speech right in the
network owner is to exclude and thereby to negate the speech rights
of unaffiliated third parties.
A third variant of ownership-as-speech rationale may be
glimpsed in the campaign finance cases, where money - a form of
ownership - is equated with speech.246 The Court's decision two
years ago in Citizens United can be seen as the apotheosis of a money
242. See Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What Copyright
Has in Common With Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and
Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REv. 1, 78 (2000).
243. See, e.g., Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Rechtsproblem der Regulierung der Entgelte, der
Paketbiindelung und der Vertragsgestaltung im digitalen Kabelfrensehen, 1/2005 ZUM 1,
5 (cable operator as "reseller" rather than speaker).
244. PG&E v. California Public Utilities Commission, 475 U.S. 1, 11 (1986).
245. Id. at 6, 22-23.
246. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (First Amendment right to
contribute to political campaign, notwithstanding claims that this would vitiate the
overall vitality of the political debate); Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010);
see also Owen Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1407-08
(1986) ("money is speech").
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as speech rationale, and reveals the persistent confusion and tension
between negative and affirmative speech freedoms. A fuller
consideration of the ramifications of that decision is beyond the
scope of this article.
Having dispatched Red Lion to irrelevancy, the Court has
increasingly looked with favor on the use of the First Amendment to
invalidate regulations. This is also can be seen as a variation on the
meme of ownership as speech. 247 Use of the First Amendment as a
shield for entrepreneurial freedom rather than speech freedom, or as
a sword to dismantle consumer protection and public interest
legislation, has been referred to as "First Amendment Lochnerism."
248
247. The transformation of communication freedoms into entrepreneurial
freedoms is often noted in the German literature. See, e.g., Wolfgang Hoffmann-
Riem, Rundfunkrecht und Wirtschaftsrecht - ein Paradigmawechsel in der
Rundfunkverfassung [Broadcasting Law and Commercial Law - a Change of Paradigms in
the Constitution of Broadcasting], in MEDIA PERSPEKTIVEN 57, 60 (1988). (over time,
"the externally pluralistic model [of broadcasting freedom] has been is emptied of
its group-theoretical justification, and understood [more] as the prototype of an
orientation of broadcasting constitution on the constitution of the economic
marketplace. Journalistic diversity is supposed to be made possible by economic
competition"); Stock, supra note 125, at 290 (contrasting the understanding of
Article 10 speech freedoms of the European Convention on Human Rights as more
of "an entrepreneurial right" [Unternehmerfreiheit], with the Constitutional Court's
jurisprudence of broadcasting freedom as a "functional, 'serving,' journalistic-
professional right"); Hoffmann-Riem, supra note 127, at 103 ("communication rights
are becoming economic goods like any other [such goods]," causing an "erosion of
the journalistic specialness of mass media").
248. See Symposium, First Amendment Lochnerism? Emerging Constitutional
Limitations on Government Regulation of Non- Speech Economic Activity, 33 N. Ky. L.
REV. 365 (2006) (Prof. Katkin, noting that "the Supreme Court and some lower
courts have arguably begun to apply stringent First Amendment 'free speech'
standards when reviewing the constitutionality of a variety of government efforts
to regulate business or economic activities-often in cases in which the regulations at
issue do not appear directly to implicate traditional First Amendment concerns
about government censorship") (citing Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S.
357, 378 (2002) (invalidating on First Amendment grounds provisions of the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act that prohibited manufacturers from marketing drugs for
uses not yet proven safe and effective); see also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533
U.S. 525, 564 (2001) (rejecting legislation protecting children from tobacco
advertising, because "tobacco advertisements, tobacco manufacturers and retailers
and their adult consumers still have a protected interest in communication"); see
also Carl Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41
HASTINGs L.J. 577, 616-18 (1990) (citing Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Comm'n of New York 447 U.S. 557, 574 (1980) (First Amendment
used to invalidate state regulation banning utility promotion of electricity use
during energy crisis), PG&E v. California Public Utilities Commission, 475 U.S. at 1,
22-23 (invalidating mandated use of extra space in PG&E billing envelopes for
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This approach had been rejected by the Court in Associated Press
v. United States: "Formulated as it was to protect liberty of thought
and of expression, it would degrade the clear and present danger
doctrine to fashion from it a shield for business publishers who
engage in business practices condemned by the Sherman Act.. ."249
The largest telecommunications carriers in the country, however,
seek a similar refuge in the First Amendment. In the FCC's "Open
Network" proceeding, the subject of Verizon's pending appeal, the
carriers denied they exercised market power, while arguing that
their First Amendment speech rights should trump the rights of
millions of network users. AT&T flatly asserted that "the proposed
rules would violate the First Amendment" rights of AT&T as a
network owner. 250 Verizon argued that "the [proposed] rules would
raise serious constitutional problems under both the First and the
Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause." 251  The National Cable
Television Association followed suit, alleging that "government
attempts to dictate 'parity' with respect to private speech are
fundamentally illegitimate."252
consumer-related messages), as well as First Amendment attacks on SEC disclosure
requirements and rules affecting stock offerings.
249. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 7 (1945).
250. In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet, GN Docket No. 09-191,
Broadband Industry Practices, WC Docket No. 07-52 [hereinafter Open Internet
Proceeding] (Jan. 14, 2010), AT&T comments at 235-41; see also id. at 16-17 ("Such
rules are particularly indefensible when they implicate First Amendment concerns,
as these would, by precluding market actors from enhancing particular messages to
communicate more effectively with the public. The rules also would create an
uncompensated taking of broadband networks in the service of dubious social
objectives").
251. Id. Verizon comments at 11, Jan. 14, 2010.
252. Id. National Communications and Telecommunication Association (NCTA)
comments at 50 (Jan. 14, 2010).
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D. An Incompletely Theorized Freedom of Speech253
First Amendment interpretation often appears to be a motley
fabric stiched together from a number of ad hoc determinations,
perhaps because of the Supreme Court's penchant for "minimalist"
decisions that address no more than the matter before them.254 This
incompleteness, if not incoherence, is manifest on (at least) two
levels: (1) the macro-constitutional question of whether and to what
extent the First Amendment serves the purposes of public
autonomy, that is, whether free speech is a "right of the public to
receive suitable access to social, political, aesthetic, moral and other
253. I am indebted to Professors Sunstein, Benjamin, and others for the phrase
"incompletely theorized." As Benjamin wrote in a recent article:
Do lawyers and judges need to adopt a particular conception of the First
Amendment in order to decide what the freedom of speech encompasses?
Part of the significance of this question arises from the fact that this
approach approximates the position of the Supreme Court. Text, history,
Supreme Court jurisprudence, basic analogical reasoning, and widely
accepted conceptions are not only lawyers' but also the Supreme Court's
basic toolkit. And the Court has never settled upon a conception of the
First Amendment. The Court has invoked the marketplace of ideas more
than any other conception of the First Amendment, but different cases
have emphasized different conceptions, and in many cases the Court has
refrained from choosing among them. This is not surprising: each possible
conception of the First Amendment can be subjected to legitimate
criticism, and reaching agreement at that level of specificity is difficult for
any group, Justices or otherwise. The Supreme Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence is thus one of the many areas characterized by incompletely
theorized agreements.
Benjamin, supra note 21 at 1677-78. As suggested above, many if not most scholars
who write about the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence see "a
doctrinal and scholarly cacophony."
254. Id. at 1678 n.13, quoting Cass Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 Sup. CT. REV.
47, 48 ("Many judges are minimalists; they want to say and do no more than
necessary to resolve cases . . [Minimalists] attempt to reach incompletely
theorized agreements, in which the most fundamental questions are left undecided.
They prefer outcomes and opinions that can attract support from people with a
wide range of theoretical positions, or with uncertainty about which theoretical
positions are best"). This stands in contrast to the German Constitutional Court
which often reaches beyond specific fact situations to address a larger problem
complexes, and does so in a way that strives for theoretical consistency. See
generally Constitutionalizing Communications, supra note 1, at 117-150. Some see the
"messiness" of U.S. speech jurisprudence as a virtue rather than a shortcoming.
Widmaier, supra note 180, at 82 n. 31 (citing Martha Nussbaum, "who is committed
to a conception of human deliberation that is 'mundane, messy, and lacking in
elegance' because it deliberately sacrifices (Platonic) theoretical elegance and
simplicity for the sake of (Aristotelian) 'practical wisdom."') MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM,
THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS - LUCK AND ETHICS IN GREEKTRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY
372 (1986).
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ideas and experiences"; and (2) the micro-constitutional question of
what happens when a number of individual rights collide. The
macro question is addressed above in the discussion of the two
competing concepts of liberty, and of the rise and fall of Red Lion.
The micro question is discussed below.
Even if speech is understood as a personal liberty, "a right of
the individual" instead of "an essential social instrument," 255 the
Supreme Court's speech jurisprudence often leaves open the
question of which individual is protected, particularly in network
cases. Two types of network cases provide two different results: the
Internet cases, where the First Amendment focus is not on the
network owner, but shifts ambiguously from "web publishers" and
"Internet speakers" to web surfers and information recipients; and
the cable cases where the network owners have succeeded
(counterfactually, I argue) in establishing themselves as First
Amendment speakers.
Reno v. ACLU was the first case where the Supreme Court
squarely addressed issues raised by the Internet. It involved a
challenge to the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), and
particularly to the sections which prohibited the knowing
transmission of "obscene or indecent" materials to any "recipient
under 18 years of age"; it made anyone who "knowingly permits
any telecommunications facility under his control" to be used for
such activity, or who "uses an interactive computer service to send"
materials that are "patently offensive," guilty of a crime.256 The
Court declared the CDA unconstitutional under the First
255. McGinnis, supra note 20, at 51.
256. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 859-60 (1997) (describing provisions of 47
U.S.C. §§ 223(a) and (d)). In so doing, the Court demonstrated its failure to
understand the relationship between the facilities and content layers of the Internet,
saying that the "major components" of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 had
"nothing to do with the Internet." Id. at 857. In fact, the linesharing and
interconnection pieces of the Act (47 U.S.C. §§ 251-252) address the conduits and
facilities that carry both telephony and IP "bits"; other parts of the Act (like section
706) directly address "advanced telecommunications services," i.e., broadband.
Section 706 of the 1996 Act is codified at 47 U.S.C. § 1302, authorizing the FCC "and
each state commission with jurisdiction over telecommunications services" to
promote "advanced telecommunications capability," i.e., the facilities substrate on
which the Internet runs. In fact, the distinction between "telecommunications
services" and "advanced telecommunications capability" is largely a matter of
semantics, and possibly of transmission speed and protocol - the facilities involved
are often the same. A fuller discussion of this matter is largely beyond the scope of
this paper, but suggests - again - the difficulty of these issues.
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Amendment because it "place[dj an unacceptably heavy burden on
protected speech." 257 But whose speech? And was it speaking
speech or receiving speech? And if speaking speech, was it the
network's speech, or the speech of content producers using the
network?
The Court begins its analysis by citing the finding of the court
below that "the Act would abridge significant protected speech,
particularly by noncommercial speakers." 258  It then cites with
approval Ginsberg v. New York, which recognized "the constitutional
freedom of expression secured to a citizen to read or see material
concerned with sex," and concludes that the Act "effectively
suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a
constitutional right to receive and to address to one another."259
Nowhere are the rights of the network owners mentioned, although
they presumably would be liable under the statute for the allegedly
"obscene or indecent" transmissions.
The case of United States v. American Library Association (ALA)
again addressed Internet indecency, but added an extra player to the
cast: in addition to network owners, content providers, and network
users, ALA addressed the rights of libraries and librarians as the
providers of the terminals (and alleged public forum) where
network-transmitted content was consumed.260 At issue was the
successor to the CDA, the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA),
which conditioned the receipt of federal universal service support
for Internet access on the libraries' installation of blocking or
filtering technology designed to prevent children's access to
pornography. 261 Among the various candidates for First
Amendment protection were the libraries, the web publishers or
content producers who provide the material that potentially could
be obscene, and the library patrons and network users who both
receive and produce content. The Court first sidestepped the
libraries' claim that they had a "First Amendment right to provide
the public with access to constitutionally protected speech," ruling
that "when government appropriates public funds to establish a
257. Reno, 521 U.S. at 882.
258. Id. at 863.
259. Id. at 864-65, 874 (citing inter alia Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
260. United States v. ACLU, 539 U.S. 194, 212 (2003) ("assuming again that
libraries have First Amendment rights").
261. United States v. American Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 201 (2003).
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program it is entitled to define the limits of that program." 262 The
rights of "Web publishers" were also specifically disavowed
("public library does not acquire Internet terminals in order to create
a public forum for Web publishers"), so the First Amendment nod
seems to go to library patrons, although their rights are first
mentioned in the concluding paragraph of the majority's opinion:
"Because the libraries' use of filtering software does not violate their
patrons' First Amendment rights, CIPA does not induce libraries to
violate the First Amendment." 263 What exactly comprised the rights
of those patrons is left unexplained. Again, the rights of the
network owner were left entirely unaddressed. In neither Reno nor
ALA does the majority discuss Red Lion's affirmation of the rights of
listeners and information recipients, the most salient point of that
case.
In Ashcroft v. ACLU, addressing another legislative attempt to
protect children on the Internet, the Court wrestles with whether a
local or national standard applies to obscenity, opting for the greater
speech protection of the latter, but does not squarely confront whose
speech rights would be truncated by the former. The Court opens
with a description of information recipients on the Internet
("individuals can access material about topics ranging from
aardvarks to Zoroastrianism ... [and] read thousands of
newspapers published around the globe"), but then turns to "web
publishers" and "Internet speakers" when it gets to the thick of its
constitutional analysis.264
Perhaps ironically, one of the few attempts to develop a
coherent taxonomy of constitutional rights in network disputes was
proffered by Justice Thomas in his concurring/ dissenting opinion in
a cable case, Denver Area Educational Area Television, where he
(consistent with his dismantling of Red Lion, above) subordinated
the rights of "programmers" and "would-be viewers" to those of the
262. Id. at 211 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991)). Even on closer
reading, it remains unclear whether the libraries are conceived as First Amendment
speaker, or conduit, or censor. See, e.g., American Library Association, 539 U.S. at
203 ("To determine whether libraries would violate the First Amendment by
employing the filtering software. . .").
263. American Liberty Ass'n, 539 U.S. at 214; see also id. at 206 (not a public forum
for web publishers).
264. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 566, 565 (2002) ("aardvarks to





We implicitly recognized in Turner that the programmer's right to
compete for channel space is derivative of, and subordinate to, the
operator's editorial discretion. Like a free-lance writer seeking a
paper in which to publish newspaper editorials, a programmer is
protected in searching for an outlet for cable programming, but
has no free-standing First Amendment right to have that
programming transmitted. Cf Miami Herald v. Tornillo [supra].
Likewise, the rights of would-be viewers are derivative of the
speech rights of operators and programmers. Cf Virginia Board,
[supra].265
To get to this hierarchy, however, Justice Thomas has to engage
in rather substantial inductive leaps which beg the question of why
speaker and viewer rights are subordinated to owner rights. This
(and Justice Kennedy's more probing but less conclusive analysis
noted in the margin) appear to be the only attempts from the
Supreme Court or its Justices to develop a theory of how various
speech rights on a network can be ranked or related to one another.
The uncertain status of speech and information recipients, and
of the speech process itself, under the First Amendment may be
symptomatic of a larger problem. The First Amendment posits a
"freedom of speech," but First Amendment jurisprudence is often
unclear about the conditions of speech in the real world, who gets to
speak, and who gets silenced. Such an empirical inquiry about
speech in society would depend on how speech is defined, an open
issue in First Amendment jurisprudence, while more defined in the
German context as described in Part IV.A above. Whatever the
definition, a negative rights constitution does not concern itself with
potential "horizontal" impediments to speech in society, as long as
those impediments do not on their face involve "state action" (a
265. Denver Area Educ. Telecom. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 817
(Thomas J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Ironically, the authority
cited for the "derivative" rights of would-be viewers is a passage from Virginia
Board of Pharmacy, one of the seminal information freedom cases, where the Court
appeared to recognize that what is protected is not so much an individual's right as
a process: "Freedom of Speech presupposes a willing speaker. But where a speaker
exists . . . the protection afforded is to the communication, to its source, and to its
recipients both." Id. (citing Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976)). Justice Kennedy's concurring and dissenting
opinion focuses on the source of the speech, concluding that neither the public or
leased access programmer's speech is the "forced speech of the operator." 518 U.S.
at 788- 806.
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further unresolved question of free speech jurisprudence, which
gets its own section below). The empirical indifference suggested
by the state action requirement is described by some as the
"withdrawal of the Constitution from society."266
Thus we have the questions glimpsed above: Who is the
speaker? Are listening and receiving data part of speech? Are there
hybrid protections, combining speech and associational rights, that
might cover networking and innovation on the network? Can one
distinguish between speech-speaking, speech-listening, speech-
information retrieval, and speech-networking?
In examining the identity of the speaker, a further level of
confusion arises about the relationship of property to speech. As
reflected in the analysis in the preceding section of various species
of ownership-as-speech, the two are closely related, if not identical
in much of the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. 267
The confusion of property and speech in network cases stems in
significant part from the cable television cases. The cable industry,
led in part by the zealous advocacy of Harold Farrow, 268 established
the principle that cable owners were in fact speakers. In 1979, in
ruling that the FCC had no explicit authority to require public,
educational and governmental (PEG) access channels on cable
systems, the Court noted but declined to address the First
Amendment issue.269 In Farrow's first foray to the highest Court,
the 1982 case of Community Communications v. Boulder (an antitrust
challenge to municipal cable franchising authority), the Court again
266. Quint, supra note 167, at 347 ("An important underlying theme of American
constitutional law is thus the withdrawal of the Constitution from society - both in
its restriction of constitutional limitations to actions of the state and its exclusion of
other types of constitutional provisions that might require the government to act in
society").
267. See generally, McGinnis, supra note 20, at 87.
268. Mr. Farrow argued in four significant cable cases in the Supreme Court,
often making his point that cable providers were First Amendment speakers:
Community Communications v. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982); Preferred
Communications v. City of Los Angeles, 476 U.S. 488 (1986); FCC v. Florida Power,
480 U.S. 245 (1987) (as attorney for amicus cable company in pole attachment case);
and Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991) (attorney for amicus cable industry
group).
269. FCC v. Midwest Video, 440 U.S. 689, 709 n.19 (1979) (Midwest II) ("The court
below suggested that the Commission's rules might violate the First Amendment
rights of cable operators. Because our decision rests on statutory grounds, we
express no view on that question, save to acknowledge that it is not frivolous").
Mr. Farrow did not participate in this case.
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declined to address the First Amendment issue, while noting that
the trial court had found the case presented "wider concerns,
including interstate commerce ... [and] the First Amendment rights
of communicators." 270 In Preferred Communications v. City of Los
Angeles, however, Farrow struck paydirt. The Court accepted the
cable company's argument that
The business of cable television, like that of newspapers and
magazines, is to provide its subscribers with a mixture of news,
information and entertainment. As do newspapers, cable
television companies use a portion of their available space to
reprint (or retransmit) the communications of others, while at the
same time providing some original content. 271
The Court ruled that "the activities in which respondent
allegedly seeks to engage plainly implicate First Amendment
interests," because the cable system spoke "through original
programming or by exercising editorial discretion over which
stations or programs to include in its repertoire." 272 It is this phrase
- "through original programming or by exercising editorial
discretion" - with its slippery disjunctive, that has lived on. Turner I
enshrined it as fact, and reiterated Preferred's conclusion that cable
operators ""seek to communicate messages on a wide variety of
topics and in a wide variety of formats." 273 On this basis, Turner I
proclaimed (now using the conjunctive rather than the disjunctive),
"Cable programmers and cable operators engage in and transmit
speech, and they are entitled to the protection of the speech and
press provisions of the First Amendment." 274
So we see the slow elevation of an implication to a certainty.
The fact remains that cable owners are only cable speakers, i.e.,
270. Community Communications, 455 U.S. at 47. While noting that the dissent at
the Court of Appeals found the Boulder ordinance violated "the First Amendment
rights of petitioner and its customers," the Court could avoid the issue because the
"petition for certiorari did not present the First Amendment question." Id. at 48
n.11.
271. Preferred Communications, 476 U.S. at 494.
272. Id. (emphasis added). The Court overruled the trial court's demurrer on the
"plainly implicates" rationale, and sent the case back for further proceedings.
Justice Blackmun (joined by Justices Marshall and O'Connor) noted in a concurring
opinion that the Court "leaves open the question of the proper standard for judging
First Amendment challenges to a municipality's restriction of access to cable
facilities." Id. at 496-97.
273. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 636, (citing Preferred, 476 U.S. at 494).
274. Id. (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444 (1991) (emphasis added)).
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content producer-providers, on about 1% 2% of their channels, the
so-called "local origination" channels. 275  All the rest may be
understood as product on a shelf, produced by people and
businesses other than the cable network owner, although Turner I
left the impression that cable network owners were speakers for all
purposes. 276  This may be traceable in part to the antecedent
structural choice that had been made about cable, one that is seldom
alluded to, yet remains as topical as the day it was issued. The
Nixon White House declared in 1974 that cable would best be
structured as a common carrier to promote programming
competition and minimize government intrusion.277 In response,
the 1984 Cable Act contained an express provision prohibiting
common carrier treatment of cable. 278 These are old battles, but they
contribute to today's confusion.
The network owner-operators - Verizon, AT&T, Comcast
among them - have seized on these many theoretical uncertainties,
claiming at every opportunity that the speech they transmit is their
speech or that they are "editors" of other people's speech, and thus
themselves are First Amendment speakers, in a quest to gain fuller
control over the speech on their networks, and greater freedom to
extract revenue from the excess value created by IP transmissions. 279
For someone inured to the concept of speech as discourse, however,
the current debate as to whether data bits can be considered speech,
the contention of Verizon Communications in its D.C. Circuit
appeal, is simply ludicrous. Equally inexplicable is how the
network subscriber's speech becomes the network owner's speech,
which it must be if Verizon can exercise dominion over it. From a
275. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.5(p) (2012) (channels "subject to the exclusive control of
the cable operator").
276. Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 637 ("our cases have permitted more intrusive
regulation of broadcast speakers"); but see id. at 645 ("must-carry provisions also
burden cable programmers by reducing the number of channels for which they can
compete"); cf Tushnet, supra note 242, at 78. Obviously, the Comcast/NBC merger
creates a heretofore unknown merging of conduit and content, raising problems of
its own, beyond the scope of this paper, but the subject of a forthcoming book from
Professor Crawford. SUSAN CRAWFORD, CAPTIVE AUDIENCE: THE TELECOM INDUSTRY
AND MONOPOLY POWER IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (Jan. 2013).
277. See Whitehead Report, supra note 241; see also Noam, Towards An Integrated
Communications Market: Overcoming The Local Monopoly of Cable Television, 34 FED.
COMM. L.J. 209, 217 (1982).
278. 47 U.S.C. § 541(c) (2012).
279. See discussion of two-sided market in note 305 infra.
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discourse perspective, the electronic networks are places where
many different speech interests meet; this perspective practically
demands that that the lawmaker or jurist engage in some sort of
balancing of interests. 280
E. The State Action Problem
While the German Basic Law has been interpreted to require
the legislature to protect speech from government as well as private
censorship, the U.S. Constitution protects only against "state
action." It is this problem that has put private censorship largely
beyond the radar of our Supreme Court. "That 'Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press' is
a restraint on government action, not that of private persons," as the
Court ruled in CBS.281
In several instances, however, the Court has discerned state
action where it was not immediately apparent, cases where
government regulation or enforcement was intertwined with actions
found to be discriminatory or otherwise unconstitutional. 282 A
badly fractured Court in CBS v. Democratic National Committee
considered these governmental involvement cases, but could not
280. Cf Constitutional Court proclamation, supra note 158 and accompanying
text, that electronic networks are places where many different rights meet and
collide, and must be balanced. "Balancing" is another word, however, that sends
shivers up the spines of conservative jurists and First Amendment absolutists. See
discussion in note 368 infra. The mere fact that many different media are
converging on one physical facility, without more, suggests that some sort of
balancing of interests is going to be inevitable.
281. CBS v. Dem. Nat'l Comm. 412 U.S. 94, 114 (1972) (citing Public Utilities
Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461 (1952)); see also Denver Area Educ. Telecom.
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 737 (1996) (reciting lower court's finding that
"First Amendment prohibits only 'Congress' (and, through the Fourteenth
Amendment, a State), not private individuals, from 'abridging the freedom of
speech").
282. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (state action in enforcement of
private discriminatory deed); Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 462
(1952) (state action found because of pervasive regulation of private streetcar
operator, and regulatory review of action in question); Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 724-25 (1961) (state action in restaurant's
discrimination because of close, symbiotic relationship between public authority
and private business); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (state
action in judicial enforcement of libel laws between private parties); Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380-81 (1967) (state action in statute which allowed private
discrimination); Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663, 668 (1991) (state action in
judicial enforcement of promissory estoppels between private parties).
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muster a majority either way. Only three Justices joined that part of
the majority opinion finding no state action, on the grounds that
government was neither a partner nor engaged in a symbiotic
relationship with CBS. 283 Three other Justices (White, Brennan,
Marshall) indicated that they would have found state action,
Brennan and Marshall because "the reach of the First Amendment
depends not upon any formalistic 'private-public' dichotomy but,
rather, upon more functional considerations concerning the extent
of governmental involvement in, and public character of, a
particular "private" enterprise." 284  Brennan and Marshall also
referenced Red Lion's finding that "'existing broadcasters have often
attained their present position,' not as a result of free market
pressures but, rather, 'because of their initial government
selection.... the fruit of a preferred position conferred by the
Government."' 28
5
The contribution of the work of Marvin Ammori and others is
to show that there is state action in many places we hadn't thought
to look before. Ammori rightly sees First Amendment spaces,
public fora, created by government across the social landscape - the
post office, government mandated common carrier systems for
telephone and telegraph systems, set-asides for noncommercial,
educational and informational channels for both cable and satellite
transmission systems. 286  (Before him, Larry Lessig saw
constitutional speech values embedded in code. After the Arab
Spring, others have noted that "technology design," in particular
Internet transport, "involves political strategy and is part of a
nation's "constitutional moment." 287). In the speech spaces he
identifies, Ammori mentions the cable and telecommunicationS288
wires that ride on pole attachments - property - which graphically
283. CBS v. Dem. Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 119 (1972).
284. Id. at 172.
285. Id. at 175 (citing Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400 (1969)).
286. Ammori, supra note 21, at 42-43.
287. MACKINNON, supra note 141, at 53 (quoting PHILIP HOWARD, THE DIGITAL
ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND
POLITICAL ISLAM 10 (2010) ("technology design can actually involve political
strategy and be part of a nation's 'constitutional moment"')).
288. Here I am using telecommunications not in the narrow sense of some
observors post-Brand X. The fact is that broadband is a technology that rides on




illustrate that speech, even the carriers' purported speech, is
dependent on the property of others, and on a system of laws that
assigns, distributes and protects those rights.289 Indeed, as the
Internet runs to a very large extent on incumbent telephone lines or
on coaxial cable, in ducts under public streets, through public and
public utility easements, 290 or hung from poles pursuant to pole
attachment statutes, 291 it becomes clear that the incumbent carriers
and their cable competitors would not be sitting on top of one of the
largest electronic networks in the world without substantial state
action.
In his expanded catalog of state action, Ammori follows in the
footsteps of others who have questioned the "negative" use of the
state action doctrine to block a more proactive First Amendment
interpretation. Citing the German jurisprudence of Drittwirkung.
comparative law scholar Stephen Gardbaum argues for the sort of
direct application of constitutional principles to legal disputes
practiced by the German Constitutional Court: Under the
Supremacy Clause, he maintains, "all law, no matter what its source
or type, is subject to the Constitution." 292 Thus, he reads New York
Times v. Sullivan to protect "the New York Times' First Amendment
freedoms ... not only where the government is directly seeking to
limit the newspaper's speech but also where a private individual
can achieve the same result by relying on a law permitting him or
her to do So."293 Gardbaum sees this as not much different from
what the Constitutional Court did in Liith, and in the subsequent
Blinkfuer case. 294 Gardbaum's concerns are more involved with
289. Ammori, supra note 21, at 42 n.213 ("While cable companies object to access
rules imposed on their own property, they lobby for access rules imposed on
others' property. Congress grants cable companies access to the utility poles of
other companies").
290. See, e.g., Cal. Gov. Code § 53066; see also Salvaty v. Falcon Cable, 165 Cal.
App. 3d 798, 805 (1985) (unregulated cable companies beyond the scope of public
utility easements).
291. 47 U.S.C. § 224.
292. Stephen Gardbaum, The "Horizontal Effect" of Constitutional Rights, 102 MICH.
L. REV. 388, 418 (2003).
293. Id. at 434.
294. Id. Of Blinkfuer, which was also a press boycott case, but one where the
Court sided with the small magazine target of the boycott called by a large
publishe, Gardbaum says that the Constitutional Court held "that the [smaller
target] magazine's freedom of expression was at issue and that the state had a
positive duty to protect it against such coercion," which is true as far as it goes. He
also notes the suggestion of a "constitutional cause of action" based on such a
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general constitutional dynamics, so he misses somewhat the
dynamics that drive the Constitutional Court's decisions (the Basic
Law's immutable principles of human dignity and democracy as
applied to communications), the Constitutional Court's concern for
the process of self government, its interest in securing the widest
possible dissemination of information and opinion, and its resulting
solicitude for the "institutional freedom" of the communication
media, whose protection may require legislative action:
Opinion and press freedom protect the freedom of inquiry and the
process of opinion building in a free democracy; they do not act as
a guaranty of economic interests. [Rather, they] protect the
institution of a free press . . The goal of press freedom is to
secure and facilitate the building of public opinion, which
demands the protection of the press from attempts to truncate the
marketplace of opinions through the use of economic pressure.295
Professor Hershkoff follows up on Gardbaum's work, finding
other cases and language that suggest a direct application of
constitutional principles, i.e., an "American version of radiating
effect," rather than walking through the state action analysis.296 The
central perception of the state action critics, according to their critic
Lillian BeVier, is "that the actions of both state and private actors are
backed by government power." She contends that the state action
doctrine can be saved from its contradictions by asking who is
exercising government power - government, or a private actor.297
None of these critics and critics of critics, however, focuses on
the specific case of the communications network of the 21st century,
which could lend their theorizing a concrete instance, in at least two
respects. First, the Internet - because it runs on a physical layer, i.e.,
wires and other facilities belonging largely to the incumbent carriers
and cable companies - could not exist without property and contract
law, as well as the judicial and administrative tribunals which
violation. See also Constitutionalizing Communications, supra note 1, at 125.
295. 25 BVerfGE 256 (1969) (Blinkfiler) (Das Ziel der Pressefreiheit, die Bildung einer
freien offentlichen Meinung zu erleichtern und zu gewdhrleisten, erfordert deshalb den
Schutz der Presse gegeniber Versuchen, den Wettbewerb der Meinungen durch
wirtschaftliche Druckmittel auszuschalten).
296. Helen Hershkoff, Horizontality and the "Spooky" Doctrines of American Law, 59
BUFF. L. REV. 455, 488-89 (2011).
297. John Harrison, Lillian BeVier, The State Action Principle and Its Critics, Univ.
of Virginia School of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series No.
2010-18, at 13, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract =1588082.
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enforce that law, and adjudicate claims between carriers, making
order out of chaos.298 It should not be forgotten that the Internet
was all state action at its inception, sponsored as it was by the U.S.
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), as a "means
for researchers and defense contractors to share information." 299
Secondly, the Internet - as a network of networks, the primary
carrier of interpersonal communication, government-individual
communication, and a wide range of economic activity - can itself
be seen as constitutive of our social lives and body politic. If free
speech is the matrix of self-government, the Internet of the 21st
century is the matrix of free speech. The Germans' foregrounding of
public discourse in their free speech analysis, and their attention to
the Drittwirkung or the radiating effect of constitutional rights and
values, seem to cut through the morass of "state action" analysis,
and get us immediately to the matter at issue in the network cases -
the speech of network users.
F. Empirical Consequences of a Negative Freedom First Amendment.
First Amendment jurisprudence posits a "marketplace of
ideas."3 00 But as discussed above, that jurisprudence most often
describes only a "negative freedom" (i.e., one that only prevents
"state action" infringing on speech). Markets can fail, however.
What are the empirical consequences of a negative freedom First
Amendment when idea or information markets fail, as they were
found to have done in the Associated Press v. United States and United
States v. AT&T, discussed above?
298. An example of state action necessary to order the network is found in the
interconnection contracts which are made under 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-252, that part of
the 1996 Telecommunications Act which requires all carriers to interconnect with
one another, and state agencies to arbitrate disputes that arise in the process. See,
e.g., Verizon v. Peevey, 462 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2006); Global NAPs, Inc. v. Mass.
Dep't of Telecomrn. & Energy, 427 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2005) (ISP bound traffic).
299. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 529 U.S. 844, 849-50 (1997) ("what began in 1969 as
a military program called 'ARPANET"'); CHRIS SHERMAN & GARY PRICE, THE
INVISIBLE WEB 1 (2002). See also history recounted in Part II.A note 23 supra; Barry
Leiner, Vint Cerf, Robert Kahn et al., A Brief History of the Internet, available at
http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtnl#darpa ("A key to the rapid
growth of the Internet has been the free and open access to the basic documents,
especially the specifications of the protocols"); see also http://www.nitrd.gov/
NCOSearch.aspx?SearchText=telecommunication (ongoing government research in
IP/telecommunications issues).
300. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Some, like Lillian BeVier, claim that the personal autonomy
unleashed by (and at the center of) negative freedom free speech
will ultimately overcome any transitory market failures, and
produce a broader and more diverse information landscape; others
see a persistent truncation of the ideas, information and opinion
available to Americans. 301
One's degree of optimism or pessimism about the real world
effects of a negative freedom model is highly correlated with one's
empirical (or not) view of the level of competition in information
and communication markets today. This question is highly
contested. Some claim that "intermodal competition" is driving
unprecedented levels of competition; others see a radical collapse of
ownership diversity in the broadcasting and entertainment
industries, and/or concentration in the telecommunications
substrate equal to or greater than it was in 1982 when the "old"
AT&T was broken up. 302 One's view of competition, in turn,
depends on how one segments the information and communications
market(s). If one focuses solely on the physical transport layer, on
the market for telecommunications transport, one can conclude that
the supposed "intermodal competitors" to the incumbent wireline
carriers - wireless telephony, Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP),
cable - all remain reliant on telecommunications transport provided
primarily by the incumbent carriers. 303
301. Comments of Lillian BeVier, Stanford Technology Law Review Symposium,
supra note 88; the more pessimistic view is represented in Wu, THE MASTER SWITCH,
supra note 146; see also citations in note 302 infra.
302. As to telecommunications infrastructure, see John Blevins, The New Scarcity:
A First Amendment Framework for Regulating Access to Digital Media Platforms, 79
TENN. L. REV. 353, 377 ("The Illusion of Platform Abundance"); see also discussion of
special access proceedings in note 47, supra; notes 374-76 infra and accompanying
text. As to broadcasting, see, e.g., Adam Marcus, Media Diversity and Substitutability:
Problems with FCC's Diversity Index, 3 INFo. Soc. J.L. & POLICY 83, 90 (2007) ("radio
industry lost 981 owners between 1995 and 1999. . . By 2002, four firms controlled
70% of the market share or greater in "[viirtually every geographic market ... [and]
66.6% of the nation's 'News' format radio listeners").
303. Thus, wireless carriers must rely on the wireline network, most crucially for
the "backhaul" from the wireless cell sites and antennae to the mobile telephone
switching offices located deeper in the network. Sprint and others complain
bitterly about the allegedly extortionate rates charged by AT&T and Verizon for
this backhaul service. See January 19, 2010 Comments of Sprint Nextel Corporation,
In re Special Access for Price Cap Local Exchange Carriers, FCC WC Docket No. 05-25.
The FCC has found itself unable even to gather the data that would establish who
owns what wires, and allow closer consideration of the de facto barriers to entry,
either through resale or lease of those wires, or "elements" of same, or by building
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Is market concentration an inevitable result of a negative
freedom" First Amendment? I would contend that there is at least a
relationship between the laissez-faire approach of a "negative" First
Amendment, oblivious to the connection between media ownership
and opinion power, and the growth of significant market power that
can restrict, divert, or amplify information flows - private
censorship, in other words.
Two recent Supreme Court challenges to the incumbent
carriers' alleged near-monopoly hold on key telecommunications
components - Verizon v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, and Pacific Bell
Tel. Co. v. Linkline Communications Inc. - were decided (like Brand X)
with no reference to the First Amendment, much less a discussion of
the speech rights of network users.304 One could say that it is unfair
to look for constitutional free speech claims in what were de jure
antitrust cases involving telecommunications companies, but: (a) the
Springer/Sat1 case cited below (like the Associated Press v. Unitd States
case discussed in Part V.A above) shows that free speech and
antitrust concerns are not unrelated; and (b) the proponents of a
negative First Amendment themselves make the competitiveness of
the communications marketplace a lynchpin for their arguments. 305
The relative inability of a First Amendment right of information
freedom to gain traction, and its almost complete absence from
telecommunications cases, creates a void that is especially
problematic in the open network cases. Here the question is which
requirements of traditional common carriage, on which much of the
Internet was built, will continue to apply to the owners of
communications transport and transmission facilities - whether
traditional wires, optical fibers, or wireless spectrum - that comprise
the "physical" layer of Internet transmission. 306
facilities-based competition. In re Special Access for Price Cap Local Exchange Carriers,
Report & Order, FCC WC Docket No. 05-25 (August 22, 2012).
304. Indeed, consumers are completely absent in Trinko, and appear only in
passing in the Linkline decision; there is no mention of the First Amendment in
either decision. Verizon v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004); Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v.
Linkline Communications Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 451 (2009).
305. See e.g., Yoo, supra note 21, at 767 ("The presence of intermodal competition
between broadband access providers has led courts to hold the gatekeeper rationale
articulated in Turner I inapplicable to the Internet").
306. See generally Ammori, supra note 21; see also Frieden, supra note 31, at 245-46;
Whitt, supra note 34, at 590, passim (describing Internet "layers"); see also discussion
of Internet's genesis on the common carrier public telephone network, in note 27
supra.
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Because the information recipients are not in the picture, the
carriers have moved into the void. In the FCC's Open Network
proceedings, Verizon argued for negative freedom: "the First
Amendment comes into play only when the government imposes
restrictions affecting speech." 307 AT&T asserted that the proposed
rules would "preclude[e] market actors [presumably AT&T itself]
from enhancing particular messages to communicate more
effectively with the public."308 NCTA complained that the proposed
rules would bar network owners' "decision-making about what
content is communicated to Internet users, and how it is
presented." 309
Verizon has now carried the banner to the D.C. Circuit, mincing
no words in the process: the FCC's Network Neutrality regime, as
insufficient as it was in the view of many, 310 "infringes broadband
network owners' constitutional rights [and] violates the First
Amendment by stripping them of control over the transmission." 311
Apparently confident that the negative First Amendment will trump
common sense, Verizon ups the ante: "Broadband networks are the
modern day microphone by which their owners engage in First
Amendment speech." 312 Verizon ignores the fact that not everyone,
indeed almost no one, has this sort of microphone at his or her
disposal.
The effect of these assertions, were they accepted, would be
breathtaking. The network owners' view would divest 300 million
Americans of sovereignty and agency in their Internet
communications, leaving only a handful of fully vested First
Amendment speakers in the country. At the point where Americans
307. Verizon Comments, supra note 251, at 111.
308. AT&T Comments, supra note 250, at 16-17 ("Such rules are particularly
indefensible when they implicate First Amendment concerns, as these would, by
precluding market actors from enhancing particular messages to communicate
more effectively with the public. The rules also would create an uncompensated
taking of broadband networks in the service of dubious social objectives").
309. NCTA Comments, supra note 252, at 49.
310. There was a belief that the FCC, instead of issuing perhaps unenforceable
rules of good behavior under Title I should instead have simply reclassified
broadband as a Title II common carrier telecommunications service, and in fact the
FCC opened a proceeding to do this. See Reclassification Notice, supra note 42, 28.
311. Verizon Brief, supra note 13, at 3.
312. Id. at 12. Oddly, Verizon later concedes that it transports the speech of
"millions of individuals use the Internet to promote their own opinions and ideas
and to explore those of others," but draws no consequences from this fact. Id. at 43.
234 [Vol. 36:1
Information Freedom
have come to accept the Internet as their primary communications
vehicle, they would be left dependent on the good graces of the few
telecommunications and cable companies that own a critical mass of
the physical infrastructure on which the Internet runs.
What do we know, empirically speaking, about the way the
carriers are likely to behave with the control they seek? Here one
can cite the familiar litany of carrier censorship: Verizon's
interception and blocking of NARAL texts; AT&T's silencing of
Pearl Jam's Eddie Veder as he waxed critical of President George W.
Bush during a 2007 Pearl Jam concert; and Comcast's interference
with the file sharing of barbershop quartet aficionados (which led to
the seminal Free Press/Public Knowledge complaint against
Comcast at the FCC). 313 There is also the Madison River VolP
blocking 314 and, if one reaches back further, the censorship by cable
313. These incidents are recited in Patric Verrone, The Comcast Case and the Fight
for Net Neutrality, 34 L.A. LAWYER 9, 10 n.37 (2011). The Comcast complaint led to
the FCC's Comcast Network Management Practices Order, 23 FCC Rcd 13028, 13055-56,
1, 47-48 (2008) [hereinafter Comcast Order] (finding Comcast guilty of a violation
of open network "principles") overturned on appeal Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d
642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (FCC had failed to show that enjoining a cable operator
from secretly degrading its customers' lawful Internet traffic was "reasonably
ancillary to the . . effective performance of its statutorily mandated
responsibilities," particularly in light of the FCC's own classification of Internet
access and transport as an "information service"). Realizing that it had a problem
on its hands, the FCC opened a proceeding to revisit its Cable Modem Ruling,
specifically its rejection of common carrier treatment for cable modem service
because "there is no separate offering" of a telecommunications transport service,
the very ruling that Justice Scalia found so questionable.) See note 53 supra. The
Commission's 2010 Reclassification Notice proposed a "third way," whereby it would
"identify the Internet connectivity service that is offered as part of wired broadband
Internet service (and only this connectivity service) as a telecommunications
service," and thereby a common carrier. Reclassification Notice, supra note 42, 25
FCC Rcd 7866 2. Rather than do this, the FCC issued net neutrality rules in its
Open Internet Order (see note 324 infra) and again based them on "ancillary"
authority. The Reclassification Notice docket remains open, but there has been no
decision and little action in that proceeding since the issuance of the Open Internet
Order. Neither the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Comcast v. FCC nor the Commission's
subsequent Reclassification Notice mention the First Amendment rights of network
users and information recipients.
314. In the Madison River case, the broadband affiliate of a telephone company
blocked access to VolP services that could compete with the telephone company,
and paid a $15,000 fine for doing so. See Madison River Communications, LLC and
affiliated companies, 20 FCC Rcd 4295 (2005) cited in Open Internet Order, 25 FCC
Rcd 17905 35 n.104 ( 2010) on appeal as Verizon v. FCC, No. 11-1355, (D.C. Cir.
2012) The Open Internet Order cites other examples of blocking, slowing or
degrading of nonfavored traffic. Open Internet Order, 35-36.
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companies of leased and public access programming.315
NARAL, Pearl Jam, and the barbershop quartets are all cases on
the margins, albeit symptomatic of deeper questions raised by
private and non-transparent control over the physical layer on
which the Internet runs. Deep packet inspection (DPI) and similar
network analysis technology opens entirely new prospects of
control. 316 Not only does DPI and related analytic technology make
it remunerative for Google to provide consumers with free email
storage in return for targeted advertising and data rights, it also
made it possible for Iran to round-up and execute dissenters.317
What the carriers appear to really want, however, is a two-sided
market, which would allow them to charge content providers to
reach network users (in addition to charging the users for access to
the network), effectively allowing "network operators to claim a
share of the value of work created by others." 318 Indeed, Verizon, at
least, is quite frank about its desire to be able to discriminate
between and among content, alleging that the FCC's "no blocking
rule denies broadband providers discretion in deciding which traffic
from so-called edge providers to carry."319
315. See, e.g., Altmann v. Television Signal Corp, 849 F. Supp. 1335, 1347 (N.D.
Cal., 1994) (injunction issued against cable company's interference with leased and
public access programming).
316. See, Catherine Sandoval, Disclosure, Deception, and Deep-Packet Inspection: the
Role of the Federal Trade Commission and Deceptive Conduct Prohibitions in the Net
Neutrality Debate, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 641 (2009); see also Deep Packet Inspection and
Privacy, EPIC.ORG, http://epic.org/privacy/dpi/.
317. The technology sold to, and then used by, Iranian mobile phone operators
to crack down on protesters was publicly available software sold by Nokia-Siemens
Networks. MACKINNON, supra note 141, at 54-56. For advertising applications, see
Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, To Track or "Do Not Track": Advancing Transparency
and Individual Control in Online Behavioral Advertising, 13 MINN. J.L. Sa. & TECH. 281,
298 (2012). The author does not mean to suggest that Google has control over the
physical layer, but rather that Google is using a technology that would be more
problematic if aggressively exploited by formerly common carrier network
operators.
318. Stefaan Verhulst, Mapping Digital Media Net Neutrality and the Media,
OPENSOCIETYFOUNDATION.ORG, 12 n.12 and accompanying text (une 2011),
http://www.soros.org/sites/default/files/mapping-digital-media-net-neutrality-
20110808.pdf (summarizing arguments of Susan Crawford); see also Verizon Brief at
9 (FCC's neutrality rules "thus foreclose[e] a wide-range of two-sided pricing
models"); Crawford, supra note 58, at 70 ("In a nutshell, the providers' claim is not
merely that they own their networks, but also that their ownership dictates their
participation in whatever profits flow from use of their broadband access points").
319. Verizon Brief supra note 13, at 16.
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VI. Criticisms, Comparisons, Suggestions, Conclusions
A. The Affirmative Speech Model - Criticisms and Comparisons
Confronted with the affirmative German speech model (with its
real world translation into a public broadcasting system sufficiently
financed to compete with commercial television), the American
reader can be forgiven for wondering whether a court-constructed
model of communications freedom would fit into the hurly-burly of
U.S. economic and cultural life. 320 Are there, nonetheless, values or
concepts or strategies that the United States could productively
borrow from the German communications jurisprudence? To
adequately answer this question, attention must be paid to criticism
of the affirmative speech model in general, and the information
freedom jurisprudence in particular.
In Constitutionalizing Communications, I touched on some of the
critiques of the German system, which at times echo the corollaries
of "negative freedom" identified by Ammori: the "slippery slope"
problem; distrust of government; a belief that judges should not
pick winners and losers or "redistribute" speech opportunities; and,
finally, the assumption that private speech is tied to property
rights.321 Each successive ruling of the Constitutional Court, and
every activity of public and private broadcasters (including the
structure of their operations and markets, and the content of their
programs), has bred criticism from various (and sometimes all)
parts of the political spectrum. I summarize these criticisms, and
the response to them, from both sides of the Atlantic.
A persistent criticism is that of "model inconsistency."
Although the Constitutional Court has clearly stated that there is no
one model - neither a press-oriented external plurality nor the
internal plurality of the public broadcasting stations - that must be
realized in its pure form,322 some see in the uneasy coexistence of
320. Simply the fact that the German's default position is public broadcasting,
while the U.S. default is commercial broadcasting, reflects these cultural
differences. See, generally, WOLFGANG HOFFNIANN-RIEM, REGULATING MEDIA: THE
LICENSING AND SUPERVISION OF BROADCASTING IN Six COUNTRIES 4, 11, passim (1996).
321. See, e.g., Constitutionalizing Communications, supra note[1, at 139-140 n.141
(citing Widmaier, supra note 180, at 107, 151 (German "values focus" constitutes an
"elitist fallacy" and amounts to "governmentally created ethics of human
interaction")); see also discussion at notes 85-86, supra, and accompanying text.
322. 83 BVerfGE 238, 315 (1991). The conservative parliamentarians had
challenged the North-Rhine Westphalia broadcasting laws, inter alia, to the extent
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public and private broadcasting two distinct constitutional
approaches, and a fundamental contradiction between
government's attempts to create an independent platform for speech
on the one hand, and the classic understanding of speech as a liberal
freedom, i.e., one directed against the state, on the other.323 Some
see a heightened incongruity in the persistence of separate
constitutional regimes for the press and broadcasting, after
broadcasting's "special situation" (based on frequency scarcity) is
alleged to have been dissolved, and even though press and
broadcasting freedoms are found side-by-side in the same clause of
the Basic Law. 324  One body of thought believes that it is
they allowed public broadcasters to engage in joint ventures with commercial
entities, and separately required commercial broadcasters to observe some of the
same public interest rules (diversity, balance, and so forth) that applied to public
broadcasters, on the ground that such mixing of public and private forms violated
the principle of "model consistency." The Court rejected this view, and put the
focus not on the institutional form, but on the constitutional goal:
The Basic Law does not prescribe any model broadcasting order, but only a
goal: the freedom of the broadcasting's essential function [Freiheitlichkeit
des Rundfunkwesens]. Broadcasting must be able to fulfill its task of free
individual and public opinion-building. This task is independent of any
model.
Id. at 316. If model consistency is not the touchstone of constitutional legitimacy,
then joint public-private ventures were also not per se unconstitutional: "The Basic
Law does not exclude cooperation [between public and private entities] ... a
command of model consistency cannot be derived from the Basic Law ... nor can a
command of strict separation between broadcasting and press." Id. at 305. See also
ALBREcHT HESSE, RUNDFUNKRECHT 9-10 at 2:56 and 4:41 (Verlag Franz Vahlen 3d
ed. 2003).
323. See, e.g., Kreile, Auf dem Praifstand: Der Funktionsauftrag des offentlich-
rechtlichen Rundfunks in der "Digitalen Welt" [On the Test Stand: The Functional Task of
Public-Law Broadcasting in the "Digital World"], 2002 K&R 248, 249 ("in the principle
of 'structural diversification' are conflated legal-political goals of regulation and
constitutional derivations. The idea of government influence on communication
habits through regulation is not consistent with an understanding of constitutional
freedom").
324. See, e.g., VON MONCH, KUNIG, GRUNDGESETZ KOMMENTAR 388, q 50 (4th ed.,
1992) ("The systematic placement [of broadcasting freedom in Article 5] between
press freedom and film freedom supports the assumption of a comparable
individual right. Moreover, it is doubtful that one can distinguish between press,
film and broadcasting . . . ."); Fink, supra note 163; 1992:19 DOV at 806 (quoting 35
BVerfGE 202, 222 (1973) (Lebach) ("broadcasting freedom is not essentially
distinguishable from press freedom")). Fink argues that the Constitutional Court's
construction of broadcasting freedom leads to its actualization as an individual,
liberal constitutional right "when the special situation, the cogency of which is
increasingly reduced to its technical aspect, ends," and believes that end is in sight
with the "introduction of broadband cable and satellite technology." Id. at 808.
Many critics simply assume that in a multi-channel world of "inter-modal
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theoretically inconsistent to apply different constitutional regimes to
print and broadcasting. 325 This perceived lack of consistency crops
up in a number of specific issues, including the extension of public
broadcasters' activities into the print medium, and more recently
into the online world.326 The alleged lack of a well-founded
doctrinal distinction between the press and broadcasting is echoed
by American jurists who argue for a unified libertarian speech
protection applied to all "speakers" - whether individuals or
network owners - although we have seen the theoretical
contradictions this approach engenders. 327
competition," there is no longer a "frequency scarcity," i.e., shortage of
transmission facilities. See, e.g., Degenhart, Funktionsauftrag und "dritte
Programmsaule" des offentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunks, 2001 K&R 329, at 335 ("a special
situation based on technical or economic factors, analogous to the frequency
shortage in early phases of broadcasting, is ipso facto to be excluded"). As noted
supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text), it can be argued that the frequency
shortage or special situation survives as long as there are individuals or groups
wanting to broadcast their views but unable to do so due to technical or financial
hurdles. Constitutionalizing Communication, supra note 1, at 144. A "special
situation" can also be derived from the "ubiquity, immediacy, and suggestivity" of
broadcasting. Id.
325. Widmaier, supra note 180, at 107, 111-14, 145-46, passim. He also complains
that the pluralism in German public broadcasting institutions resulting from the
Constitutional Court's communications freedom jurisprudence is insufficient and
one-sided. Id.
326. Constitutionalizing Communications, supra note 1, at 173-75. The economic
competition between private publisher/broadcasters and public broadcasters was
in large part what animated the discussion of "model consistency" in the Sixth
Decision. 83 BVerfGE 238 (1991). It seemed to the commercial publishers that they
had the worst of both worlds: competition from public-law broadcasters who were
now allowed into entrepreneurial and publishing activities, while they themselves
were still saddled with special diversity and equal-time requirements more
germane to the public broadcasting world. The German Court responded that
nothing in the Basic Law prevented legislators from mixing aspects of public and
private broadcasting institutions, or broadcasting and the press:
The legislator is not required to allow only public-law or only private-law
broadcasting, nor is the lawgiver required, once he has chosen a dual
broadcasting system, to strictly separate the two sectors from each other ...
. The principle of "journalistic separation of powers" is not one of
constitutional status. Compare 73 BVerfGE 118, 175 (1986).
Constitutionally, the only thing that matters is that broadcasting is in a
position to perform its serving function for individual and public opinion
building.
83 BVerfGE at 305.
327. A classic example of a one-size-fits-all First Amendment is in the decisions
and commentary supporting the application of a "newspaper" or press model to
the First Amendment rights of the cable network operator. See discussion of
Preferred Communications, Midwest Video Corp., and Christopher Yoo's article Beyond
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The subscribers to an affirmative free speech model counter
that a "structural diversity" of speech regimes - different speech
rules for press and broadcast, and (particularly in the German case)
for public and private broadcasters - contributes to a diversity of
information and opinion available to the public. As the American
jurist Lee Bollinger puts it: "by permitting differential treatment of
these institutions [press and broadcast], the Court can promote
realization of the benefits of two distinct constitutional values, both
of which out to be fostered," based on an "accommodation of
competing First Amendment values." 328 Professor Hoffmann-Riem
gives the German reading: "the combination of [public-law and
private broadcasting in a dual system] promotes broadcasting
freedom, in that structurally anchored possibilities compensate for
the disadvantages of one system with the advantages of the other,
and vice versa." 329
The notion of structural diversification is an anathema to those
who would see communications freedom as a defensive or negative
right. They believe that the Constitutional Court's broadcasting
jurisprudence has essentially taken a defensive constitutional right,
i.e., a freedom that inheres in the individual broadcaster and is
directed against the state, and - with the introduction of the
"foreign" concept of a "freedom useful to third parties" - has
emptied the original, liberal sense of "freedom of reporting by
broadcast" of all of its content.330  Thus we have Professor
Oppermann delivering a ringing defense of "negative" liberty:
The untutored reader of the constitution may not yet have
Network Neutrality, in Part V.C and V.D , supra.
328. Widmaeir, supra note 180, at 147 n.383 and accompanying text (quoting LEE
BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 116 (1991)). Widmaier ultimately concludes that
there are no workable distinctions between the media for First Amendment
purposes. Id. at 148.
329. WOLFGANG HOFFMANN-RIEM, REGULIERUNG DER DUALEN RUNDFUNKORDNUNG,
[REGULATION OF THE DUAL BROADCASTING SYSTEM] 68-69, 315 (2000). Hoffmann-
Riem half concedes, however, that such a theory of mixed constitutional regimes is
essentially putting the best possible face on an economically inevitable situation: "it
is doubted that the dual system has led to an [overall] improvement of the
broadcast order." Id. at 69 n.231 (citing HESSE, supra note 30, at 213 ("if one looks
however at the journalistic and substantive quality as the decisive criteria, then the
dual system can hardly be said to have led to an improvement in the [total]
broadcast offering [available when broadcasting was a public monopoly]").
330. Cf Fink, supra note 163, at 807-08 ("the idea of a [constitutional] freedom




discovered why the actual basic speech rights of sentence 1
[Article 5's individual freedom of expression] do not have at least
equal status and normative power in the realm of electronic
media. So we come to the Constitutional Court's demand for the
institution of broadcasting freedom based on a "positive order
with material, organizational and procedural safeguards," behind
which the status libertatis of the natural constitutional proponent
of Article 5 must retreat. 331
On this view, the notion that broadcasting freedom "serves" the
interests of democratic self-governance is nothing more than an
invention of the judges who sit on the Constitutional Court:
It has yet to be successfully shown, that the constitution is built on
any specific canon of values, be they the cultural inheritance of
Europe, the ideas of Christian morals and ethics, or the modern
accomplishments of a western-oriented, enlightened society, or
whatever frame of orientation one might choose . .. [B]ecause of
the diversity of partially contradictory conceptions, a legal order
which pretends to be generally applicable will have difficulty
following a specific natural law model. 332
Such critics find a "free and uncensored press, not steered by
government authority, to be the essential element of a free state ...
and ineluctable for the modern democracy." 333 Their most trenchant
criticism of the affirmative speech model is that it might pretend to
be values-neutral, but is in fact implementing substantive values.
Some of these criticisms are restated in the American vernacular by
a German lawyer practicing in the United States, who complains
that German jurisprudence and the public television it makes
possible are not, in fact, values neutral, but rather cover a barely
hidden cultural elitism. 3 34  He also claims to find significant,
331. Thomas Oppermann, Rundfunkgebuehr - Rundfunkordnung -
Rundfunkideologie, Zum Rundfunkgebuehrenurteil des BverfG vom 22.2.1994, 1994 JZ
499, 500.
332. Fink, supra note 163, at 811 (arguing that the jurisprudence of the
Constitutional Court in the final analysis relies on the "personal conceptions of the
judges"); compare BeVier, supra note 49, at 1315-16 ("all nine of the Justices would
make their own subjective determination"). See also discussion in Constitutionalizing
Communications, supra note 1, at part III(C), regarding institutional freedom and
objective rights.
333. Id. at 807.
334. Widmaier claims to find significant, opinion-building content in what
others see as the "vast wasteland" of commercial broadcasting. Widmaier, supra
note 180, at 158 (finding useful content in The Simpsons and Married with Children).
See also id. at 152 n.402, discussing Newton Minnow's famous dismissal of U.S.
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opinion-building content in what others see as the "vast wasteland"
of commercial broadcasting. 335 Some critics go deeper, objecting
that the German Basic Law's system of objective values, as
enunciated in Liith and subsequent cases, "allows the
[Constitutional] [C]ourt to engage in open-ended decision making
while appearing to be text-bound." 336
On the other hand, it can be argued that the German
constitution's core values of human dignity and democracy are not
elitist, that the interpretation of a democratic constitution is always
somewhat open-ended, and that the lack of such values can lead to
efforts to "obstruct modernity" and protect entrenched private-
market relationships. 337
Some see the U.S. and German constitutions as fundamentally
different, although human rights and democracy are heralded as
signature values in both countries. Moreover, Professor Jackson
notes a long tradition of considering foreign and international law in
the development of U.S. law.338 Constitutional law can mature in
the same way that common law matures, and the current absence of
an affirmative speech tradition may be seen more as a point on a
trajectory than a settled reality.339 Critics of this view claim in effect
television as a wasteland: "The most aggressive and least helpful denouncement of
television that I have encountered is that by President Kennedy's chairman of the
FCC, Newton N. Minow. Minow, in a 1961 address to the National Association of
Broadcasters, expressed his deep-seated disdain for television by stating:
[Television is] a vast wasteland. You will see a procession of game shows,
violence, audience participation shows, formula comedies about totally
unbelievable families, blood and thunder, mayhem, violence, sadism,
murder, western badmen, western good men, private eyes, gangsters,
more violence, and cartoons. And endlessly, commercials - many
screaming, cajoling, and offending. And most of all, boredom."
Id., quoting Newton N. Minow, Address to National Association of Broadcasters
(1961), quoted in JONATHAN W. EMORD., FREEDOM, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 198 (1991).
335. Widmaier, supra note 180, at 158.
336. As reported in KOMMERS, supra note 4, at 47.
337. See Vicki Jackson, Constitutional Law and Transnational Comparisons: the
Youngstown Decision and American Exceptionalism, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 191, 191
(2006) (quoting Justice Scalia's "position that constitutions are 'designed to obstruct
modernity,"' in Modernity and the Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE UNDER
OLD CONSTITUTIONS 15. (Eivind Smith ed., 1995)).
338. Jackson, supra note 337, at 192 n.6 and accompanying text.
339. Cass Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic
Guarantees? 14 U. of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 36 (January 2003),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=375622, ("The realist explanation ...
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that the choice was made long ago, that the U.S. Constitution
expresses a culture where speech is rooted in personal autonomy
and a private sphere, a view antithetical to a "world of 'undeviating
organization'" that (critics worry) could result from the
"collectivist" argument that free speech must be "managed" to the
benefit of democracy. 340
Some of this criticism can be explained in practical terms by
what the Germans refer to as the distinction between internal
pluralism and external pluralism, diversity as found on one network
or platform versus diversity across many networks, programs, and
platforms.341 In the former, access mechanisms like a right of reply
or a fairness doctrine, if not a common carrier or functional
separation model, might obtain; the latter is dependent on a robust
marketplace. The negative First Amendment theorists reject any
attempt to inject pluralism into an individual publication (Tornillo),
or broadcast station (Red Lion), or network platform (common
carriage or separation), believing instead that diversity of opinion
and information is best served by the "external pluralism" of the
marketplace, or - in the event of marketplace failure - by attempts
to secure a diverse and pluralistic marketplace at a sub-
constitutional level, through antitrust rules and ownership limits,
for example. 342
As suggested above, what view one espouses on the question of
affirmative vs. negative rights, internal vs. external pluralism, may
well depend on one's view of the marketplace. The German critics
more inclined to the external pluralism point of view argue that the
goals of liberal democracy are best reached under the conditions of
entrepreneurial freedom, i.e., in a "state free space" where (they
assert) neither content nor values are predetermined. 343 Only in this
way can "individual development, the protected area of every basic
emphasizes that American constitutional law is, to a considerable degree, a form of
common law, based on analogical reasoning").
340. Tushnet, supra note 93, at 1275-76 n.237-50 and accompanying text; see also
Post, supra note 20, at 1136 ("State intervention, however, implies managerial
control, and we ought not to be quite so quick to embrace a world of 'undeviating
organization' (as members of the Frankfurt school would characterize it)") (quoting
MAx HORKHEIMER & THEODOR W. ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT 87 (John
Cumming trans., 1972)).
341. See, e.g., Constitutionalizing Communications, supra note 1, at 21 n.21, 158
n.225, 186 n.329 and accompanying text.
342. See West German Television Law, supra note 1, at 158.
343. Fink, supra note 163, at 807, 812.
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right, remain free from governmental regimentation."344
Democratic speech theorists counter that such state-free spaces
are an illusion, at least for the complex electronic networks of today,
in that such networks require state property laws, judicial
enforcement and regulatory structure to exist, not to mention the
legislatively mandated use of public and private rights of way. 34 5
Moreover, as argued in the next section, the case against an
affirmative speech model depends (by definition) on the belief that
private censorship is not a problem, that significant "opinion
power" does not result from the concentrated ownership of the
underlying facilities, or that such concentrated ownership does not
in fact exist. 346
B. Possible Ways Forward
The fundamental question posed by this article, by the current
appeal of FCC network neutrality (or "open network") rules, and by
a myriad of other information-related issues referenced at the
outset, 34 7 iS whether the Supreme Court is going to concern itself in
a practical or empirical way with the amount and scope of
information and opinion available to the public. And should the
Court find the public's access to information and opinion
344. Id. at 812.
345. Broadcasters, cable operators, telephone companies, and other network
operators need courts to enforce contract and property rights, regulatory agencies
to manage spectrum, and legislation to authorize their use of streets and public
rights of way. See, e.g., Ammori, supra note 21, at 27 (telephone access rules), 42
(pole attachments), 51 ("public rights of way at no charge"); see also SUNSTEIN, supra
note 8, at 40 ("government licenses television channels, and it confers rights of
exclusion") and 45 ("broadcasters are given property rights in their licenses by
government, and their exercise of those rights is a function of law"); Cal. Gov. Code
§ 53066 (granting cable networks rights in public utility easements).
The second response to the libertarians is that they ignore the potential for private
market forces, as much as authoritarian governments, to (1) undermine and limit
such "autonomous self determination," and (which is another way of saying the
same thing) (2) negate any indeterminacy of values. In other words, the market
brings with it its own set of values and limitations on what is conceivable in the
public opinion-building process. See Part III.E supra.
346. See generally, Yoo, supra note 22, at 702, 733 ("Court has long held that the
fact that an intermediary may wield monopoly power and the danger that
intermediaries may act as private censors do not justify regulating their editorial
discretion" because "the remedy for any private censorship ... is more speech, not
regulation . . [except] when the opportunities to speak are limited" (citing CBS v.
Democratic National Committee, Tornillo, and several other cases discussed supra).
347 See notes 7-9, supra, and accompanying text.
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threatened, will it step in and use the law of information freedom,
developed in Red Lion, Virginia Board of Pharmacy, and related cases,
to protect and maximize the public's access to a diversity of ideas
and a fullness of information?
There are numerous reasons for doing so. Whether one
subscribes to the philosophy of Friedrich Hayek, Karl Popper, John
Rawls, or Jtirgen Habermas, to take a sample of prominent 20th
Century thinkers about democracy, information is the coin of the
realm. There is little quarrel with the proposition that the quality of
public decisionmaking is improved by more information and better
access to the broadest range of opinion. Hayek, Prof. John McGinnis
suggests, would have seen the Internet as "an example of
spontaneous order arising from the decisions of thousands of
individuals and corporations without the central direction of the
state" (and, at least to date, without the central direction of of the
network operators). 348 Hayek might have immediately recognized
how the Internet allows an individual or decision-making body to
"obtain dispersed information ... the 'dispersed bits of incomplete
and frequently contradictory knowledge."' 349 Similarly, Popper's
notion of an "Open Society" turns on the importance of free
information flow in "preventing bad governments from doing bad
things."3 5 0 From a Rawlsian viewpoint, the Internet provides "a
forum that enables the participation of all, and not [just] a closed
community in which rules of seniority, aristocracy and exclusivity
may apply." 351 The Habermas perspective of an ongoing, self-
legitimating democratic process is described above. Despite their
348. McGinnis, supra note 20, at 100 n.210 and accompanying text (citing F.A.
Hayek, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism in 1 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF F.A.
HAYEK 3, 6, 83-84 (W.W. Bartley, III ed. 1988).
349. SUNSTEIN, supra note 145, at 118 ("[t]hroughout his life, Hayek was
concerned with how to obtain dispersed information . . . He emphasizes the
unshared nature of information, the 'dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently
contradictory knowledge"').
350. Frederick Schauer, Transparency in Three Dimensions, 11 U. ILL. L. REV. 1339
n.79 (2011) (citing KARL POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (5th ed. 1966)).
See OPEN SOCIETY, Book 1, at 200 ("Once we begin to rely upon our reason, and to
use our powers of criticism, once we feel ... the responsibility of helping to advance
knowledge, we cannot return to a state of implicit submission to tribal magic").
351. Schejter & Yemini, supra note 143, at 171. Because "everyone is potentially a
speaker" on the Internet, nondiscrimination rules would seem to best approximate
the choices that would be made from the "original position," where every
participant in the social discussion "must participate [in the framing discussion]
unaware of their own circumstances." Id. at 144-145, 171.
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fundamental differences, all of these philosophical/social programs
would be damaged by allowing a handful of network owners to be
the last word on what information is most readily available to
citizens.
The German constitutional jurisprudence, and the institutions it
has spawned, teach us that it is possible to create independent,
neutral, self-executing, and "diversity-generating" structures to
guard against public or private censorship, and that these structures
have a constitutional dimension. 352 The focus on structure avoids
individual determinations about content that are constitutionally
problematic, and invite litigation and delay.35 3 A focus on structure
(or First Amendment "architecture") also avoids the "world of
'undeviating organization"' that haunts critics of the affirmative
model. A program for information freedom in the United States,
then, could embrace structures that are content-neutral, self-
executing by nature, and do not require case-by-case enforcement.
Many such structures suggest themselves; this article's focus is
on one of them, a robust and open Internet. The Internet is a miracle
bequeathed to the world by the chance conjunction of a government
funded research network 354 and a group of nonconformist engineers
who developed the code and protocols to enable a worldwide
converged network capable of carrying all digitally expressible
information.355 It is also the concrete test case of U.S. free speech
jurisprudence in the 21st century, and its adequacy to protect this
"voice for the many" and "first true technology of abundance." 356
Professor Lessig draws the connection between structure and
352. Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, Von der dualen Rundfunkordnung zur
dienstespezifisch diviersifizierten Informationsordnung - Einfiihrung, in VON DER DUALEN
RUNDFUNKORDNUNG ZUR DIENSTSPEZIFISCH DIVERSIFIZIERTEN INFORMATIONSORDNUNG
1, 17 (Kopps, Schulz Held, eds. 2001) ("It is a rule of thumb, that facilities and
support for diversity-generating structures are preferable to regulation of specific
communication content").
353. Regulations that address content - for example, Fairness Doctrine issues
relating to whether a broadcaster has covered all issues of importance and given
fair treatment to all sides of those issues inevitably draws the oversight agency into
content adjudications - trigger the highest level of constitutional protection, and
strict scrutiny on review, as opposed to content-neutral regulations which receive
less scrutiny. Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) ("Our precedents thus apply the
most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose
differential burdens upon speech because of its content").
354. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997) (discussing ARPANET).
355. See generally MARKOFF, supra note 7, at l65-66, 201, 206.




The architecture of the Internet, as it is right now, is perhaps the
most important model of free speech since the founding. This
model has implications far beyond e-mail and web pages. Two
hundred years after the framers ratified the Constitution, the Net
has taught us what the First Amendment means. 357
What has made the Internet the many-to-many communications
wonder it is today has been its "end-to-end" principle, the fact that
it is "dumb in the middle," with its intelligence at the edges, which
allows innovation by anyone who would "only connect." 358 Here,
the contrast is between the common carrier model, where the
conduit transports all content without discrimination, 359 and the
vertically integrated carrier where the network owner is also a
content provider, or where the network owner otherwise combines
its basic transport function with the sale of content or services, and
can discriminate at will between such services. 360 In the latter case,
we can surmise that control of the "medium" or network (to use the
German vocabulary) leads to control of other "factors" or inputs in
the public opinion-building process. 361
357. LESSIG, supra note 45, at 167.
358. The reference here is to Kevin Werbach's Only Connect, 22 BERK. TECH. L.J.
1233, 1266 (2007) ("content and application providers at the edges of the internet
[are] essentially becoming network operators themselves"); see also Werbach, The
Digital Broadband Migration: Rewriting the Telecommunications Act: Communications
Law Reform: Breaking the Ice: Rethinking Telecommunications Law for the Digital Age, 4 J.
ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 59, 62 (2005) ("Intelligence moves to the edges of the
network"); LawrenceLessig, Reply: Re-Marking the Progress in Frischmann, 89 MINN.
L. REV. 1031, 1040 (2005) (" the Internet was born with an end-to-end
architecture. That architecture shifts intelligence in this network to the ends, or
edge, so far as that is possible, and seeks to keep the network itself as simple as
possible. The end-to-end architecture was - at least at the terminating ends - in fact
the architecture of the common-carrier telephone company distribution systems.
See also Werbach, supra at 76 ("The argument was that the open platform model
used for the phone network had been the foundation for the Internet's spectacular
growth").
359. 47 U.S.C. § 202(a) ("It shall be unlawful for any common carrier to make any
unjust or unreasonable discrimination in charges, practices, classifications,
regulations, facilities, or services for or in connection with like communication
service, directly or indirectly, by any means or device, or to make or give any
undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, class of
persons, or locality, or to subject any particular person, class of persons, or locality
to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage").
360. The cable television provider is the paradigm here. See discussion of
Preferred and Midwest Video cases in note 241, supra.
361. See Constitutionalizing Communications, supra note 1, at 171 n.270, 189 n.344
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The "layered" nature of "next generation networks," allows
many different information-laden applications - telephony, email,
websites, search engines, radio and video transmission among them
- to ride on a common transport or network layer;362 this
accentuates the conflict-of-interest associated with allowing quasi-
monopoly network operators to market applications, services and
content competing with third-party applications, services and
content on those networks. 363  Similar concerns have led to a
negotiated "functional separation" between British Telecom and its
underlying transport subsidiary, "open reach," 364 and to a recent
and accompanying text ("medium and factor"); 135 n.125, 136 n.129, 177 n.297 and
accompanying text (transfer function of communications medium); see also Whitt,
supra note 34 and accompanying text (control over the physical layer enables
control over higher protocol layers).
362. See discussion in Part II.A supra.
363. These dangers are contested. Opponents of network neutrality claim there
is little if any reason or evidentiary record to substantiate fear of abuses by network
operators. See, e.g., William Rahm, Watching over the Web: A Substantive Equality
Regime for Broadband Applications, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 34 (2007) ("Advocates of a
market-based solution contend that there are no demonstrated harms"). History,
economics, and operational realities - not to mention Verizon's recent filings in the
net neutrality appeal - all provide reason for concern. See also supra, Part V.D.
AT&T and other monopoly or quasi-monopoly telecommunications providers have
a long, documented history of leveraging their incumbent status for profit-
maximization rather than customer service, and indeed under United States
corporate law may be required to do so. See, e.g., Universal Service and Intercarrier
Compensation, 24 FCC Rcd 647 (Nov. 5, 2008), Appendix A (Chairman's Proposal),
if 160-168 n.390-96 and accompanying text, detailing AT&T's historical
anticompetitive conduct (refusal to interconnect in order to drive independent
telephone companies out of business). Economics underscores the history. See, e.g.,
van Schewick, Towards an Economic Framework for Network Neutrality Regulation, 5 J.
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 329, 342-68 (2007) (economic incentives for network
owners to exploit control of the conduit).
364. In 2002, the British Parliament passed a Communications Act creating the
Office of Communications (Ofcom), and in 2003 passed another Communications
Act authorizing Ofcom to enforce provisions of the Enterprise [antitrust] Act, and
to police anticompetitive conduct or situations in the communications markets. See
2003 Act, § 369 et seq., available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2003/
ukpga 20030021 en 1. This legal authority resulted in a settlement between Ofcom
and British Telecom in 2005, "Undertakings given to Ofcom by BT pursuant to
Enterprise Act 2002," current version found at http://www.stake holders.
ofcom.org.uk/binaries/telecoms/policy/bt/consolidated.pdf. This essentially
required BT to do two things: (1) establish a separate "ring-fenced" business entity
or subsidiary to offer bottleneck services, including last mile loops and Ethernet
backhaul; and (2) to offer such wholesale bottleneck services to BT subsidiaries and
third party competitors on an equal basis. The separate subsidiary was named
openreach. See http://www.openreach.co.uk. Ofcom reports that this separation
has led to a reduction in price and an increase in penetration for broadband
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directive of the European Parliament allowing member countries to
separate the transport layer from the applications layer of the
network (as the British did), meaning the transport layer operates
effectively as a common carrier.365
If information and communications freedom mean anything in
the digital age, they require securing the neutral operation of the
transport layer in order to protect this new "model of free speech."
This separation was the law of the land when the FCC issued its
Computer II decision, prohibiting the incumbent carriers from
directly owning information (or "enhanced") services which used
the network (again with no discussion of First Amendment
issues).366 An analogous separation of content and conduit has been
services. See presentation of Ofcom's Tom Kiedrowski, Functional Separation: the UK
Experience, at http://www.wik.org/fileadmin/Konferenzbeitraege/2008/ Review
_of theEuropeanFramework/11_KidrowskiTom -_0408.pdf (April 2008) and
http://www.eett.gr/conference2008/pdf/Kiedrowski.pdf (June 2008).
365. On November 25, 2009, the European Parliament adopted Directive
2009/140/EC which amended the EC's Directives 2002/21/EC on a Common
Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services,
2002/19/EC on Access to, and Interconnection of, Electronic Communications
Networks and Services, and 2002/20/EC on the Authorization of Electronic
Communications Networks and Services, by adding a new Article 13a to the Access
Directive, providing in relevant part:
Where the national regulatory authority concludes that the appropriate
obligations imposed under Articles 9 to 13 have failed to achieve effective
competition and that there are important and persisting competition
problems and/or market failures identified in relation to the wholesale
provision of certain access product markets, it may, as an exceptional
measure, in accordance with the provisions of the second subparagraph of
Article 8(3), impose an obligation on vertically integrated undertakings to
place activities related to the wholesale provision of relevant access
products in an independently operating business entity.
That business unit shall supply access products and services to all
undertakings, including other business units within the parent company,
on the same timescales, terms and conditions, including with regard to
price and service levels, and by means of the same systems and processes.
The document is currently available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ
/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:337:0037:01:EN:HTML; cf common carrier duty of
non-discrimination under U.S. law, 47 U.S.C. § 202.
366. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
(Second Computer Inquiry) 77 FCC 2d 384 (1980) [hereinafter Computer II],
modified on reconsideration, 84 FCC 2d 50 (1980) [hereinafter Reconsideration Order],
further modified on reconsideration, 88 FCC 2d 512 (1981) [hereinafter Further
Reconsideration Order], affid sub nom. Computer and Communications Indus. Ass'n
v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982) cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983), affd on second
further reconsideration, FCC 84-190 (released May 4, 1984). The clear distinctions of
Computer II's "structural separation" began to collapse with the FCC's issuance of
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the working assumption of the Constitutional Court's broadcasting
jurisprudence from its inception. 367  This separation reflects a
balancing of competing speech interests, in which the scales tip
heavily in favor of the speech interests of the millions of network
users rather the handful of network owners. 368  To protect a
democratically constitutive plurality of voices, opinions, and
information on next generation networks, lawmakers on both sides
of the Atlantic will need the political will to maintain a transport
system with "open and standardized interfaces." 369 This is where
Computer III in 1986, and disappeared entirely when the FCC decided in its Cable
Modem Ruling that it could no longer distinguish between transport and enhanced
or information services. Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission's Rules
and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry) 104 FCC 2d 958 (1986) [commonly
known as Computer III]; see also Cable Modem Ruling, supra note 12.
367. As described above, the Constitutional Court has posited from its First
Decision forward a separation between the editorial function of broadcasting and
the transmission facilities that made that function possible. Constitutionalizing
Communication, supra note 1, at 109-10. In this regard, the German Court was
prescient in emphasizing the neutrality of the conduit, necessary to broadcasting's
"transfer function" in social discourse. Id. at 135-37 n.125-29, 177 n.297 and
accompanying text (discussing broadcasting's Vermittlungsfunktion). In its later
Decisions, the Court extended the reach of Article 5 broadcasting freedom to
frequency allocation, cable retransmission and must-carry rules, again assigning the
transmission facilities a sewing function in the constitutional hierarchy). See id. at
Parts III(K)(3)(c) and (d). It is largely as a result of the market liberalization driven
by the EC that the serving function of the transmission facilities has been called into
question. Id. at 195.
368. The word "balancing" is a loaded term in First Amendment jurisprudence,
implicating the old debate among First Amendment "absolutists" and "relativists."
See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) ("I believe that
the First Amendment's unequivocal command that there shall be no abridgement
of the rights of free speech and assembly shows that the men who drafted our Bill
of Rights did all the 'balancing' that was to be done in this field") (Black, J.,
dissenting); Patricia Stembridge, Adjusting Absolutism: First Amendment Protection for
the Fringe, 80 B.U. L. REV. 907, 911-19 (2000) (describing the different strains of
absolutism of Justice Black and Prof. Meikeljohn, and noting that "the Supreme
Court has never accepted the absolutist position"). Many of the classic "balancing"
cases pitted First Amendment "rights" against other interests, whereas with the
evolution of First Amendment law and electronic networks the Court is now more
prone to see "important First Amendment interests on both sides of the equation."
Turner II, 520 U.S. 180, 227 (1996) (Breyer, J. concurring) (finding that must-carry
statute at issue "strikes a reasonable balance between potentially speech-restricting
and speech-enhancing consequences").
369. ERG Consultation Document, supra note 35, at 96-97. The argument to be
made against this is essentially the same argument made by cable companies in
Germany and United States against retransmission requirements, and more
recently even by telephone companies with regard to common carrier obligations:
the imposition of public interest duties infringes on the economic (or speech) rights
of the underlying network owners. See Constitutionalizing Communications, supra
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common carrier and constitutional (First Amendment or Article 5)
interests meet. The constitutionalization of the communication
infrastructure, or at least its transport layer, is the first condition of
speech in the 21st century.370
As suggested above, concerns about slippery slope and
government hauteur (if not censorship) are addressed by tying First
Amendment speech protections to content-neutral structures. It is
difficult to imagine a more content-neutral structure than common
carriage telecommunications, which is the essence of the network
neutrality proposal, although some (like Professor Tribe, quoted
above) persist in seeing the choice of a common carrier transport
system as favoring one sort of speech over another. 371 Government
can operate in a content-neutral way to separate conduit from
content; such a separations principle has been a recurrent feature of
telecommunications law. A common carrier regime has never been
successfully challenged on First Amendment grounds.372
Those who would oppose any attempt to impose "common-
carrier lite" nondiscrimination requirements on the network
operators, as in the pending Verizon appeal, invariably base their
opposition on a belief that the market is self-executing, and any
note 1, at sections III(K)(3)(c), III(K)(3)(d). Cf Part IV.D supra.
370. It may sound somewhat hyperbolic to predict the end of communications
freedom unless transmission systems are secured for public purposes, but the
privatization of the German communications and broadcasting infrastructure has
already compromised broadcasting freedom, as described in Constitutionalizing
Communications, supra note 1, at section III.K.
Separation of transport and service/content layers of the Internet is by no means a
new suggestion. See, e.g., Computer II, supra note 366; Justin Brown, Fostering the
Public's End-to-End: A Policy Initiative for Separating Broadband Transport from Content,
8 COMM. L. & POLICY 145, 186 (2003) (pre-Brand X, pre-NGN article discussing
transport/content separation, as well as carriers' "First Amendment challenges to
common carrier obligations"); Crawford, supra note 58, at 86-87 (suggesting
"wholesale separation regime for telecommunications providers ... [b]ecause
'unbundling' has proven not to work in the United States ... [and] 'quarantine' will
be needed").
371. The content-neutrality at the root of net neutrality is reflected in the diverse
groups of supporters that it attracts - from the NRA to the ACLU, from NARAL to
the Christian Coalition. See, e.g., Statement of Michele Combs, The Christian
Coalition of America, GN Docket No. 09-191, at 5 (filed Dec. 22, 2009) (explaining
why Christian Coalition and NARAL both support net neutrality), cited at FCC's
Open Internet Order, supra note 319, at 6 n.232.
372. See discussion in Wu, supra note 146, at Chapter 21 ("The Separations
Principle"); but see Comcast v. Broward Cnty, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685 (D. Fl., 2000)
(cable company's transport of broadband traffic akin to distribution of circulars, no
mention of network users' rights).
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government intervention will lead to less competition and therefore
less choice among information options, not more.373 This is a subject
which has been extensively discussed in the scholarly literature (not
to mention FCC and court decisions), some of which is referenced
above, but on which I will offer one further observation. As noted
above, the market optimists typically build their argument, for a
healthy marketplace and against non-discrimination rules, on the
perception of "inter-modal" competition, a world where cable, VolP,
wireless, and plain old fashioned telephone service all compete with
one another; the reality, however, is that all of these services use the
same wired inputs, and those wires are owned overwhelmingly by
AT&T and Verizon.374 At least we think they are. The FCC has been
attempting for over ten years to gather information on competition,
or the lack thereof, in the crucial "middle-mile" and/or "special
access" markets, with little success, and little urgency. 375 These are
373. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 305, at 767. There was, however, an explosion of
competition after the intervention by the British Government (Ofcom) to separate
content from service layers of the network. See Kiedrowski, supra note 364, at 15.
374. See notes 302-305 supra, and accompanying text. For the market optimist
position, see also Adam Thierer, Are "Dumb Pipe" Mandates Smart Public Policy?
Vertical Integration, Net Neutrality, and the Network Layers Model, 3 J. ON TELECOMM &
HIGH TECH L. 275, 301 (2005) ("the current broadband marketplace is growing
increasingly competitive with each passing month. The picture will only get rosier
as wireless alternatives become more ubiquitous and other wireline providers
(especially electric utility companies) start jumping into the broadband market");
compare Blevins, supra note 302, at 378 ("Adam Thierer writes, 'it is now possible to
consume the same piece of content via a broadcast TV or radio station, a cable
channel, a satellite system, on a DVD player, on a cell phone or other mobile media
device, on a portable gaming system, or over the Internet.' Interestingly, however,
many of these seemingly abundant platforms - the cell phone, the gaming system,
the mobile media device, the Internet, and even broadcast and cable content - all
increasingly rely on the same broadband access infrastructure as a shared foundational
input. Even though these scholars are aware of the Internet's layered structure, the
emphasis on cross-platform substitutability and convergence implies an equality
between the application and network layers that does not exist.") (emphasis
added); see also Qwest Corporation, 25 FCC Rcd 8622 (2010), 33-34 (the
"predictive judgments" of coming facilities-based competition, made earlier to
address "theoretical and empirical concerns associated with duopoly"
communications services in the Qwest service area - Qwest and its cable
competitors - "have not been borne out by subsequent developments").
375. See Special Access for Price Cap Local Exchange Carriers, FCC WC Docket
No. 05-25 (August 22, 2012), 7, 14 (noting 2002 petition for rulemaking to revoke
pricing flexibility rules, and announcing an intention to issue a data request in the
future). As set forth in note 51 supra, the competitive carriers had filed a writ of
mandamus asking the D.C. Circuit to compel the FCC to investigate and act on this




key inputs. We know the last mile is in most places a duopoly, with
cable predicted to emerge as the ultimate winner because of its
higher capacity wires. Long-haul or backbone capacity is generally
assumed to be a more competitive market. It is the "middle mile" or
special access market - lines needed for backhaul from every cell
tower into the network, to connect every VoIP provider to a central
office, to allow CLECs to reach their customers, and take traffic from
cable head-end into the network - which is emerging as ever more
crucial, and the subject of increasing complaints about its control by
the incumbents (which also control roughly half of the last-mile
market, and substantial portions of the backbone market).37 6
A constitutional mandate of information freedom, applied
either directly or through the prism of state action, could (as it did in
the Associated Press case, supra) also reframe or reinforce the antitrust
analysis as applied to information markets. In Springer/Sati, both
the German Cartel Office and the Commission on Competition in
the Media (KEK) rejected the proposed acquisition of Germany's
second-largest private broadcaster, ProSiebenSat.1 Media AG, by its
largest newspaper and magazine publisher, Springer Press. The
KEK rooted its decision in constitutional grounds which superceded
a purely numbers-based approach to the proposed merger:
With the factual standard of "dominant opinion power," [the
applicable section] of the Inter-State [Broadcasting] Treaty refers
back to a ... constitutional command of opinion diversity in the
media. This in turn rests on the special importance of
broadcasting as medium and factor in the process of individual
and public opinion-building, which is ineluctable [unverzichtbar]
for the development of the individual personality and the
securing of a free democracy .... [I]n the total offering of
commercial programs at least a substantial part of all social
groups and ideologies must have the actual chance to speak, so
that a marketplace of ideas is created . . . . [This mandate also
includes] the prevention of one-sided, or in large measure
unbalanced, influence of individual producers or programs on the
development of public opinion, in other words the deterrence of
376. See, e.g., July 8, 2011 public hearing in California Public Utilities
Commission proceeding 1.11-06-009 Investigation of Planned Purchase by AT&T of T-
Mobile, transcript at pp. 87 (Sprint assertion that "90-plus percent of our special
access [backhaul] is with the ILECs"); see also id. at 93-94; cf
www.nochokepoints.org.
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dominant opinion power. 3
By contrast, when cross-ownership limits promulgated by the
FCC were recently challenged in the D.C. Circuit, the interests of
information recipients made a fleeting appearance (FCC rules "are
rationally related to substantial government interests in promoting
competition and protecting viewpoint diversity"), but those
interests were not explicitly elevated to constitutional status, while
the broadcasters' and publishers' claimed (negative) First
Amendment right to be free of any ownership limits and to
aggregate themselves into ever larger units assumed center stage. 378
VII. Conclusion
Digital convergence and IP technology, and the growing
realization and reality that the world is becoming connected to and
by one network, has created the most profound "structural
transformation of the public sphere" in history.379 And it may be
more than the public sphere that is changing; a rearranged cognitive
infrastructure may also change the way we think.380 The question is
whether, on a meta-level, it is possible to make choices about how
our thinking will be changed. How well can we, as a matter of
policy and politics, think about thinking? How does the
information explosion reframe questions of identity, liberty,
equality, and democracy?381
377. Beteiligunsvercinderungen bei Tochtergesellschaften der ProSiebenSat.1
Media AG [KEK] Mar. 30, 2007, No. KEK 293-1 bis-5 (F.R.G.), available at
http://www.kek-online.de/kek/verfahren/kek293prosieben-satl.pdf; see generally
Constitutionalizing Communications, supra, note 1, at 170-73.
378. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 652 F.3d 431, 464-65 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(citing FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 796, 799-800 (1978)).
379. The reference is to JURGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF
THE PUBLIC SPHERE (Burger trans., 1989) (original German is STRUKTURWANDEL DER
OFFENTLICHKEIT) (1962).
380. I am borrowing the phrase "cognitive infrastructure" from Karl-Heinz
Ladeur, and his article on cognitive infrastructure and public decisionmaking.
Ladeur, The Role of Contracts and Networks in Public Governance: The Importance of the
"Social Epistemology" of Decision Making, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 329, 330 (2007).
381. See, e.g., Robert Boynton, Enjoy Your Zizek! An Excitable Slovenian Philosopher
Examines The Obscene Practices Of Everyday Life - Including His Own, 8:7 LINGUA
FRANCA (October 1998), available at http://linguafranca. mirror.theinfo.org/
9810/zizek.html ("While Foucault and Derrida dissolve the human subject in a sea
of discursive indeterminacy and historical contingency, Habermas's defense of
reason ultimately rests on a vision of the individual as an ethical actor in a
functional community").
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To date, our incompletely theorized First Amendment has not
been up to the task. Yet the constitutional dimension is present
whenever design decisions are made about the cognitive
infrastructure. Perhaps a shift of focus from speaker to speech as
the object of constitutional protection would allow the Supreme
Court to set a more consistent, comprehensive, and democratic
course in future network decisions.
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